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ABSTRACT 
The Thesis seeks to explain the policy-making process 
using a legitimacy notion as an alternative to various kinds 
of rational models. Legitimacy here takes its broadest 
sense as the recognised or accepted norm or belief that 
something is appropriate. 
Based on two ethnographic case studies of policy-making 
"episodes" in Hong Kong education, the writer argues that 
policy-actors, in this case policy-advisory bodies, do not 
necessarily act according to a "means-end" rational model, 
or interact with one another because of conflicts in 
interests or power; but that each advisory body has 
developed within itself some sub-culture which identifies 
certain legitimacy to making policies. 
In the first Episode, a policy body on higher educaiton 
was forced to reject an overall policy proposal which was 
based on manpower forecasting; or else the body's legitimacy 
generated from "expert judgement" might be undermined. In 
the second Episode, an OECD panel caused difficulties 
because it adopted a "participatory approach" which tended 
to upset the conventional legitimacy in policy-making. Along 
similar lines, the writer attempts to explain more briefly a 
number of dramatic junctures during the two Episodes using 
the legitimacy explanation as a parallel to the rational 
model of policy-making. 
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Abstract 
The writer infers that conflicts occur when certain 
actor is forced to submit to a different kind of legitimacy. 
The actors have to strive hard to maintain their original 
legitimacy, or else they may lose their status in making 
policies. In so doing, the subject under attention is less 
the policy output than the policy process. The issue again 
is not so much a matter of the power to make policies, but 
the way policies are to be made. Overall, it is the process, 
and not the product, of policy-making that legitimates or 
de-legitimates the actor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, an OECD (Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development) panel which was invited to review 
Hong Kong's education system expressed in its report the 
following impression about educational policy-making in Hong 
Kong: 
There is a pervasive feeling that responsibility and 
knowledge about what is happening lies elsewhere; but 
no-one is sure where this is, or who holds the master 
plan (Perspective, 1981: 15-16). 
This Is a correct reflection of a general feeling. 
Consultation is never lacking, but no one knows who makes 
the final decisions. White papers are often preceded by 
Green Papers for public comments, but no one knows who 
writes the former which are usually drastically different 
from the latter. There have been major policy exercises 
which were supposedly based on intensive studies, but what 
studies, no one seems to know. Even very crucial decisions 
such as the institution of 9-years compulsory education came 
out of an unknown process. 
J. The Two Episodes 
In fact, the OECD review mentioned above was itself a 
case with a number of unknowns. The OECD exercise was an 
overall review of the Hong Kong education system. A four- 
man panel organized by the OECD spent two weeks in Hong 
Kong, one in 1981 and another in 1982, and carried out 
12 
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extensive visits and interviews. The Government gave the 
exercise much publicity and it aroused wide public interest. 
However, the Government showed signs of reluctance to 
publish the panel's report, even though it was eventually 
published. Why was the OECD panel invited? Did the 
Government intervene in the review exercise? Was there in 
fact a problem in publishing the report? What made the 
Government eventually change its mind? All these remain 
unanswered from the point of view of the public who after 
all lent enthusiastic support to the review. 
The OECD review, however, was not the only event that 
was unexplained. In 1980, about a year before the OECD 
review, the Hong Kong Government announced the appointment 
of a Committee to Review Post-Secondary and Technical 
Education (hereafter abbreviated as the CRE). This Committee 
was headed by Kenneth Topley who was to be made Hong Kong's 
first Secretary for Eduction six months later when the 
Committee fulfilled its terms of reference. Again, the 
exercise was given full publicity. Six months passed. 
Nothing came out of the Committee and, apart from 
fragmentary rumours in the newspapers, nothing was heard 
since. Again, what happened remains unknown to the public. 
Similar incidents are numerous. The two Episodes 
above, which are the subject of research in this study, are 
only recent examples of the more comprehensive exercises 
which cover large areas in the education sector. 
Such unknown and unexplained events in educational 
policy-making lend themselves to various explanations. They 
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could be identified as part of the colonial conspiracy, or 
signs of bourgeois coercion, or they could easily fall under 
other environment-deterministic interpretations. However, 
without serious research efforts, such explanations can 
hardly be more than guesswork. 
2. Points of Curiosity 
Apart from the individual policy exercises, there are 
also other points of curiosity. Hong Kong is well-known for 
its free market economy. Friedman (Friedman and Friedman, 
1980) repeatedly quoted Hong Kong as the model of a free 
market. Yet Hong Kong practises manpower forecasting which 
is supposed to be most inappropriate to a free market. Why 
should manpower forecasting function in a free market? 
In fact, Hong Kong is also keen in adopting other 
technical planning techniques that seem to play significant 
roles in policy-making. While elsewhere planners complain 
that their efforts are often superseded by political 
interactions (e. g. Hallak, 1980: 83), Hong Kong planners seem 
to be in a much better position. Visitors to Hong Kong 
sometimes exclaim that Hong Kong is a "planners' paradise" 
(CSBO1; CSWO1). Why should a colony be a "planners' 
paradise"? 
Moreover, one may be astonished by the extensiveness in 
which consultations are conducted by the Hong Kong 
Government. Why should a Crown autocracy bother to seek 
consultations? 
Even environment-determinism may find difficulties in 
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explaining these curious points. 
The writer's experience with Hong Kong's education 
policies has led to the conviction that educational policy- 
making can be better understood only through studying the 
process, to see what really happens during the course of 
policy-making. 
Meanwhile, it could be seen from the literature that 
even in a democracy, the policy-making process is not always 
that transparent. Or, even if we know all the details of 
the process, it is still open to interpretations and 
explanations. Much is left undone particularly in the field 
of education. 
Under these circumstances, the writer is tempted to 
think that the uniqueness of Hong Kong - the free market 
autonomy and the structural autocracy - may carry some 
advantages. Seeing how policies are made in an extreme case 
may shed light on the more general cases. For example, Hong 
Kong never claims that it plans its economy. Its reason for 
adopting manpower forecasting may explain in more general 
terms the popularity of manpower approaches in other 
economies. Moreover, Hong Kong is not a democracy in the 
prevalent Western sense. The extensive consultations in 
Hong Kong may hence provide explanations other than one of 
democracy. 
3. Aix and Nature of the Research 
The aim of the present study is to understand the 
policy-making process. It is not primarily intended to 
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solve policy problems. It does not follow the current 
policy-agenda laid down either by the government or by its 
opponents. The subject of the study is not even a current 
controversy. Neither the policy-makers nor their opponents 
would find much in this study that would help strengthen 
their positions, as are the cases suggested by Trow (1984) 
and Coleman (1972; 1976; 1978). In fact, the research, its 
findings and interpretations might mostly be foreign to the 
Hong Kong community. 
However, the subject of study is basic to policy- 
making. It pertains to a basic analysis of the dynamics of 
policy-making process and hopefully to the enrichment of our 
knowledge in this respect. It belongs to the camp of 
"researchers" in Husen's "two cultures" (1984: 8). The study 
therefore bears all the characteristics of an academic 
research: it is not meant to inform urgent policy changes; 
it does not seek endorsement from policy-makers and it is to 
be judged on the basis of academic scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, the basic nature of the research does not 
preclude its relevance to the practical scene. There Is in 
Hong Kong an excessive belief in the formal structure, in 
the system and procedures of policy-making which in reality 
contribute only modestly to the shaping of public policies. 
If the study can succeed in revealing and explaining the 
real dynamics in educational policy-making, it might help 
people to re-adjust their conceptions and attitudes towards 
educational policy-making. In other words, if the study 
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could eventually add to the body of knowledge about 
educational policy-making, then Weiss' notion of policy 
enlightenment may prove encouraging. That is, the research 
results may serve to shape the "climate of opinion" that 
would, in the long run, affect policy-making (Weiss, 
1977: 534; 1979: 429; 1982: 290). 
4. Delimitation 
Before embarking on the substance of the study, it is 
necessary to do some delimitation. 
First, the study represents research into the policy 
process and not the content. That is, the attention is not 
on what policies there are or how good the policies are, but 
on how policies are made. 
Second, the study Is not intended to cover the entire 
policy process. The study concentrates on the decision- 
making or policy-making stage in the policy-process. It Is 
the stage when the policy-maker has to make selection from 
among options and formulate recommendations. Different 
authors present the policy-making process in different ways 
and use different names for this particular stage in the 
process: "decision" (Jenkins, 1978: 16-17) "recommendation 
and adoption" (Lasswell, 1963: 93), "Issue analysis" (May and 
Wildavsky, 1978), "options analysis" (Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984: 4), or "forecasting and recommendation" (Dunn, 1981: 44- 
48). In terms of educational policy-making, it corresponds 
to Jennings stages of "discussion and debate" and "legitimi- 
zation" (1977: 39-40). 
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Alternatively speaking, the policy-making process 
occurs in the black box of "political system" in Easton's 
systems model (Fig 0.1 below). 
Figure 0.1 The Easton Model 
(Source: Easton, 1965: 112; modified by Jenkins, 1978: 18) 
This is the process where policy inputs are converted into 
policy outputs (Easton, 1979: Chaps 8& 9). In particular, 
the policy-making process in this thesis refers to the last 
stage in Easton's conversion process, where issues become 
converted into policy outputs (Ibid.: 73). 
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5. Policy-making and Environment: An Assumption? 
The relationship between the larger environment and the 
policy-making process has ben mentioned earlier. This can 
best be represented by the following diagram: 
Figure 0.2 Environments, Decisions and Policies 
(Source: Dye, 1972: Chap 11; 1981: 325-33; adapted in Jenkins, 
1978: 50; see also a further version in Dunn, 1981: 46) 
At one extreme, one may say that public policies are 
completely determined by the policy-making process, i. e. by 
the government structure, the policy-making machineries, the 
participants in policy-making, the "rules of the game', and 
so forth. The emergence of a policy is therefore somehow 
incidental, if not accidental. It depends on the special 
features of the political situation at the time the policy 
is made. In this case, a study of the policy-making process 
will be crucial, because the process is the sole determinant 
of public policies. 
At the other extreme, one may also say that public 
policies are totally determined by the socio-economic and 
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political environment. Under certain political, social and 
economic environment, public policies of certain nature are 
bound to emerge, regardless of the finer structures in the 
government, the policy-making machineries or the feature of 
the policy-participants. According to this argument, 
studying the policy-making process becomes meaningless, 
because policies are not determined by the policy-making 
process. 
The present study does not assume any particular 
relationship between the three elements in Fig. 0.2. As 
mentioned earlier, it is the conviction here that the 
relationship between the three elements can only be 
understood through genuine research, and such a research 
should start empirically from the policy-making process 
which is more observable than the environment. 
6. The Chapter Arrangements 
Chapter One is a description of the background in which 
the two episodes occurred. It will introduce the system, 
its evolution, the policies and the policy-making bodies of 
Hong Kong education. Special attention will be paid to some 
of the special features which are relevant to the two 
Episodes under study. 
Chapter Two is devoted to the methodological 
deliberations during the research. There is an attempt to 
borrow from the rigours of ethnographic research and to 
adapt them to research in policy-making. That this chapter 
is placed before, and not after, the chapter on theory is a 
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reflection of the methodology adopted in the research: that 
theories come in during the course of the research and not 
before the design of the research. 
The chapter on theory, Chapter Three, surveys all the 
models encountered during the research. They are largely 
classified using the notion of rationality as a frame of 
reference. There is then a discussion of the notion of 
legitimacy as a possible alternative to the conventional 
models. There is also a brief survey of the different views 
on the multiplicity of models. 
Enthnographic type of research usually yields "thick 
descriptions". Thus, Chapters Four and Five provide 
detailed accounts of the two Episodes as perceived before 
and after the research. Each of the Episodes is then 
analysed using two separate models: the rational model and 
the legitimacy model. 
The conclusions come in Chapter Six. This chapter 
attempts to deepen the legitimacy notion developed so far by 
applying it to more policy events and by comparing it with 
other conventional theories of the policy-making process. 
The thesis ends with some extrapolation of the research 
findings to Hong Kong in general. 
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CHAPTER 0NE 
BACKGROUND 
0. Introduction 
This first chapter faces three tasks: first, to 
introduce the Hong Kong education system and the evolution 
of its education policy; second, to introduce the 
institutions of policy-making in Hong Kong education; third, 
to describe the general scene of educational policy-making, 
with particular attention to third-party consultation and 
manpower forecasting which are characteristic of the two 
Episodes under study. 
I. Davolopaant of Education Policy in Hong Kong 
We shall concentrate on policies after 1971, firstly 
because these are more relevant to the present study and 
secondly because they were formulated under the leadership 
of the Governor, Murray MacLehose, who was also the Governor 
when the two Episodes took place. 
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I. I. The System and its Evolution 
The Hong Kong education system underwent very rapid 
changes in the decade 1971-1980. The quantitative expansion 
is particularly spectacular. The following is a very brief 
account of the development. 
The chart on the next page is a schematic presentation 
of Hong Kong's education system in the 1.970s. Broadly 
speaking, the system remained the same throughout the 
decade. 
Children started school at age six, although the 
majority did a two years kindergarten and a considerable 
percentage did nursery classes at three years old. 
From 1971,6 years primary schooling became free and 
compulsory, but primary education was largely universal even 
before this legislation. Free and compulsory education was 
extended in 1978 to 9 years (up to age 15 or Form 3 
whichever came first). From 1978, primary school leavers 
were allocated to different secondary schools (which were 
usually separate from the primary schools) by a centralised 
system which took as its criteria student aptitudes, school 
internal assessment and parental choice. This replaced the 
Secondary Schools Entrance Examination which existed before 
1978. After completion of compulsory schooling, the majority 
of students went on to study in traditional 'grammar" 
schools. In summer 1980, the gross promotion ratio from 
Form 3 to Form 4 was around 87% (Education Department, 
1986: Table 5), of which some 40% studied In government or 
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Figure 1.1 Education System of Hong Kong as at 1980 
! Idea by Leung Kam Fong, adapted by Cheng Kai Ming, produced 
by William C. W. Pang. ] 
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government-aided schools, others in self-financing private 
schools (Education Department, 1981: 33). Another 3% of the 
Form 3 leavers continued their study in technical institutes 
in craft courses (Ibid.: 40). The number of technical 
institutes increased from I in 1971 to 5 in 1980. 
The students sat for a public Certificate of Education 
Examination after Form 5. About one third of the students 
went on to 2-year Sixth Forms. Others went to technician 
training in technical institutes, other post secondary 
institutions, or became employed. 
In 1980, there were three government-subsidized 
tertiary institutions: the University of Hong Kong (HKU), 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) and the Hong Kong 
Polytechnic (HKP). There were others which were registered 
as post-secondary institutions (e. g. Baptist College). 
Sixth-form students were admitted into tertiary 
institutions, the CUHK in particular, after one year's 
study. Others sought admission in HKU, HKP and a variety of 
tertiary institutions after a further year's study. Still 
others went abroad to study in overseas universities. 
1.2. The Education Policies and Their Evolution 
The year 1971 saw the legislation of compulsory primary 
education, following the dramatic expansion planned in the 
1965 White Paper (Education Policy, 1965). 
Then came the so called `MacLehose Years' (South China 
Morning Post, Supplement, April, 1982). In 1972, the new 
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Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose (now Lord MacLehose of 
Boech) hastened to announce, in his first policy speech, a 
ten-year development plan in which Education was one of the 
three major areas (Hong Kong Hansard, 1972: 7-9). The major 
policy target was to increase the percentage of government- 
aided junior secondary school places. The target escalated 
from 50% when MacLehose made the speech in 1972 to 100% in 
1977 when MacLehose made a "surprise" Introduction of 9-year 
compulsory education. In between, there were the 1973 Green 
Paper (Report, 1973) and the 1974 White Paper (Secondary, 
1974) which laid out Government policies in secondary 
education. Then there was the 1977 Green Paper (Senior, 
1977) and 1978 White Paper (Development, 1978) which stated 
polices for post-compulsory education. 
The successive promulgation of policies raised a number 
of controversies and aroused unprecedented public debate. 
Public attention focused on the desirable size of government 
aided senior secondary education. The debates were further 
heated by the emergence of very strong teachers' unions and 
other education pressure groups. 
Meanwhile, in 1979, a government internal working group 
(Government Secretariat, 1981: 96-101) decided to expand 
technical education by building 2 additional technical 
institutes, to increase the universities expansion rate from 
3% to 4% per annum in terms of student numbers, and to 
introduce an emergency loan scheme for Hong Kong students 
going to the U. K. for tertiary studies. 
Anyway, in 1980 when the CRE was appointed, the first 
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batch of "compulsory" students were about to leave Form 3 in 
1981, but policies on post-compulsory education were still 
vague. Whether the proposed expansions could cope with the 
desire of the much increased number of candidates was 
questionable. It was supposedly the job of the CRE to tackle 
these controversies. 
In 1981, the Director of Education wrote: 
Publication of the (CRE) Committee's report would 
therefore mark the completion of the current reviews of 
the Hong Kong education system which began in 1974 with 
the White Paper on "Secondary Education in Hong Kong 
over the Next Decade", followed by the 1978 White Paper 
on "The Development of Senior Secondary and Tertiary 
Education" ... (Education Department, 1981: 1) 
This is perhaps the best summary of the background for the 
CRE exercise. If the CRE exercise were complete, then the 
OECD review would be a well planned deliberation to review 
the overall system when policies at all levels were 
available. The chronology in Table 1.1 may help to 
summarise the position of the two Episodes in this study. 
Table 1.1 Chronology for Development of 
Education Policies in Hong Kong 
1971 Legislation of compulsory primary education 
1974 White Paper: planning universal junior 
secondary education 
1977 Announcement of compulsory 9-year education 
1978 White Paper: planning expansion in senior 
secondary education and beyond 
1981 Expected policy paper planning development 
in higher and technical education (CRE) 
1982 Expected overall review at all levels (OECD) 
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II. The Policy-Making Bodies in Education 
The following refers to the situation in 1980. 
Significant changes have materialised since. 
II. 1 The Decision-makers 
The Governor, or the Governor-in-Council, was de jure 
solely responsible for making policy decisions. The Governor 
was the representative of the British Queen. 
The Governor presided over and was advised by the 
Executive Council (EXCO) which comprised 5 other ex-officio 
members and 10 others appointed by the Queen or the 
Governor. Most of the appointed members were unofficial 
member's (i. e. they are not civil servants). EXCO was de 
facto the decision-making body. Its meetings were 
confidential. 
The Governor also presided over the Legislative Council 
(LEGCO) which made laws and controlled public expenditure. 
In practice, it was de facto a top-level advisory body. The 
LEGCO comprised 4 other ex-officio and a maximum of 49 
appointed members. About half of the members were 
unofficials. LEGCO meetings were open and minutes of the 
LEGCO were published in the Hansard. 
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11.2. The Administration of Education 
In 1980, apart from the ordinances for higher education 
institutions and a separate one for the Examinations 
Authority, the major legal document in education was the 
Education Ordinance (Laws of Hong Kong, Chap. 279). 
The Director of Education was responsible for seeing the 
Education Ordinance observed. The Director of Education 
headed the Education Department - one of 49 government 
departments - and worked under the Secretary for Social 
Services. The power given to the Director of Education by 
the Ordinance was quite broad: 
The Director (of Education] shall be charged with the 
superintendence of matters relating to education in 
Hong Kong.... the Director shall promote the education 
of the people of Hong Kong and control and direct 
education policy (Education Ordinance, Section 4). 
However, with the development of the education system, 
the power of the Director of Education was increasingly 
limited in practice. In at least four areas the Director of 
Education had no full control: higher education, technical 
education, special education and public examinations. 
Universities and the Polytechnic were governed by their 
respective ordinances. They were autonomous and were not 
administered by any government department. The Director of 
Education controlled the colleges of education and, because 
of legislative problems, had tentative control over the 
institutions registered under the Post Secondary Colleges 
Ordinance. 
The Director had control over the technical institutes, 
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but the planning of these institutions was largely the 
charge of the Hong Kong Training Council (to be discussed 
below). In fact the latter was about to take over technical 
education. There was a Division of Industrial Training in 
the Labour Department which acted as an administrative arm 
of the Hong Kong Training Council. 
The Director of Education was in charge of special 
education, but the plans were laid down by the Education 
Subcommittee of the Rehabilitation and Development Central 
Committee which was directly answerable to the Governor-in- 
Council. 
Public examinations used to be administered by the 
Examinations Division of the Education Department. However, 
this division became independent in 1977 and then functioned 
as the Hong Kong Examinations Authority (HKEA). 
11.3. The Advisory Bodies 
There were in 1980 more than 360 policy advisory bodies 
appointed by the Hong Kong Government. These were not 
policy-making bodies in legal terms, but were mostly quite 
influential in their respective policy areas. 
We shall concentrate on three such bodies: the Board of 
Education, the Hong Kong Training Council and the University 
and Polytechnic Grants Committee. 
There were two major categories of advisory bodies: 
statutory and non-statutory. 
Statutory advisory bodies are established by ordinance 
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and are therefore answerable to the Governor-in-Council, 
I. e., the Governor in his official capacity as Chairman of 
the EXCO. The strength of statutory bodies is that they are 
established by law and therefore their recommendations will 
always be tabled in the EXCO. Meanwhile, they can only be 
dissolved by legal procedures. The disadvantages are that 
all recommendations of such bodies are subject to formal 
procedures of consideration and are approved only when the 
EXCO has discussed and endorsed them. 
Non-statutory advisory bodies are appointed by the 
Governor as his administrative aid. Their advantages and 
disadvantages are just opposite to the statutory bodies. 
Their recommendations can easily be dismissed and they can 
be dissolved for administrative convenience. However, they 
have direct dialogue with the Governor in person and have 
more opportunity to apply direct influence over the Governor 
who in fact has the final say. 
The Board of Education is a statutory body. The Hong 
Kong Training Council and the University and Polytechnic 
Grants Committee are not. 
11.3.1. The Board of Education 
The Education Ordinance states that the Governor be 
advised, via the Director of Education, by the Board of 
Education (BoE) on all policy matters within the scope of 
the Ordinance (Education Ordinance, Section 7). The BoE was 
therefore a statutory body, of which the Director of 
Education was a member and, until 1972, was the Chairman. 
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Members of the Board of Education were all local, appointed 
by the Governor in their personal capacities and tacitly 
understood as representing (a) "community leaders" which 
usually meant unofficial LEGCO or EXCO members, (b) major 
school councils (organization of schools by type), (c) major 
school sponsoring bodies which usually meant the major 
religious bodies: the Anglican Church, the Church of Christ 
in China, the Methodist Church and the Roman Catholic 
Church, (d) the Hong Kong Training Council and (e) tertiary 
institutions. Membership lists of the BoE In the years 1980- 
1983 are in Appendix A. In 1972, as another innovation from 
MacLehose, an unofficial member was for the first time 
appointed Chairman of BoE. 
There were no definite terms of reference for the BoE. 
In recent years, the BoE was reminded from time to time 
that its role was to advise and not to decide (Government 
Secretariat, 1981: para 4.18-4.21). Its role in policy-making 
could be illustrated by the drafting of the 1973 Green Paper 
(Report, 1973). MacLehose was not satisfied with the speed 
proposed by the Green Paper to substantiate his ten year 
plan. While the Green Paper was published for public 
comments, the Governor ordered the UMELCO (Unofficial 
Members of the Legislative and Executive Council) to set up 
an ad hoc committee to "improve" the Green Paper. The 
eventual White Paper (Secondary, 1974) was largely based on 
the ad hoc committee's confidential report (DSX11). The BoE 
was even reminded that in certain instances "it might not be 
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possible or appropriate to consult the Board before the 
event" (Government Secretariat, 1981: 64). The announcement 
of 9-year compulsory education was obviously one such event 
when the Governor consulted only the Chairman of BoE and the 
Director of Education (ISX01). 
The BoE's disssatisfaction with its falling status and 
the Government's reaction to this dissatisfaction surfaced 
publicly in the background report which was prepared for the 
OECD review (Government Secretariat, 1981: 63-65). 
11.3.2. The Hong Kong Training Council 
The Hong Kong Training Council (HKTC) was a non- 
statutory advisory body appoined by the Governor in 1973 
(First Report, 1975). Among it terms of reference (See 
Appendix B), two points were essential: first, to advise the 
Governor 
on the measures necessary to ensure that there is a 
comprehensive system of manpower training geared to the 
developing needs of Hong Kong'economy (Seventh Report, 
1981: 1). 
and to look after the sharing of responsiblity between the 
Government and the Industry In such training (Ibid.: 38). 
It also included in its terms of reference the target 
of converting the Council into a statutory organization. 
This it achieved in 1982 when a statutory Vocational 
Training Council (VTC) was established to replace the HKTC. 
The HKTC was a comparatively small Council governing a 
huge complex of training boards and committees. Members of 
the HKTC included leading industrialists and representatives 
of the relevant government departments, labour unions and 
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training institutions. A membership list of the HKTC in 1980- 
1981 and that of VTC in 1982-83 is in Appendix C. 
The HKTC's responsibility was not limited to technical 
education. It operated vocational training centres, carried 
out biennial manpower surveys at all manpower levels (from 
operatives to post-graduates) for the major industries and 
administered the legislated apprentice scheme in the 
designated industries. The operations of the Hong Kong 
Training Council were supervised by the industrial training 
boards and committees and other ad hoc establishments each 
comprising the leading employers and trainers in the 
respective areas. The HKTC was serviced by the Industrial 
Training Division within the government Labour Department. 
In practice, the HKTC was in practice the policy-maker 
and planner in technical education and vocational training. 
The entire philosophy was based on the manpower requirements 
of the economy. 
In 1982, a new Technical Education and Industrial 
Training Department (TEITD) was established by merging the 
relevant divisions in both the Education Department and 
Labour Department. This serves as an administrative arm to 
the new VTC. These are however largely beyond the scope of 
this study. 
It may be necessary to mention in passing that there 
were also the Construction Training Centres and Clothing 
Training Centres which were independent of the HKTC and were 
supported by levy on firms in the respective industries. 
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11.3.3 The University and Polytechnic Grants Committee 
The University Grants Committee was appointed in 1965 
as a result of the establishment of the CUHK in 1963, but 
the idea of an advisory body analogous to the British UGC 
emerged as early as 1953 (University, 1976: 1). In 1972, the 
Committee was renamed the University and Polytechnic Grants 
Committee (UPGC) to include the HKP (University, 1980a: 9). 
Similar to UGC arrangments elsewhere, the Hong Kong 
UPGC plays the dual role of allocating public funds on the 
one hand and safeguarding institutional autonomy on the 
other. However, the Hong Kong UPGC is unusual in a number of 
ways. The UPGC has developed its methodologies to assess 
polytechnic costs for which few overseas models exist. In 
1980, all the academic members of the UPGC - eight out of 
fourteen - were serving members of overseas institutions. 
All members, including the Chairman, work on a part-time 
voluntary basis (Griffiths, 1984: 545-46). A list of the UPGC 
members in 1980-1983 can be found in Appendix E. The UPGC 
met twice a year, once in Hong Kong and once in London. 
The UPGC was non-statutory. Many crucial decisions were 
made over a luncheon meeting with the Governor. It was 
served by a small Secretariat which was a government 
establishment under the Social Services Branch, and from 
1981, under the Education and Manpower Branch. 
The Hong Kong UPGC maintained a "triennium" planning 
system even after the 1973-1974 recession, thus it escaped 
the constraints of the government annual budgets. Until 
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1984, there were no "cash limits" imposed on UPGC 
deliberations, and as a matter of fact, UPGC proposals were 
not even once rejected by the Government (Griffiths, 
1984: 546; ISX10). 
The UPGC had legally been charged only with duties of 
financial allocations. In 1980, the terms of reference for 
the UPGC were revised to re-confirm its policy-making 
functions (University, 1980b: 1). The UPGC was de facto the 
policy-maker of higher eduction in Hong Kong. The new terms 
of reference asked the UPGC "to keep under review in the 
light of the community's needs" the facilities, plans for 
development, the financial needs and the application of 
funds in university and polytechnic education in Hong Kong 
(See Appendix D). 
II. 4. A Summary 
Figure 1.2 on the next page helps to summarise the 
situation. 
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III. Educational Policy-Making in Hong Kong 
This section provides a general introduction to 
educational policy-making in Hong Kong. After a discussion 
of the overall pattern, manpower forecasting and third-party 
consultation are then considered in some detail, because 
these are critical features of the two Episodes under study. 
III. 1. The General Pattern 
Apart from stage of "needs identification" which is 
often subtle, policy deliberations at a macro level in Hong 
Kong usually involve the following steps: 
(a) It starts with a specially appointed committee which 
usually invites public submissions before or during 
its course of deliberation. 
(b) After submission to the EXCO, recommendations of the 
commissioned committde are often published, in whole 
or in a summary form, sometimes as a Green Paper, for 
public comments. 
(c) The recommendations are then modified, supposedly with 
due consideration. to the public comments, and tabled 
at the LEGCO, often in the form of a White Paper, for 
official adoption. 
The procedures of such a process are conventional. 
There are no standard procedures for the formulation of 
education policies. Two points are outstanding: consultation 
and secrecy. 
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Consultation. Consultation is a special feature in 
educational policy-making in Hong Kong. It occurs at almost 
all possible junctures of the policy-making process. There 
are different modes of consultation. Public consultation 
can be carried out by issuing a Green Paper, by inviting 
submissions from recognised organizations, or by discussions 
in regular or special consultative meetings. Public 
pressures developed in the mass media may also carry weight. 
The modes of consultation are discussed in an earlier study 
(Cheng, 1983). 
The 1965 White Paper was preceded by a 1963 Green Paper 
worked out by an overseas Education Commission. Both the 
Commission and the Green Paper sought public submissions. 
The 1974 White Paper was preceded by a 1973 Green Paper 
which was actually a report from the BoE. Opinions were 
sought from the public both before and after the Green 
Paper. The 1978 White Paper followed the 1977 Green Paper. 
The latter sought public input both before and after its 
publication. 
Consultations are extensive and are not only unique to 
education. The Government is quite proud of this and 
regards it as the "distinctive feature of the system of 
government in Hong Kong" (Government Secretariat, 1981: 173). 
Secrecy. In contrast to the extensive consultations, 
there is also no lack of secrecy. The 1963 Green Paper was 
pre-empted by a Government "Statement" to restructure the 
education system. The "Statement" was issued just before 
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the arrival of the Education Commission and the source of 
the idea was unidentified. The ad hoc UMELCO committee 
which "improves" the 1973 Green Paper was confidential and 
its "Memorandum" upon which the 1974 White Paper was based 
was never made public. The 1977 Green Paper was the 
endeavour of a Working Party, the existence of which was 
known to the public only in 1981 (Government Secretariat, 
1981: 96) but even then its elaborate report was never 
published. There was another confidential working party 
which converted the Green Paper to the 1978 White Paper. The 
1979 Working Group to deliberate higher education policies 
was again a government internal set-up. 
Resource allocation. Besides the process itself, an 
additional outstanding point was resource allocation. The 
Hong Kong government adopted a sort of "demand-led" criteria 
in funding education (ISBO1). 
There was not so much a competition of resources, because we did not operate like that. Whenever we feel 
it is necessary to do something, we always secure 
support from the Financial Secretary. Whenever we 
started anything new, we got separate funding and would 
not compete with the old programmes (ISX08). 
We do not have resource competition, not only in 
education. The doctrine is not cake cutting at all. Items will be financed for justifiable reasons (ISX09). 
In practice the EXCO decides which programme is 
justified and to be resourced. The EXCO of course has to 
face resource allocation problems, "there is a 'cake' within 
the EXCO" (ISX10), but there is no sense of "distribution" 
or "competition" among sectors when policies in individual 
sectors are being made. This is possible largely because of 
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two points quite unique to Hong Kong. First, it is not a 
polyarchy where each social group has a say; second, the 
Government is in general affluent and can afford to be 
generous. 
111.2. Third Party Consultations 
The OECD review can be regarded as a form of third- 
party consultation. Third-party consultation is another 
approach which is adopted quite often in policy-making in 
Hong Kong education. Where possible, elements of third- 
party consultant were built into education policy-making. 
consultants including experts from overseas or prominent 
figures in the local community. 
The 1963 Green Paper (Report, 1963), known as the 
Marsh-Sampson Report, was written by a two-member Education 
Commission appointed by the Government in 1963. Marsh and 
Sampson were from Hampshire, England. They paid an eight- 
week visit to Hong Kong in February-April, 1963 and were 
asked to advise on the overall demand and supply of 
education and its finance. The White Paper (Education 
Policy, 1965) took the Green Paper into consideration, but 
did not agree with many of the proposals. 
In both the final stage of the drafting of the 1977 
Green Paper and its conversion into the 1978 White Paper, 
Peter Williams from the University of London Institute of 
Education was invited as external consultant. In fact, 
Peter Williams was also invited to be the adviser in the CRE 
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exercise. 
The most famous internal third-party consultations were 
the T. K. Ann Commission and the Rayson Huang Committe. 
In 1973, there was a dispute over salary between the 
non-graduate teachers in government and government-aided 
schools. The dispute led to territory-wide industrial 
action. After the dispute was settled, a Special Commission 
on the Certificated Masters was appointed by the Governor 
(1) to examine the underlying causes of the dispute and (2) 
to advise on the measures to be taken to obviate a 
recurrence of such a dispute (Report, 1976: 4). This is 
referred to as the "T. K. Ann Commission" after its chairman. 
The Committee solicited public opinions and produced the 
"T. K. Ann Report" (Ibid. ). 
A "Rayson Huang Committee" was set up in 1978 to 
investigate the controversial closure of a school run 
by the Catholic Precious Blood Congregation. The incident 
started by the public revelation of financial 
misappropriation by the Congreration and soon developed into 
a confrontation between the school management and the 
Education Department on the one side and the students and 
teachers and pressure groups on the other. At the climax, 
there was a public students sit-in demonstration outside the 
Bishop's House. The Education Department reacted by closing 
the school. The so called "Rayson Huang Committee" invited 
public submissions and conducted interviews and produced two 
reports. 
42 
Chapter 1: Background 
111.3. Manpower Forecasting in Hong Kong 
This section attempts to trace the historical 
development of manpower requirement deliberations in Hong 
Kong. This is done by identifying the major efforts to apply 
manpower techniques to Hong Kong. 
111.3.1. Special Committee on Higher Education 
The Special Committee on Higher Education (SCHE) was 
established in 1964. It was obviously prompted by the 
international tide of manpower forecasting. Its Interim 
Report started with the following remark: 
Throughout the world, countries are becoming increas- 
ingly development-minded and it seems that often the 
key to economic expansion is the planned development of 
manpower resources. The most important means by which 
manpower resources can be developed is formal 
education and in particular, formal education at the 
higher levels (Special Committee, 1966: 1). 
The SCHE based its methodology mainly on the British 
Robbins Report and the now classical work by Harbison and 
Myers (Ibid.: 6). The SCHE even thought of inviting Harbison 
to undertake a commissioned survey for Hong Kong (Ibid.: 4). 
The SCHE members included representatives of the two 
universities, senior LEGCO members and other relevant senior 
officials. The basic terms of reference of the SCHE was to 
assess the demand and to design the supply of high-level 
manpower. 
The SCHE attempted to calculate the Harbison-Myers 
composite index (Harbison and Myers, 1964), but this yielded 
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no fruit because of lack of GNP figures. It then turned to 
what it called the "forecasting-manpower-needs" approach to 
assess the demand of "highly educated personnel" (Special 
Committee, 1966: 6-9). By that time the results of the first 
general census (1961) for Hong Kong were available. Using 
1961 as the base-year, the SCHE tried to project the demand 
and distribution of high-level manpower in 1971. This 
projection was tested by using the government sector as a 
"microcosm" of the economy (Special Committee, 1966: 22). 
This projected demand was then balanced by a projected 
output of education. This constituted an Interim Report in 
1966. In 1968, a second interim report was produced which 
included mainly a survey of one sector of the economy, 
namely, manufacturing industry. This was carried out by 
Robert Mitchell of CUHK and was the first of its kind in 
Hong Kong (Special Committee, 1968). The Mitchell survey 
looked at (a) the manpower structure of all firms employing 
200 or more workers and a small sample of firms employing 
100 to 199 workers and (b) the educational qualification of 
individuals working in these firms. The SCHE did not 
produce further reports. 
111.3.2. Manpower surveys: ITAC 
An Industrial Training Advisory 
appointed in 1965 as a non-statutory 
Governor on industrial training. ITAC 
the HKTC which was of a more permanent 
1971: 1). One of the major efforts of 
and HKTC 
Committee (ITAC) was 
body to advise the 
was later replaced by 
nature (Final Report, 
both the ITAC and the 
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HKTC was conducting manpower surveys In the major 
industries. 
The ITAC and HKTC adopted the "employer's opinion 
survey" technique which was first introduced by experts from 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1967 (Waters, 
1985: 112). The surveys carried out full-population 
investigations as far as possible and used the survey 
results as a basis for forecasting. An "adaptive filtering" 
technique was used for forecasting where mathematical models 
which favoured more recent data yielded a family of curves. 
The training boards then discussed and decided the most 
acceptable projection (Report, 1977). This has become a 
biennial exercise for each of the selected industries. 
Results of the survey and projection for individual 
industries are published. Two comprehensive reports were 
published in 1977 and 1984 respectively (Ibid.; Vocational, 
1984). The planning of a large range of training 
facilities, from the training of operatives in training 
centres to the training of technologists in the Polytechnic, 
are very much influenced by the survey results. 
We shall see that the HKTC's manpower survey had some 
role to play in the CRE Episode. 
111.3.3. The 1977 Green Paper 
The preparation of the 1977 Green Paper started with a 
government internal Working Party on Higher Education which 
was later renamed Working Party on Senior Secondary and 
Tertiary Education because it was found necesary to widen 
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its terms of reference. This was a government internal 
inter-departmental working party with senior educational 
officials as its core members. Appointed in 1975, the 
Working Party produced among others an Interim Report in 
1976 (DSX08) and a Final Report (DSX09) In 1977. The latter 
was condensed and "dressed" to become the Green Paper 
(Senior, 1977). 
The Working Party was the first attempt in Hong Kong to 
use the manpower requirements approach to plan the overall 
system of education. Its crucial Chapter II, "Demand and 
Supply' was repeatedy re-written. In this chapter, much 
effort was devoted to looking at the demand in terms of 
student demand ('demonstrated demand" and 'student ability') 
and job opportunities ("existing occupational structure", 
"measured (forecast) demand', and "employment patterns and 
salary levels" (DSX09). 
The Working Party, however, did not attempt to conduct 
its own survey for manpower requirements. The Working Party 
drew data from the Education Department, the Examnations 
Authority, HKTC, the 1976 by-census and graduate surveys of 
the universities and the Polytechnic. The Working Party once 
thought of asking the Census and Statistics Department to 
develop a mathematical model to predict the number of 
vacancies, but was persuaded by the HKTC experience not to 
do this. While rate of return analysis was too difficult to 
carry out, the Working Party attempted to draw education- 
earnings profiles. 
Later, the 1979 Working Group took a second look at the 
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key issues and began to sense the necessity to develop a 
methodology different from the HKTC approach. The 1979 
Working Group exercise developed an expert team and paved 
the way for the CRE review (ISX11). 
III. 3.4 Summary of manpower forecasting 
We may conclude that manpower calculations were a rather 
strong tradition in Hong Kong. Their use was reinforced by 
the availability of a rich data base and a team of experts. 
IV. Summary 
The two Episodes under study were very comprehensive 
policy exercises with very broad involvement. It is not 
easy to describe all the factors that would be necessary for 
someone foreign to Hong Kong to understand the situations 
fully. Nevertheless, the above descriptions have perhaps 
delineated the context in which the two Episodes took place. 
More detailed information is introduced in the text of later 
chapters where necessary. 
47 
CHAPTER T WO 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
0. Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology and methods 
adopted in the research. The basic philosophy follows 
Homan's remark: 
People who write about methodologies often forget that 
it is a matter of strategy, not of morals. There are 
neither good or bad methods but only methods that are 
more effective under particular circumstances in 
reaching objectives on the way to a distant goal (Homan 
1949: 330) 
There is a description of the conditions under which 
the research was carried out. In this context, the 
methodology adopted in the study, which is a retrospective 
case-study borrowing much from ethnographic research, will 
be discussed in detail. Because of the nature of the 
research design, the process of the research will be 
delineated prior to the methodological presentation. 
1. Conditions and Design of the Research 
It is essential to describe the conditions under which 
the research was carried out, because these justify the 
methodology adopted. 
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First, the research started with a very vague question: 
How are education policies made? The question does not 
constitute the necessary components of a "hypothesis". 
However, what little was known about the policy-making 
process - and the little that was known might well be a 
misinterpretation - determined that it would be unrealistic 
to formulate any sensible hypothesis at that stage. 
Second, the researcher has never been an "insider" in 
the policy-making machinery. All that was available was the 
published materials and a number of rumours. He would remain 
as an outsider during the research. 
Third, it is clear that given the nature of the 
research as a PhD programme, it is only possible to do 
retrospective research. Any on-going process would have 
presented difficulties of unpredictable durations. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of on-going policy issues would 
have prohibited the "outsider" researcher from acquirng 
reliable data. 
Fourth, the researcher was reluctant to start with a 
theory which was borrowed from elsewhere. Whether theories 
generated elsewhere would apply to the Hong Kong scene was 
to be found during the research, and not before. Given the 
small amount of knowledge about the policy-making process in 
Hong Kong, selection of theory could only be arbitrary. In 
these circumstances, early adherence to any arbitrarily 
selected theory could pre-empt data-collection and hence 
pre-empt explanation. 
Fifth, policy-making in Hong Kong is highly 
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confidential. Only the final outputs are published in a 
very brief form. All the policy-advisory bodies keep 
confidential minutes. Only the Hansard, the minutes of the 
LEGCO, are published, but that contains public speeches 
rather than substantial debates. This was particularly so in 
the years under research when the LEGCO comprised only 
members appointed by the Governor. There were so far only 
two articles published on the process of policy-making in 
Hong Kong education. One was written by a former UPGC 
member (Griffiths, 1984) and provided much "insider" view of 
the process. The other was written by a former Deputy 
Director of Education (Lowe, 1980). The latter does not 
seem to reflect much of the actual process of policy-making. 
Sixth, since the research started afresh in a virgin 
ground, there was a dilemma of whether it should aim 
primarily at breadth or at depth. If the research had aimed 
at a general trend over a long period of time and a vast 
number of events, it would have to ask very general 
questions about each event. Much of what was collected would 
then be abstract value judgements or general beliefs rather 
than facts. If this were the case, the research might 
become a survey of "views" on policy-making which deny the 
researcher the supporting "facts". The research hence had 
chosen to start from depth, by doing intensive case studies, 
so that there was more opportunity to look into the "facts" 
as well as the "views". 
It follows from the above conditions that the research 
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had to be an exploratory, retrospective, and ethnographic 
case studies and had to rely heavily on the "key-informants" 
who participated in the policy-making process. 
2. Choice of Cases 
The choice of cases is based on a number of 
considerations. 
One, the availability of data. Availability of data 
was expected to be a problem in this kind of research, the 
two cases were chosen because they seem to present fewer 
difficulties than most. There was a host of past or current 
policy-participants whom the researcher could interview 
during his stay in Europe and who have either retired or 
could answer questions in an unofficial capacity. 
Two, the 'freshness' of the cases. As mentioned above, 
the cases had to be remote enough from the current issues so 
that they would not be so sensitive as to prohibit data 
collection. However, if the cases were too old, it might 
rely too much on vague recollections or secondary sources. 
The two cases were quite fresh when the research was started 
in 1983, but each case had terminated as a policy episode. 
That the cases were just past gave the advantage that most 
of the participants were still active in the scene and still 
kept fresh memory. 
Three, the "comprehensiveness" of the cases. The two 
cases both presented comprehensive policy exercises in 
education. Each of them considered not just one part or one 
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policy of the education system. In both cases, almost all 
actors in the educational policy-making arena were 
mobilized. The implication of these two case studies thus 
may extend well beyond an understanding of the two 
particular episodes. 
Because of the nature of the research design, it will 
be appropriate to describe the procedures adopted and to 
discuss the methdological aspects thereafter. 
3. The Procedures 
The research started with a detailed documentary 
analysis of published policy papers on Hong Kong education, 
in the period 1963-1983. A list of these documents is 
included in Appendix G. 
3.1. Phase I (October, 1983 - July, 1984) 
In Phase I, 22 interviews were made in Europe (U. K., 
France and West Germany) among people who had once 
participated or were then participating in educational 
policy-making in Hong Kong. These are called key- 
informants. During the interviews, information pertaining 
to both episodes were collected, because in practice they 
were intertwined and involved to a large extent the same 
informants. The informants include retired senior government 
officials of Hong Kong, retired Legislative and Executive 
Councillers and members of the Board of Education and other 
advisory bodies. There were also members of the OECD Panel 
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who visited Hong Kong to review education and other relevant 
OECD officials, overseas members of the UPGC and people who 
had once acted as external consultants to Hong Kong 
education. Although most of the interviewees were 
participants in the two major Episodes, a few persons who 
had not been directly involved were also consulted. Some of 
the informants were visited twice. A few interviews were 
made with participating policy-makers who happened to pass 
by Europe. 
Simultaneously with the interviews there were analyses 
of the unpublished documents available at that time, 
including the CRE report and most of its working papers, 
some UPGC documents, the OECD draft report and other 
Government confidential documents. Most of these documents 
occured as `by-products' of interviews. There were around 7 
sources of such unpublished papers. 
3.1. Phase II (August, 1984 - May, 1986) 
Phase II was carried out mainly in Hong Kong. 17 key- 
Informant interviews carried out in this period, included 
policy-making participants relevant to the two Episodes, who 
were either resident in Hong Kong or outside Europe. Two 
interviews were carried out in the USA and Australia 
respectively. Meanwhile, the entire body of documents 
relevant to the two episodes were revisited. These included 
published and unpublished documents, press articles either 
from newspaper clippings or from Government Press Release, 
the Hong Kong Hansard, the UPGC Reports, and so on. The 
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goal in this Phase was to organize and enrich the data 
acquired in Phase It to form a tentative framework for 
further investigation. 
Some part of the investigations at first does not seem 
directly relevant to the final thesis, but then proved 
helpful in understanding the context in which the two 
Episodes took place. In particular, manpower forecasting and 
consultation were the two crucial issues in the two Episodes 
respectively. Therefore, special attention was paid to these 
two aspects. An in-depth investigation was made to 
understand the function of manpower forecasting in real 
planning of training facilities in the Vocational Training 
Council. The Construction and Building Industry was 
examined under the microscope and the entire planning 
process was traced. Two papers were produced (Cheng, 1985a; 
1985b). Results of this investigation is not directly 
related to the analyses of the two Episodes, but prove 
extremely enlightening in illustrating the notion of 
legitimacy. Part of the results are inlcuded in Chapter 6 
(see 1.3). An indepth study of the consultation facilities 
in Hong Kong education was done earlier (Cheng, 1983) and 
was not repeated in this research. 
During the course of this phase, two interim reports 
were drafted. These became the basic analyses of the 
Episodes and were revised at the final stage. 
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3.3. Phase III (June, 1986 - November, 1986) 
In this phase, a further 8 key-informant interviews 
were carried out among selected persons who held key 
positions during the two Episodes. That these selected key- 
informants were interviewed at this phase was deliberate. 
They possess rather comprehensive knowledge of the policy- 
making machinery in general and of the two Episodes in 
particular. They were supposed to provide crucial 
information or opinions which would not have come forth if 
the interviewer did not possess sufficient knowledge to 
present questions which probe in depth their understanding 
of what had occurred. 
These were done at the same time when the analyses 
based on the previous reports were being revised. These 
produced Draft I of Chapters 4 and 5 of this Thesis. 
The third component of this phase was to invite 10 
persons identified as expert consultants who were 
politically sensitive and who were adequately familiar with 
the Hong Kong scene. They were invited to read the tentative 
reports (either Draft I and the earlier reports) and give 
comments either by scribbling on the draft or in discussions 
with the researcher. Some of these invited were policy- 
makers interviewed earlier, others were people who never 
participated in policy-making but had been keen watchers of 
the two Episodes. 
Hence, the key-informant interviews, the revision of 
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the analyses and the expert consultations ran parallel to 
each other and interact with each other. In fact the 
analyses were revised after each interview and each 
discussion with the expert consultants. Although the 
modifications on the "facts" were only marginal, changes in 
the analyses were tremendous. The result of Phase III is 
presented as Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
4. The Methodology 
The present study is basically a retrospective, ethno- 
graphic case study. This section presents the basic 
methodological approach in this research. Lack of 
consistency in much of the terminology in the literature on 
methodology has made it necessary to pay special attention 
to the substance of any term used. 
4.1. The ethnographic approach 
It must be made clear at the very beginning that it is 
not the objective of the present study to produce an 
ethnography. The entire objective was to borrow from the 
rigour in ethnographic research, as an alternative to the 
traditional "hypothesis-testing" type of research. 
The terms ethnographic, qualitative, phenomenological, 
naturalistic, anthropological and participatory research are 
used almost as synonyms in the literature (Wilson, 1977: 245; 
Kirk and Miller, 1986: 9; Maseman, 1982: 1; Burgess, 1985a: 1). 
Halfpenny (1979) gives a rather amusing long list of such 
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synonyms. In this thesis, the term ethnographic research 
will be used as a "shorthand rubric" (Goetz and Lecompte, 
1984: 3) for investigations with similar methodological 
orientation. 
The dichotomy between ethnographic research and 
traditional psychometric approach (another shorthand rubric) 
is really one of difference in the data-theory relationship. 
Discussion of such a methodological dichotomy occurs in 
various branches of social science. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), as sociologists, advocate the notion of grounded 
theory which aims at theory generation rather than theory 
verification. Parlett and Hamilton (1972; 1977), in an 
evaluation context, contrast social-anthropological with the 
traditional agricultural-botany approach. Aldrich and 
Ostrom, in a review of research in political science over 
twenty-five years, distinguished discovery from justifica- 
tion orientations (1980: 864). Owens (1982), from the 
perspective of educational administration, identifies the 
dichotomy of naturalistic and rationalistic inquiry. 
As a summary of the discussions, a quotation from 
Aldrich and Ostrom may be useful. According to Aldrich and 
Ostrom (1980), the discovery orientation is "data-first" and 
the general sequence of analyses is: 
(1) data collection, 
(2) development of classification schemes, 
(3) inductive derivation of hypothesis, and 
(4) Integration of hypothesis into a coherent theory. 
On the other hand, the justification orientation is "theory- 
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first". The sequence of analyses consists of the following 
steps: 
(1) theory construction, 
(2) derivation of hypotheses from the theory, 
(3) data collection and operationalization, and 
(4) testing inductive inference. 
There are two key aspects in the distinction between 
the two approaches: the objective and the sequence. 
The present study follows the "data-first" model. The 
objective is not to verify or test theories generated 
elsewhere, but to discover and generate theories from the 
data (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 5; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
As Hammersley and Atkinson assert, the absence of knowledge 
of the process itself represents a useful starting point for 
research (1983: 30). The study did not hope to find data to 
match a theory. Rather, it hoped to find a theory that 
explains the data (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 4). 
The present study is methodologically naturalistic 
(Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 10; Owen, 1982: 3): it allows the 
process to unfold Itself. The research Is empirical, but 
does not pretend to deny the researcher's influence on the 
researched. Therefore it does not claim to be absolutely 
non-manipulative, but the manipulations were to minimize 
interventions rather than to strengthen them. 
It was difficult to divide the research process into 
the conventional stages of problem-formulation, hypothesis- 
building, data-collection, data-analysis, hypothesis-testing 
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and so forth. The stages were often interwined, overlapped 
with each other and occurred recurrently throughout the 
process of research (Burgess, 1985b: 9). 
4.2. "Theory" in the research 
It may be necessary to add a few words at this stage to 
clarify the role of "theories" In the research. 
To start with, the research did not start with a 
definite theoretical framework in the conventional sense. As 
Kirk and Miller described, the researcher often "arrives on 
the scene with considerable theoretical baggage but very 
little idea of what will happen next" (1986: 30). The 
theoretical baggage did not constitute a theoretical 
framework because there was nothing definite to be confirmed 
by the research. A typical ethnographic case-study is Peter 
Blau's account of his research process in his pioneering 
book The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Blau, 1967). He started 
with a large number of random "hypotheses", which he 
confirmed and refuted in the field. An ethnographic 
researcher is never theory-free. The difference between an 
ethnographer and a researcher of other traditions is not 
whether he/she has theory or not, but rather, whether he/she 
forces any preconceived theory on to the observed data. 
What was done in this research was correctly delineated 
by Kirk and Miller when they refer to the ethnographic 
researcher as fieldworker and qualitative researcher: 
The fieldworker I... ] is continuously engaged in some- 
thing very like hypothesis testing, but that effective- 
ly checks perception and understanding against the 
whole range of possible sources of error. He or she 
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draws tentative conclusions from his or her current 
understanding of the situation as a whole, and acts 
upon them. Where, for unanticipated reasons, this 
understanding is invalid, the qualitative researcher 
will sooner or later (often to the researcher's intense 
dismay) find out about it (1986: 25). 
That is, the research started with some vague, 
indefinite theory. This was meant to be tentative, to be 
modified during the entire process of research - research 
design, data-collection, data-analysis, and so on. 
The orientation was discovery rather than testing of 
theory, but analysis was sequential - it was both guided by 
and guided data collection. "Concepts emerge from the field, 
are checked and re-checked against further data, compared 
with other material, strengthened or perhaps re-formulated" 
(Woods, 1984: 51). Woods correctly challenges the notion that 
concepts "emerge" from the field. The researcher actually 
searched among existing theories for what might be relevant 
to his observed data (Wilson, 1977: 250-251). 
4.3. Ethnographic research and objectivity 
Writers are split on the epistemology underlying ethno- 
graphic research. Silverman provides a very good summary of 
three approaches to ethnography: cognitive anthropology, 
interactionalist sociology and ethnomethodology (1985: 96). 
Cognitive anthropology regards ethnographic research 
as just a variation of empirical "science" (Pelto and Pelto, 
1978: 19-23) which has always "celebrated objectivity" (Kirk 
and Miller, 1986: 10-12). 
The interactionalists admit objectivity, but recognize 
the objectivity as a network of social relations of which 
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the researcher is an integral part (Barnes, 1963: 121). 
Hence, what one can best acquire as objectivity is modified 
by the researcher (Silverman, 1985: 101-9; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983: 11-12). 
The pure ethnomethodologists regard ethnographic 
research as the anti-thesis of positivistic research, as 
"interpretive" and "subjective", as opposite to the 
scientific paradigm (Cohen and Manion, 1985: 120). 
Others discuss ethnographic research in the context of 
contrasting naturalism with positivism (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983: 1-9; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Therefore, an adoption of the ethnographic methodology 
does not, as some believe, commit the researcher to a 
particular school of epistemology. The stand of the present 
study is near to the category of cognitive anthropology 
which can be represented by the following quotation: 
There is a world of empirical reality out there. The 
way we perceive and understand that world is largely up 
to us, but the world does not tolerate all understand- 
ings of it equally (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 11). 
Such a stand will have significance not only in the design, 
but will also be discussed in the conclusion. 
4.4. Ethnographic approach and qualitative methods 
Some writers equate ethnographic research with qualita- 
tive techniques. An increasing number of authors are using 
qualitative research as a synonym for ethnographic research, 
although most of them qualify by declaring that they do not 
exclude quantitative techniques (e. g. Kirk and Miller, 
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1986: 10; Burgess ed., 1985b; Goetz and LeCompte, 1984; 
Silverman, 1985: 17). In fact, Maanen et al. write in the 
introduction to their recently published Qualitative 
Research Methods Series: 
We wish to highlight the distinction between methods 
thought to be qualitative and quantitative, but also to 
demonstrate that such dimensions typically break down 
when subject to scrutiny (In Agar, 1986: 5). 
As far as this present study is concerned, it is 
basically qualitative. It is a matter of practicability 
rather than a matter of style. Quantitative methods are not 
applied to the two cases, because (a) the study is 
exploratory and knowledge about the subject does not allow 
sensible quantification; (b) the study works on small 
numbers and statistical methods can hardly play a role. 
4.5. Ethnographic research and research techniques 
Many authors illustrate ethnographic research by iden- 
tifying it with certain research techniques. This is not 
always justified. 
Some writers try to substitute case-study (Cohen and 
Manion, 1985) for ethnographic research, but case-studies 
could well start with a strong theoretical framework (e. g. 
Stake, 1980: 8-4). Case studies are not always ethnographic. 
When Philip Coombs used his comparative case study 
methodology to look into non-formal education, he started 
with 36 pre-set research items (Coombs and Ahmed, 1974: 259- 
264). When Hans Weiler compared educational policy-making 
in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, he 
started with a strong framework borrowed from Habermas' 
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theory of legitimacy (Weiler, 1983a). These are case- 
studies, but are not research in the ethnographic paradigm. 
Others commit ethnographic research to fieldwork (see 
Burgess, 1985a: 1). This is to a large extent true, but 
ethnographic research often also relies on archival 
materials (e. g. Pelto and Pelto, 1978: 116). 
Still others equate ethnographic research with 
participant observation, but there are obvious cases of 
ethnographic research where participant observation is 
impossible, or non-participant observation is more 
appropriate (Cohen and Manion, 1985: 122-124). 
The understanding in this study is that ethnographic 
research is a term in methodology, not in techniques. As a 
matter of fact, many writers regard the use of multiple 
methods as one of the main features of ethnographic research 
(Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 3; Wolcott, 1980: F-4). 
The methods adopted in this research are multimodal 
(Wilson, 1977: 255): documentary analysis and interviews in 
the main, but archival materials, newspaper clippings, radio 
records and conversations also play important roles. On the 
whole, the methods adopted were not pre-determined by the 
theoretical framework, but were pragmatically decided by 
requirements of efficiency and validity in data-collection 
(Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 3) 
The research operated under a flexible design. The 
process of the research was shaped during the progress of 
the research. The research tactics were continuously revised 
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characteristic of ethnographic research (Burgess, 1985b: 8). 
5. Some Methodological Issues 
Given the amorphous nature of ethnographic type of 
research, problems during the research could not receive 
neat solutions according to standard formulae. It is 
therefore necessary to look into some of the methodological 
issues that were encountered during the research and to see 
how they were solved. 
5.1. The "outsider-Insider' Issue 
The aim of the research is to understand a social 
process (Burgess, 1985b: 8-9), which is policy-making. What 
the researcher faced were therefore participants of a social 
process who carried with them not only facts, but also 
values. In a way, it is a study of the "culture" which, as 
is usually the case in ethnographic research, is unfamiliar 
to the researcher (Wolcott, 1980: F-3). 
One basic strength of ethnographic research is exactly 
the possibility of gaining access to the culture of a social 
group or process. This is best achieved in participant 
observation when the researcher becomes an "insider" of the 
group or process. Then, the research requires the researcher 
to identify with, and at the same time to remain distant 
from, the group or process being studied (Sandy, 1983). 
However, there could be a converse argument which 
favours an "outsider". It could be an advantage for the 
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favours an "outsider". It could be an advantage for the 
outsider that he/she has no preconception of the process and 
therefore would not be insensitive to the "culture". Some 
even quote the saying, "It would hardly be the fish who 
discovered the existence of water" (Sandy, 1983: 21). Hence, 
it is up to the "outsider" researcher to exploit his 
strength to overcome his shortcomings. 
In the case of policy processes, insider observation is 
impossible only in the case of ex-participants. The other 
possibilities are either the researcher plays a covert role 
as an insider, which is not likely, or he observes as an 
outsider. One of the best-known "ethnographic" case on 
educational policy research, for example, would be the case 
of Maurice Kogan who researched the policy-making process as 
an ex-member of the process (See for example Kogan 1975; 
Kogan and Packwood, 1974; Kogan and Atkin, 1982). Another 
example could be Harvey Goldstein who used his experience as 
ex-member when he was researching into the Assessment of 
Performance Unit (Gipps and Goldstein, 1983). In most other 
cases, however, the researcher remains foreign (For example, 
Jennings, 1977; Allison, 1971; Helco and Wildavsky, 1981). 
In this research, the "outsider" position of the 
researcher makes him suffer from the "opaqueness" of the 
scene, but at the same time it gives him the privileged 
position of an impartial "third-party". In a way, that the 
researcher was foreign to the "culture" did bring some 
advantages. Several interviewees remarked: "I like talking 
to you. I have never thought that way" or "It has helped me 
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to summarise. " 
5.2. A retrospective research 
The present research is retrospective in nature. The 
historical nature of the research presented a number of 
methodological difficulties. First, the informants responded 
by recollecting past events. This made the informants in a 
sense "impartial" because they were then more remote from 
the politically sensitive events and were less worried about 
the responsibilities and consequences of providing 
information. This "impartial" sense was an advantage 
because it helped to reduce the sensitivity and 
confidentiality of the information. However, the reliance 
on recollections gave rise to disadvantages that the 
informants might provide reproduced versions of the 
information which might not reflect their actual perspective 
when they participated in the process (Hindley, 1979). 
The recalling feature also added to the difficulties in 
raliability. This is discussed in section 2.5.5. 
5.3. Key informant interviews 
The main body of the research was done through key 
informant interviews. 
Key informants are not subjects who respond to 
questions or stimuli, rather, they teach the researcher to 
interpret the information and understand the process through 
the former's eyes (Spradley, 1979: 25-34). Therefore, instead 
of trying to eliminate subjective data (subjective due to 
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the informant), the researcher tried to incorporate them 
(Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 9-10). 
The exploratory nature of the research determined the 
naturalistic features of the interviews. The interviews 
were unstructured, covering only open ended broad topics, 
usually sent to the interviewee before the interview. The 
informants were allowed, if not encouraged, to elaborate in 
whatever direction they choose. The idea was to minimize the 
degree of manipulation so as to let the episodes unfold 
themselves. There were pieces of information that did not 
seem to be relevant at the time of interview, but later 
became precious clues. 
To start discussion, most of the time the informants 
were asked to present their "insights". It was found that 
very few people were unwilling to speak about their 
"insights", but once they speak, they usually tend to 
collate facts to support their "insights". "Insights" were 
therefore the "thin end of the wedge" opening up the way to 
obtain data, values and facts alike. This use of "insights" 
incidentally coincides with Yin's suggestion (Yin, 1984: 83). 
5.4. Locating key inforwants 
Unlike interviews in controlled experiments or surveys, 
key informants are atypical individuals who, instead of 
being chosen by sampling, are chosen by deliberation so as 
to ensure representativeness (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 119- 
20). The informants are not expected to reflect across-the- 
board pattern. On the contrary, key informants are chosen 
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each because of his/her special knowledge. They frequently 
are chosen because they have access - in time, space or 
perspective - to observations which are otherwise denied the 
researcher (Ibid). Key informant interviewing is therefore 
the process of seeking a large body of special information 
from each of the informants (Wolcott, 1980: F-4). 
Given the nature of key-informant interviewing, 
locating the key informants becomes an essential step 
(Spradley, 1979: 45-54). The locating of informants in the 
present research started with the pool of policy-makers in 
the high level advisory bodies. They are, fortunately, 
finite in number. Nevertheless, because of time and access 
problems, full population interviewing was still impossible. 
The informants were name-picked according to their 
participation in the two policy-making episodes. The 
intention was to interview those who would provide the best 
information, both in terms of quantity and quality. As the 
interviews went on, earlier interviews informed the 
researcher of further potential interviews. When time 
constraints were significant, the reduction of number of 
informants was based on the expected returns of information 
rather than by statistical sampling. 
The search for key informants was a continuous process. 
The research started with little knowledge about "who is 
who" in the policy-making arena, but as interviews 
accumulated, it became clearer who were the "key" informants 
who deserved to be interviewed. An interview with a retired 
senior official at the very early stage, for example, was 
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very informative. The interview itself was a complete 
failure. The interviewee knew very little of what had 
happened at the policy-making level, and what he claimed to 
know was obviously largely imaginery and contradicted the 
facts collected elsewhere. One of three points might be 
true: (a) the interviewee was not in the policy-making rank, 
(b) the interviewee was insensitive to policy matters, or 
(c) the interviewee was lying. Further interviews tend to 
support (a) and (b). The Education Department, for example, 
was not a place to study policy-making. Apart from the 
planners in the Education Department, people there had very 
little knowledge about the policy-making arena. Further, 
there were people who were involved but were insensitive. 
One retired Councillor, for example, kept on telling inside 
stories which mixed scandals and gossip with politics. Such 
cases gave strong hints of who the "key" informants were. 
Another example was the interviews with the OECD 
Overall Review panel members. Each member had a view about 
the other members. These views more or less converge and 
enabled prioritising the importance of the four members, 
although all of them were 'key" enough to be informants. In 
the end the Rapporteur was identified as the most key 
person. This converging view, however, was not shared by 
policy-makers outside the panel. If the word culture could 
be used in this context, there was a kind of culture within 
the OECD panel which was foreign to people outside the team. 
The process of prioritising the panel members was somehow a 
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process of learning the culture within the team - 
enculturation in Spradley's terms (1979: 47). Very similar 
situations occurred in interviewing the UPGC members. 
Spradley's notion of "current involvement" was an 
important factor in choosing key informants (Spradley, 
1979: 48-49). In one sense, as what were researched were 
historical events, interviews concentrate on people who 
participated in those events. In the other sense, there was 
a marked difference between those who were still making 
policy and those who had retired from the arena. Ex-policy- 
makers had the advantage of relaxation from responsibility 
and confidentiality. Several informants strongly invited 
the researcher to take away the documents in their 
possession. Two of them were retired and one actually said: 
"I am a dying man of seventy. These materials will be of no 
use to me. " The other said: "I am now a free citizen and I 
can do whatever I want to. " The best key-informants were 
therefore persons who participated in the episodes under 
research but had retired when they were interviewed. 
5.5. Reliability 
It is often said that research using ethnographic 
methodology enjoys high validity but suffers from low 
reliability. Therefore, special attention was paid to 
reliability. The low reliability is often attributable to 
the naturalistic setting which is hardly replicable (Goetz 
and LeCompte, 1984: 211). It is also attributable to the 
"personalistic" nature of such research, that no researcher 
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does research just like another (Ibid: 213). 
In the present study, the episodes under investigation 
are bygone historical events. Replication is out of 
question. This, however, increases the internal reliability 
because the facts are unique and different researchers 
coming to the same episode would come to the same pool of 
informants and obtain more or less the same information. 
This meanwhile poses difficulties on the external 
reliability because the same episode would not repeat to 
allow for comparison. 
An additional internal reliability problem arose from 
the fact that the interviews were not tape-recorded. In 
the present research, all interviews were recorded by hand. 
It may be argued that what is quoted in the 
report has been polluted by the researcher's mistakes, 
errors, misunderstandings and misinterpretations. This 
reduction of reliability, due to lack of machine-recording, 
is rewarded by the increase in validity that informants are 
more willing to express their viewpoints freely and feel 
less threatened when they come to matters of 
confidentiality. Machine recorders are suspected of 
reducing this validity to an intolerable level (See also 
Pelto and Pelto, 1978: 118). The design was actually to 
trade reliability for validity. To compensate, in cases 
where immediate transcription is not possible, the manual 
records were transfered into details immediately after the 
interviews by the researcher's self-tape-recording. This 
was an attempt to preserve the attitudes, the tones, the 
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language and so on of the informant. Full texts were then 
transcribed at some later time, because the transcription 
usually took eight to ten times longer than the verbal 
recording. This final transcription was sometimes done by a 
research assistant. 
Reliability was also improved by triangulation. In the 
actual interviews, very often more than one informant 
referred to the same event, although with different 
undertones and varying minor details. When more and more 
informants referred to the same event, what actually 
happened became increasingly clear. Informants may lie; they 
rarely tell the same lie. That the informants were far 
apart added to this advantage. If this could be called the 
multiple-informant approach, it actually played a dual role. 
First, it provided triangulation for a given fact. The 
degree of success of this triangulation was often reflected 
by the reducing marginal return to additional interviews. 
Secondly, given that the facts were confirmed, the multiple- 
informant approach provided a very good means to probe the 
reactions of the different actors to the same fact -a way 
to separate "values" from "facts". 
It has to be mentioned that the research is to a 
certain extent handicapped by the lack of access to more 
confidential papers. Official archives are open to research 
(to research only) only if they are older than thirty years. 
If the official minutes could be traced, more about the 
dynamics of policy-making could be understood. 
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5.6. Theorizing 
Theorizing is the cognitive process of discovering or 
manipulating abstract categories and the relationship among 
those categories. It is the fundamental tool of any 
researcher and is used to develop or confirm explanations 
for how and why things happen as they do (Goetz and 
LeCompte, 1984: 167). 
Theorizing is perhaps the most difficult part of the 
whole research process. Although it may be argued that 
theorizing always presents a real test of the intellectual 
ability of the researcher, it is particularly so in 
ethnographic research because at the point of theorizing, 
the researcher has to switch his thinking from an "insider" 
to an 'outsider', from understanding to analysing, from 
passively receiving information to creatively interpreting 
the information (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 198). Theorizing 
is to a considerable degree an art, because the switching 
does not occur at a definite stage, but occurs continuously 
throughout the entire research process. 
Agar attempts to reduce the complex process of- 
theorizing to a notion of breakdowns. 
A breakdown is a lack of fit between one's encounter 
with a tradition and the schema-guided expectation by 
which one organizes experience. One then modifies the 
schemas or constructs new ones and tries again. Based 
on this new try, further modifications are made, the 
process continuing iteratively until the breakdown is 
solved (1986: 21). 
A theory is thus born. 
Goetz and LeCompte attempt to resolve theorizing into 
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standard techniques as "perceiving; comparing, contrasting, 
aggregating and ordering; establishing linkages and 
relationships; and speculating" (1984: 167). Among all these 
techniques, the greatest challenge for researchers would be 
to distinguish between what is perceived and what is 
speculated. 
In the actual research, data perceived prompted the 
researcher immediately to analyse and generate some 
hypotheses. Unfortunately, speculation is the basis of 
hypothesizing (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 173). These 
hypotheses therefore represented a mix of what was perceived 
and what was speculated. In fact, successive hypotheses were 
formulated and subsequently tested throughout the research. 
Speculation hence became an integral part of the research 
design and occurred recurringly throughout the research. 
In an ideal case, the researcher is very conscious of 
the distinction between the perceived and the speculated and 
in further research steps modifies the speculated while 
preserving the perceived. However, if not careful, the 
researcher might easily pollute his perceptions with his 
speculations. He might unintentionally increase the weight 
of speculation in his further hypotheses generation and take 
for granted that the speculated are facts. This will make 
the researcher more and more insensitive to the perceived 
data. He would then unconsiously move away from the 
ethnographic approach which requires a maximal influence of 
the perceived data on the speculation. 
This might be the source of what Spradley called "lip 
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service" (1979: 23) to ethnographic research. The research 
then easily degenerates into a cheap piece of journalism. 
It is almost an art to avoid the degeneration. 
Different authors have listed various techniques in the 
process of theorizing (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984; Wilson, 
1977; Owens, 1982). However, the lists provide more a 
summary of what people have done rather than a guideline for 
those who are doing. In other words, the lists of techniques 
do present a spectrum of cognitive activities during 
theorizing, but they do not, and cannot, tell the researcher 
when to use which. It is the choice of techniques which 
demands intellectual effort. Once the choice is made, 
techniques such as negative-case selection, constant 
comparison, typological analysis and so on (Goetz and 
LeCompte, 1984: 175-183) themselves normally does not present 
much technical sophistication. 
The strategy used in the present research to maintain 
sensitivity to perceived data comprised three components. 
First, the researcher forced himself to remain in 
stupid naivete for the greater part of each and every 
interview, as if the research had just been started afresh. 
Each new interview was carried out with the same open-ended 
topics. This sensitizes the researcher to new information 
in the data, or signals for new hypothesis in the data. 
This alone, however, would prohibit the use of gathered data 
and probing for depth In understanding. Hence the second 
component. 
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Second, the researcher did not absolutely withhold the 
knowledge gathered from previous data-collection. Two 
tactics were used to make use of previous data. 
In the first case, at some stage of the interview 
particulärly when the informant was giving very official and 
superficial information, the researcher tries to give the 
informant some signal that the researcher had some knowledge 
of the subject matter. This often caused the informant to 
feel relaxed that "I am not the first one to speak up"; feel 
more interested because "I am facing a sensible 
interviewer", or feel obliged to provide more information so 
that "I don't look as if I know less than the other 
informants. " 
In the second case, particularly at the end of 
interviews, when the informant had more or less provided all 
he/she would, some "hypothesis-testing" was done by asking 
"higher-level" questions such as "Some say that the entire 
purpose of the CRE was to co-ordinate the fragmented policy- 
making machinery. What is your comment? " Such questions 
were asked only at the end of the interview, or at second 
interviews, to guarantee that the questions did not steer 
the direction in which the informants elaborate. 
Third, the expert consultation played an essential part 
in guarding against over-use of speculation. The expert 
consultants did point out a large number of inconsistencies 
in the drafts of Chapters 4 and 5 and also raised new 
questions to be answered. This put the researcher's 
speculation under the microscope of other perspectives. 
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The task in theorizing is actually to formulate the 
optimal theoretical explanation. In other words, after all 
those comparing, contrasting, aggregating and ordering 
(Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 169-72), the researcher has to use 
his/her creative mind to discover or generate a theory that 
can best explain most of the data collected. The researcher 
should not expect a theory that can fully explain all the 
data, but he/she can look for a theory that explains the 
largest number of cases, that encounters the least number of 
negative cases (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 175-76). In short, 
ethnographic research can hardly expect perfect or ultimate 
theory (although in the absolute sense, perfect or ultimate 
theory exists nowhere)(Kirk and Miller, 1986: 11; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967: 32). In some sense, the theorizing process is 
ever incomplete. The termination of the research process is 
mainly a matter of managerial necessity (Kirk and Miller, 
1986: 67). 
5.7. Reporting 
As is with most ethnographic research, the research was 
rounded up in "thick descriptions" (Owens, 1982: 7-9) which 
were supposed to carry not only the facts or the events in 
the cases, but also the texture, the quality and the context 
(Ibid. ). 
The reports of the two episodes will be seen in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. The discussion that 
follows is to highlight some of the methodological and 
ethical issues that arise when reporting. 
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The report of each episode is largely divided into two 
parts: the "facts" and the analyses. This is a deliberate 
device to separate the "perceived" from the "speculated". 
Although it may be argued that the "facts" were constantly 
affected by the changing perspective of the researcher, it 
would still be important to leave the analyses open. Care 
is therefore taken in the reporting of the "facts" to avoid 
imposing cause-effect relations to the data, and to leave 
ample room for "speculation" from various perspectives. 
This is very much so in the CRE episode (Chapter 4). 
In the OECD episode, much was known to the public before the 
research, but what was perceived by the public did not 
totally match the findings of the research. There are hence 
two versions of the "perceived" scene: by the public and by 
the research. These two have been deliberately separated in 
reporting. 
The second methodological issue in reporting is 
confidentiality. Most of the documents are confidential and 
all the interviews are confidential. At the early stage of 
the research, it was envisaged that there could be three 
levels of confidentiality: 
Level 1. Release of source and content are both 
forbidden. 
Level 2. Release of source is forbidden, the content 
can be quoted but not in its exact wording. 
Level 3. Release of source is forbidden, but the 
content can be quoted in exact wording. 
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Very early on in the research, one retired top official 
(ISXO1) accepted an interview 
on the strict understanding that if he (the researcher) 
repeats anything either verbally or in writing he does 
not reveal the source. 
This is confidentiality of Level 3 and is in fact the 
best one can have in this kind of interview. This formula 
was repeated with all the other interviews and all 
informants seemed to accept its happily. 
The formula proved essential to the research. It would 
be extremely difficult to carry the tones and gestures, i. e. 
the "culture" in the reporting if exact wordings could not 
be quoted. In hindsight, it seems that confidentiality of 
Level 3 is almost the base line to allow a research of 
ethnographic nature in policy-making. 
In the actual reporting, the exact wordings were used 
whenever possible, but the sources were coded. "Exact 
wording" here needs qualification. Apart from documentary 
sources, the records of the interviews were immediate 
reproduction or tape-reproduction of manual records. It was 
not the most desirable, but it was the best one could have 
under the existing constraints. 
A third problem in reporting is a matter of ethics. A 
large amount of Interview data involved personal names. 
Sometimes the names are essential because they indicate a 
special relation among people or the views of people on the 
policy-makers. Most of the names, unless they were essential 
for understanding, did not appear in the reports. Absence of 
the names has inevitably reduced the vividity of the 
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reports, but has provided more comfort as far as confident- 
iality is concerned. 
There was in fact a possibility of pursuing a "third 
explanation" for the two cases, which focussed on people's 
personal likes and dislikes of a particular key person. 
This is briefly discussed in the conclusion. After some 
ethical considerations, this was not done. 
6. Summary of Chapter Two 
The research probes a policy-making process which was 
foreign to the researcher. This determined that the research 
had to be ethnographic in nature, i. e. to be based on data 
and to search for and develop theories to explain the data. 
This has brought out a host of issues in methodology: 
in data-collection, in theorizing and in reporting. There 
were no standard prescriptions to attack these issues, but 
that only prompted the researcher to Justify each and every 
step from first principles. 
The methodology adopted in this research may have 
general application in studies of the policy-making process 
which usually presents itself as a "black-box". It proposes 
a multimodal way of acquiring knowledge of the inside of the 
"black-box". This relies on the "insiders" and the research 
methodology is to allow the "insiders" to teach the 
"outsider" researcher to perceive what goes on in the 
"black-box". As the research develops, the researcher learns 
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increasingly more from the "insiders" and is in a stronger 
position to interpret what is perceived. With due 
speculation, the researcher arrives at some theory, which 
can be further modified by further data-collection. 
Such research does not necessarily entail a single 
theory to explain the policy-making process. The data may 
tolerate different explanations. Modification of the theory 
is continuous, and endless. This is, anyway, the way 
mankind develops its body of knowledge. 
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0. Introduction 
As has been made clear in Chapter 2, the aim of this 
research is to search for theory or to discover theory to 
explain the acquired data, and to generate hypotheses 
therefrom. 
The purpose of this chapter on theory is therefore not 
to delineate the theoretical framework in which the research 
operated, but to re-present the theories encountered during 
the study. In fact, data and theory interacted dynamically 
in the course of the study. Various theories came to. 
attention at different stages of the study in a rather 
random manner. Such theories have been rearranged so that 
they form a more logical sequence. 
The basic question is: How are policies made? 
There is never a shortage of theories or models in the 
study of policy-making. The task of this chapter is to 
survey such theories and models, to attempt to classify 
them, to see how these can be useful in explaining the two 
episodes and to identify possible alternatives. 
Dye (1978; 1981; 1984) displays an array of eight 
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models: institutional model, process model, group model, 
elite model, rational model, incremental model, game theory 
models and systems models. He calls these "models of 
politics". Harman (1978) displays twelve "theories of 
policy-making and policy process": rational or classical 
model, incremental approach, political interest group 
theories, bargaining theories, Lowi's typology, Rose's 
models, political systems model, Iannaccone's typology, 
theories of voting behaviour, organization models, garbage 
can model and process model. These two lists are typical 
and many others are similar (e. g. Schoettle, 1968; Woll, 
1974: 21-52; Lynn, 1980: 9-22; etc. ). 
Dye conceives these models as "separate ways of 
thinking about policy" and "each one provides a separate 
focus on political life" (1984: 20). Although Dye emphasises 
the combination of models in reality, it is questionable 
whether the models really represent "separate" ways of 
thinking. For example, in the Dye models, one may regard the 
systems model as a kind of process model (Jenkins, 1978: 16- 
19) and one can hardly separate game theory model from 
rational model, both of which work for optimal solutions. It 
is even more so with Harman's list. One needs only to look 
at the example of Herbert Simon (to whom we shall return 
later). Harman regards Simon's "satisficing" notion as a 
modification and adaptation of the rational model (1978: 11). 
Other authors quote "satisficing" as a modified development 
of rationality (Smith & May, 1980); still others regard it 
as a theory of the "self-interest of the policy maker" 
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(Schoettle, 1968: 154). More often, Simon is identified as 
champion in the organizational model. 
There is no suggestion that the classification into 
models is arbitrary or meaningless. However, it is strongly 
suggested that the relations between the different theories 
and models are by no means straightforward. The rest of 
this chapter will start with a survey of the typical 
theories in policy-making, using rationality as a frame of 
reference. The notion of legitimacy will then be discussed 
as an alternative to notions of rationality. The last part 
of the chapter will focus on Allison's models to see how 
different writers view this multiplicity of models. 
I. Th" Notion of Rationality 
In his seminal work to explain the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Allison (1971) puts forward three parallel 
perspectives: the rational models, the organizational models 
and the political models. These have since also been 
borrowed by writers in the field of educational policy- 
making (e. g. Peterson and Williams, 1972; Crowson, 1975; 
Benjamin and Kerchner, 1982; Lane, 1983; Kirst, 1977). By 
using Simon's notions of rationality, a classification of 
the various theories of policy-making yields a continuum 
which roughly matches Allison's three models. 
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I. 1 Si*on's Notions of Rationality 
Herbert Simon discusses decision-making in the context 
of both management science and political science. Central 
to his discussions are his insights on rationality. Simon 
follows the classical definition of rationality: 
In a broad sense, rationality denotes a style of 
behavior (A) that is appropriate to the achievement of 
given goals, (B) within the limits imposed by such 
conditions and constraints (1964). 
He distinguishes substantive rationality and procedural 
rationality as the two basic forms of rationality (1985: 
294). In essence, the concern of substantive rationality is 
the "substance" or output of decision-making; that of 
procedural rationality the 'procedure" or the process of 
decision-making. In Simon's own analysis, the focus is on 
the behaviour of the decision-makers: 
Behaviour is substantively rational when it is 
appropriate to the achievement of given goals within 
the limits imposed by given conditions and 
constraints.... Behavior is procedurally rational when 
it is the outcome of appropriate deliberation. Its 
procedural rationality depends on the process that 
generated it (1976: 130-31). 
Substantive rationality is also referred to as 
"objective" rationality because here the decision is based 
purely on contraints that arise from the external situation 
(Simon, 1985: 294). On the other hand, procedural 
rationality can also be referred to as 'subjective" 
rationality because it takes into account the limitations 
of knowledge and computing power' (or bounded rationality) 
of the decision-maker (Ibid. ) 
According to Simon, substantive rationality is assumed 
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in the realm of economics and procedural rationality in 
cognitive psychology (Simon, 1964; 1976; 1983; 1985). His 
consistent effort throughout the years is to bridge the two, 
so as to introduce behavioural explanations into management 
science and political science. 
The relevance of Simon's notions of rationality to this 
study is less the emphasis on "behavioural" explanations 
than the separation of "substance" from "procedures" of 
decision-making. This pertains to the relationship between 
means and end in decision-making. In the following 
paragraphs, there is an attempt to discuss the typical 
models and theories of policy-making using the "means-end" 
relationship as a frame of reference. 
I. 2. Substantive Rationality 
Simon's substantively rational model is usually 
realized as the rational model. By rational model is 
commonly implied the classical or comprehensive rational 
model which is typically represented by the following five 
steps (adapted from Carley, 1980: 11): 
1. identification of problems and criteria for solution, 
2. survey of alternative solutions, 
3. estimation of consequences, 
4. comparison of consequences, 
5. selection of an optimal solution. 
At one point, Simon reduces the model to John Dewey's 
three questions: What is the problem? What are the 
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alternatives? Which alternative is best? (Simon, 1960: 3). 
There are a number of assumptions in this classical 
rational model. 
Firstly, it assumes that there are definite distinctive 
goals in policy-making. 
Secondly, it assumes that the decision-maker is a 
rational man or an entity that acts as a single rational 
man. 
Thirdly, it implicitly assumes that the decision maker 
has the intelligence to acquire full information and full 
capacity to analyse it, or at least is able to assess the 
probabilities. 
Fourthly, it follows that given a particular situation, 
there is a unique optimal solution to each problem: 
The foundation of... [the rational model] ... is the 
assumption that every actor possesses a utility 
function that induces a consistent ordering among all 
alternative choices that the actor faces, and, indeed, 
that he or she always chooses the alternative with the 
highest 'utility (Simon, 1985: 296). 
Such a policy-making process can be conveniently 
referred to as one of "maximization" or "optimization". 
Fifthly, and most relevant to this study, such a 
process assumes that decisions are made in a process where 
the "end" determines the "means". In group policy-making, 
there is an identifiable consensual goal which determines 
the consensual procedures. 
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I. 3. Procedural Rationality I: rationality redefined 
Simon's notion of procedural rationality can be 
realized in a number of theoretical frameworks of decision- 
making, viz. as an extension of the rational models, as an 
organizational model and as a type of political model. 
1.3.1 Lindblom: incrementallsm 
Lindblom argues that in order to be rational in the 
classical sense, one has also to be comprehensive. That is, 
one has to have full access to comprehensive information and 
full competence to analyse the alternatives, i. e. one has to 
submit to "comprehensive rationality". Lindblom argues that 
this is impossible in reality: 
It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is 
even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time 
and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is 
limited, as is always the case (Lindblom, 1959). 
Because of this, it is not possible to list all 
the alternative solutions, and the solutions cannot be 
estimated and compared with full confidence. 
Besides, a policy-maker has to face conflicting values 
and subtle priorities that cannot be settled by rational 
means (Ibid. ). Under these circumstances: 
The test [of 'good' policy] is agreement on policy 
itself, which remains possible even when agreement on 
values is not (Ibid. ). 
Therefore, the actors 'fall back on agreement whenever 
it can be found" (Ibid. ). This deviates significantly from 
the classical rational model because the actors arrive at 
consensus even if they disagree on the goals. 
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What happens in reality is what Lindblom calls 
successive limited comparison or limited rationality, where 
only a limited number of solutions which are not far apart 
from the status quo can be safely selected. As a matter of 
consequence, means are often selected without reference to a 
well-defined end, and decision-makers tend to evade 
definite value goals. Therefore, policies tend to change 
only in small steps, hence the term incremental ism. 
An attempt to adopt the incrementalism notion to 
explain educational policy-making can be found in 
Hochschild's comprehensive analysis of school segregation in 
the United States (1984). 
1.3.2 Simon: satisficing 
Lindblom's "incrementalism" echoes, at least in part, 
Simon's earlier notion of "satisficing" which originated 
from organizational decision-making in business firms. As 
Simon himself admitted: 
My point is that first-hand contact with business 
operations leads to observation of the procedures that 
are used in reaching decisions, and not simply the 
final outcomes (1976: 137). 
In Simon's view, the decision-maker's rationality is 
bounded not only by the lack of full information and 
capability, but also by his/her particular values. In the 
case of policies made by an organization, the decision- 
makers who disagree in values tend to accept the solution 
which receives early consensus. The decision-making process 
is therefore a "satisficing" process (Simon, 1957b) In which 
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the decision-makers discover and select satisfactory 
alternatives rather than an "optimal" solution. 
1.3.3 Extended notion of rationality 
Lindblom's "limited rationality" and Simon's "bounded 
rationality" can be regarded as extensions of the 
traditional definition of rationality in decision-making. 
Etzioni and Dror, independently, regard Lindblom's and 
Simon's notions as just variations of the classical rational 
model. 
Etzioni puts forward a model of "mixed scanning" (1967) 
which proposes that comprehensive rationality and 
incrementalism could be applied respectively to broad 
political orientations and detailed policy decisions, so as 
to safeguard from conservatism in the former and to be 
realistic in the latter. 
Dror (1968; 1983) argues that Lindblom's "incrementa- 
lism" is a variation of economic rationality where the 
"costliness' of getting comprehensive information is weighed 
against the benefits of doing so. He also argues that 
Simon's "satisficing" is but a change of goal in 
rationality, from "optimal quality" to 'satisfying quality". 
Lindblom's and Simon's models are therefore presented as 
"realistic second-bests to the unachievable ideal, pure 
rationality". 
While Etzioni and Dror may be right in stating that 
both Lindblom's and Simon's notions are still in the realm 
of rationality, they fail to recognise the basic difference 
90 
Chapter 3: Theory 
between substantive and procedural rationality. 
The conclusion here is that both notions pertain to 
rationality, because both arrive at some consensus in the 
process of making policies. The difference is related to 
the goal. In substantive rationality, there is a consensus 
in the goal; In procedural rationality there is a conlfict 
in goals. 
1.4. Procedural Rationality II: Organizational Models 
From the above discussion, it seems legitimate to 
equate procedurally rational models with organizational 
models and to retain the name rational models for models 
adopting substantive rationality. 
Procedural rationality can be interpreted as rules of 
decision-making that takes place in an organization of human 
beings with different individual values, goals and interests 
(Simons, 1976: 138). "Incrementalism" and "satisficing" are 
consensual rules of the game to arrive at a policy among 
actors with conflicting values, goals and interests. 
In fact, Simon opines that the principle of bounded 
rationality lies at the very core of organization theory" 
(Simon, 1957a: 200). In the organizational setting, decision- 
making aims at consensus in procedures rather than at an 
optimal solution. In a way, Simon observes that in an 
organizational environment procedural consensus is the only 
possible solution to problems. This is expressed in a 
number of ways in different contexts. 
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1.4.1 Firms as organizations 
Cyert and March (1963) studied behaviour in 
business firms and found that that organizational structures 
and conventional practices heavily influence the development 
of goals, the formulation of expectations and the processes 
of choice in business firms (Jenkins, 1978: 34). Here the 
procedures of decision-making have developed into 
'conventions' in a stable organization. 
1.4.2 Government as organization 
Allison further developed this into the organizational 
process model where (a) most of the behaviour is determined 
by previously established procedures; (b) decision 
procedures have become routines that decision-makers in the 
government are given only limited choices and (c) decisions 
have to be made within narrow constraints (Allison, 1971: 
79). This Is Allison's second model in his analyses. 
Allison's model has also developed into various 
versions of bureaucratic models where organizational 
decisions are bound by bureaucratic routines (examples in 
education are Kirst, 1977: 318; Peterson and Williams, 
1972: 158). 
Allison's model has apparently reduced all government 
decisions to Simon's programmed decisions which are purely 
subjects of routines (Simon, 1960). 
On the other hand, the "garbage-can" model (Cohen at 
al., 1972), which we shall discuss below, seems to treat all 
decisions as 'non-programmed decisions". 
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1.4.3 Organization as garbage-can 
The model refers to "organized anarchies" where 
participants, with definite goals in mind, search for 
opportunities to realize these goals by attaching themselves 
"strategically" to some central policy issue which is most 
likely to be solved. If this issue then becomes too 
difficult to solve, the problems will flow to other more 
attractive issues until they get solved. 
Although Simon endorses the model (1983: 81-82), it is 
debatable whether in the "garbage-can" there is any 
consensus in the process of producing policies. Hence, it 
is not all clearcut whether the "garbage-can" model Is an 
example of procedural rationality or one of political model 
which we discuss below. 
1.5 Procedural Rationality III: Political Consensus 
In the garbage-can model the consensus in procedures is 
less apparent than the case in a commercial firm or in a 
government bureaucracy. The "garbage-can model" therefore 
comes near to a political model where each individual is 
very rational, but the decisions are made by political, and 
not rational, procedures. There are two types of such 
political procedures: by consensus and by conflicts. We 
shall discuss the "consensus" case here and leave the 
"conflicts" case to the next section. 
In general, a decision-making process can be regarded 
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to be "political" if there are conflicting goals among the 
decision-makers. The goal-conflicting actors may make 
policies by consensus, i. e. by procedures that are agreed by 
all the decision-makers. 
The argument here is that the consensus political 
models lends themselves to procedural rationality. In these 
models, the actors each has his/her own axe to grind, but 
they come to consensus according to certain rules of game in 
policy-making. The consensus here is one in the process and 
not in the goals. 
In a broad sense, such political consensus is the basic 
notion in all sorts of democracy. 
In theory, democracy means "rule by the people" (Held, 
1987: 2). In practice, democracy means involvement of all 
parties in decision-making. There are different conceptions 
of democracy, embedded in the political culture or civic 
culture (Almond and Verba, 1963) and various models as a 
matter of ideology (Held gives eight models, 1987). However, 
in principle democracy is a means so that people of 
different interests and values can live together. Hence, 
democracy in a stable state is also a consensus among the 
citizens. In this sense, democracy provides the means (e. g. 
voting, parliaments) of procedural rationality, that is, 
providing consensual procedures of policy-making for 
conflicting goals. 
The purpose of the above is to show that Simon's notion 
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of procedural rationality has broad interpretations in the 
frameworks of decision rationality, organizational models and 
political consensus. These frameworks share the same 
features that there are goal conflicts which are to be 
solved by consensus in procedures. Simon's two notions of 
rationality, however, do not seem to include the case when 
the goal-conflicting actors do not come to consenus in 
procedures. This is our partisan models. 
1.6 Partisan Rationality: policy-caking by interactions 
However, there are other cases where the goal- 
conflicting actors in policy-making do not work according to 
consensual peocedures. The conflicts are solved by 
interactions among the actors. Such interactions involve 
either peaceful negotiations, persuasions, or rather 
antagonistic dominations or coercions. Policies are produced 
as a result of such interactions and not as the result of 
any consensual procedures. A few examples are briefly 
introduced to demonstrate this case. 
1.6.1 Allison: decisions as resultants 
The results of political interactions are referred to 
as political "resultants" in Allison's third model of 
decision-making: the "governmental politics paradigm', 
resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen 
as a solution to a problem but rather results from 
compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with 
diverse interests and unequal influence (1971: 162). 
The word 'resultant", borrowed from mechanics, connotes (a) 
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that the forces pull in different directions (i. e. 
conflicting goals), (b) that there is no external influence 
over the interaction among forces (i. e. pluralism), (c) 
equilibrium is achieved by force and not by agreement (i. e. 
political interactions), and (d) none of the actors achieves 
his/her goals to full satisfaction. 
Peterson and Williams (1972: 161-167) apply the model to 
analyse U. S. school boards as an arena for political 
bargaining and identify three categories of bargaining: 
democratic, pluralistic and ideological. 
1.6.2 Truman: interest group interactions 
The pluralistic bargaining model in Peterson and 
Williams' theory is similar to Truman's theory of political 
interest groups. Here the interest groups play a 
significant role in policy-decisions. Truman even asserts 
that given adequate information about the 'variables" of the 
interest groups, some prediction can be made about the 
policy decisions (1956). Levin in fact applied the theory 
to educational policy-making (1974). 
There are numerous -other examples which study the 
influence of political interest groups on educational 
policy-making (e. g. Kogan on U. K., 1975; Urwick on Nigeria, 
1983; Peterson and Rabe on U. S., 1983). 
1.6.3 Archer: political exchange 
The decision-making process can be viewed as a process 
of political bargaining or exchange of benefits. Margaret 
Archer presents the best example in education policies. 
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Archer looks at decision-making processes which she 
interprets as "negotiations" among the educational 
professionals, the external agencies and those in power. 
She Identifies (1979; 1981) three types of negotiations in 
educational policy making: internal initiation, where the 
educational professionals trade expert services for 
financial and political resources (money and autonomy); 
external transaction, where the external agencies buy expert 
service with financial resources; and political 
manipulation, where those in political power exchange power 
resources for expert services (1981: 34-36). 
1.6.4 Lindbios: Persuasion 
Persuasion is a broad term that Lindblom uses to 
indicate all the means by which one interest party exerts 
control over others in a polyarchy. The means include 
propaganda, Indoctrination, advertising, campaigning, 
'scientific' analysis or, in general, talking (Lindblom, 
1977: 52-54; 1980: 30). Lindblom regards persuasion as a way 
of exchange between the leader and the citizen, between 
leaders at all levels and between politicians and their 
opponents (1977: 137-9). It is a game by which political 
conflicts get solved and is a fundamental feature of policy- 
making in a polyarchy (1980: 30). 
Z. 6.5 Lowi: manipulation of process 
Lout (1970; 1972) assumes a power structure, by way of 
resource distribution, in the society. In this power 
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framework, he classifies policies into categories. Each of 
these categories is found to be associated with some 
particular type of policy-making process with some 
particular degrees of citizen participation. He further 
asserts that the different types of process are deliberately 
designed by the government to control the making of public 
policies ('legitimate coercion'). 
1.6.6 Bachrach & Baratz: Control of Agenda 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963) look into the stage of 
agenda-setting in policy-making. They discover that the 
struggle and coercion of powers do not exist only during the 
stage of making choices (selection of policy options), but 
also in the stage of agenda-setting, i. e. as early as when 
the policy problem, or the issue is being identified. 
In so doing, the dominant power exercises its bias 
influence not only during the process of decision, but also 
by preventing the issue from entering the process. This is 
a way to confine decision-making to safe issues (Ham & Hill, 
1984: 63) and thereby suppress the conflicts. Bachrach and 
Baratz call these non-decisions, to distinguish them from 
negative decisions (decisions that suppress) and decisions 
of non-action. 
1.6.7 Lukes: Latent Influence 
Lukes assumes that there is a dominant power, but he 
does not look only at the overt conflicts over the decision- 
making table, or the covert conflicts over agenda-setting. 
Instead, he looks at the latent conflicts that exist In the 
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environment in which decisions are made. Lukes states that 
the dominant power may exercise influence to shape people's 
preferences. There the dominant power can manage to 
maintain a certain prevailing value system which is to the 
advantage of some rather than the other (Ham & Hill, 1984: 
68). Lukes' idea comes near to the notion of legitimacy 
which will be discussed in the next section. 
1.6.8 Marxist Theories 
Marxist theories in general view policy-making as a 
matter of class struggle, i. e. coercion of social groups 
which are classes. Again, most Marxists recognise that 
there is a dominant power in society, which is the 
bourgeoisie in a capitalist society. Marxist theories 
differ from other power models in that they regard public 
policies as somehow pre-determined by the class relations of 
the society. 
Along this line, education policies are made either as 
an instrument to reproduce social relations (e. g. Bowles and 
Gintis, 1976), to pursue class struggle in the arena of 
education (e. g. Apple, 1982), or that education policies per 
se have become arenas of class struggle (e. g. Carnoy and 
Levine, 1985). 
1.7 An Interim Summary 
We have now three alterantives to explain the policy- 
making process: (1) the classical rational model or Simons 
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substantive rationality where there is consensus in the goal 
as well as the procedures; (2) the organizational model, the 
bureaucratic model and the model of political consensus, all 
as variations of Simon's "procedural rationality" where 
there Is conflict in the goals but there is consensus in the 
procedures; and (3) the partisan political model where there 
is conflict in the goals as well as in the procedures. 
In a way, the actors in the partisan political model 
are rational, rational in the sense that they are conscious 
of their goals, each has his/her axe to grind, but they do 
not come to consensus in the procedures of making policies. 
They are therefore not "rational" in Simon's sense. Some 
coherence in terms can be achieved if we label this last 
category of partisan political models as cases of partisan 
rationality. There is then the following summary table. 
Table 3.1 Classification of Rational Models 
Goals Procedures 
Substantive Rationality consensus consensus 
Procedural Rationality conflict consensus 
Partisan Rationality conflict conflict 
The 
fact that 
producing 
In 
there is 
goal. In 
coherence in the terms is 
in all the three models, 
some policy. 
substantive rationality and 
the concern of producing a 
procedural rationality, th 
also intrinsic in the 
there is the concern of 
partisan rationality, 
policy that serves the 
ere is the concern of an 
too 
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agreeable procedure that will yield satisfactory policies. 
In more abstract terms, there is a concern for the `end", or 
the "means" towards an "end". That is, they all lie in the 
"means-end" paradigm in a broad sense. This justifies the 
use of the term "rationality". 
In the analysis of the Episodes in Chapters 4 and 5, a 
rational explanation is adopted where "rational" takes 
its broadest sense, i. e., a concern for producing some 
policy. 
The table above immediately hints at a fourth category 
of rationality: consensus in goals and conflict in process. 
The discussion of legitimacy to a certain degree answers 
this question. 
In a vague sense, legitimacy considerations may lead to 
a concern of the process of policy-making, but not 
necessarily the output of that process. In Chapters 4 and 5, 
this notion of legitimacy will be used as an alternative to 
the rational explanations. 
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II. Legitimacy in Policy-Making 
This section starts by defining the meaning of 
legitimacy and by introducing the spectrum of notions of 
legitimacy in the context of this study. Having done that, 
the discussion focusses on the use of technical expertise 
and consultation as means of attaining legitimacy. 
11.1 The Meaning of Legitimacy 
The term legitimacy has been used fairly broadly in the 
literature of policy studies. As different authors use the 
term in different contexts, it is necessary to survey the 
various meanings of the term and to delimit its meaning to 
what is appropriate to this study. 
11.1.1 General Definition 
The Oxford Dictionary definitions of legitimacy are: 
(a) of a government or the title of a sovereign: the 
condition of being in accordance with law or 
principle... (b) conformity to a rule or principle; 
lawfulness. In logic, conformity to sound reasoning. 
This dictionary definition presents more the legal and 
rational senses of the term. Schaar (1969, in Connolly ed. 
1984: 108) calls this the "old" definition and distinguishes 
it from the "current professional definitions" which are put 
forward by Upset and other writers: 
Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to 
engender and maintain the belief that the existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones 
for the society (Lipset, 1960: 77). 
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In fact, the Webster International Dictionary's has 
already extended the meaning of the word to customs and 
beliefs: 
(a) the possession of title or status as a result of 
acquisition by means that are or are held to be 
according to law and custom. (b) a conformity to 
recognized principles or accepted rules or standards 
(emphases added). 
In the tradition of Weber, legitimacy has been defined 
as 'the degree to which institutions are valued for 
themselves and considered right and proper' (Bierstedt, 
1964: 386, paraphrasing Upset). 
Other writers define political legitimacy 'as the 
quality of 4oughtness' that is perceived by the public to 
inhere in a political regime. That government is legitimate 
which is viewed as morally proper for a society" (Merelmann, 
1966: 548). Legitimacy is therefore a matter of "credibility 
and acceptability on the part of the modern State in its 
relationship to its society and its citizens" (Weiler, 
1985: 185). 
Dahl, a recognised pluralist (Manley, 1983: 368), adopts 
an "axiomatic" approach by assuming 'uneven political 
influences" and "conflicting aims" in the modern political 
system. It is in this context that the "acquisition of 
legitimacy" becomes a basic task of the political leader. 
In the most recent edition of his famous book Modern 
Political Analysis he writes: 
Leaders in a political system try to ensure that 
whenever governmental means are used to deal with 
conflict, the decisions arrived at are widely accepted 
not solely from fear of violence, punishment, or 
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coercion but also from a belief that it is morally 
right and proper to do so (Dahl, 1984: 53). 
Schaar identifies that "the old definitions all revolve 
around the element of law or right" and is "external to and 
independent of the mere assertion or opinion of the 
claimant", whereas "the new definitions all dissolve 
legitimacy into beliefs and opinions" (1969, in Connolly, 
1984: 108). 
In sum, legitimacy in politics is a sort of second- 
order objectivity people accept to justify the authority of 
the government. In this sense, a government is regarded as 
legitimate not necessarily because it produces anything 
"good", but more because the people believe that it is doing 
things in the "right" way. 
It is relevant to look briefly at a few notions of 
legitimacy put forward by masters in the field. 
ll. 1.2 Weber's notion of legitimacy 
Max Weber uses the term legitimacy in the context of 
the State: 
A state is a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory (1918, tr. 1948: 78, original 
emphasis). 
In this sense, 
The state is a relation of men dominating men, a 
relation supported by means of legitimate (i. e. 
considered to be legitimate) violence (Ibid. ). 
It is in this context that Weber put forward his three well 
quoted basic legitimations of domination (Ibid.: 78-79): 
tradition, charisma and legality. Some authors call this 
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the three basic types of authority (e. g. Ham and Hill, 1984: 
47); others call these the three grounds on which the 
political leader might claim legitimacy (e. g. Dahl, 1984: 64- 
65). 
In Webers views, the weakness of traditional authority 
lies in its static nature and the weakness of the 
charismatic authority lies in its instability. It is the 
rational-legal authority which is superior to either of the 
other two (Ham & Hill, 1984: 47). Weber's rational-legal 
legitimacy rests upon 
a belief in the legality of the patterns of normative 
rules, and the right of those elevated to authority 
under such rules to issue commands (tr. 1947: 328). 
Therefore, Weber implies that rational-legality, or 
bureaucracy, provides the State with the legitimacy to shake 
itself free of class control (Ham and Hill, 1984: 48-49). 
This is perhaps the basic distinction between Weber and the 
Marxist theories on legitimacy. 
11.1.3 Habermas' legitimation crisis 
Habermas' Legitimation Crisis (1973, tr. 1975) Is 
widely recognized as the Marxist classic on the topic. 
Habermas' notion of legitimation is formulated in the 
context of "late-capitalism" where the basic "contradiction" 
remains the "private appropriation of public wealth". The 
problem, in short, is how to distribute socially produced 
wealth inequitably and yet legitimately" (McCarthy, 1978 in 
Connolly ed. 1984: 156). 
Habermas identifies four crisis tendencies: economic 
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crisis, rationality crisis, legitimation crisis and 
motivation crisis. He classified the first two as systems 
crises and the other two identity crises, belonging to the 
infrastructure and superstructure respectively. The four 
crises form a hierarchy with a tendency of moving towards 
legitimation crisis. Thus, there is a transformation of 
crisis from the economic system through the political system 
into the social-cultural system. This is schematically 
presented in the following diagram (Habermas, tr. 1975: 45): 
Table 3.2 Haber*as' Crises 
Point of Origin System Crisis Identity Crisis 
Economic 
System 
Political 
System 
Socio-cultural 
System 
Economic 
Crisis 
Rationality 
Crisis 
Legitimation 
Crisis 
Motivation 
Crisis 
Habermas' legitimation crisis is based on the 
assumption that in late-capitalism, the State intervention 
has transferred from market mechanisms to administrative 
manipulations. He defines the legitimation crisis in terms 
of 'mass loyalty': 
The legitimizing system does not succeed in maintain- 
ing the requisite level of mass loyalty while the 
steering imperatives taken over from the economic 
system are carried through (tr. 1975: 46). 
Although Habermas is undoubtedly working within the 
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Marxist framework, he deviates from the traditional Marxists 
(which he calls the orthodox position (Ibid.: 51)) in what he 
calls a 'reconstruction of historical materialism" (cited in 
McCarthy, 1978 in Connoly ed. 1984: 156) where he moves from 
an emphasis of the economic system to an emphasis on 
superstructural considerations. 
The basic point where Habermas differs from Weber is 
that "the political decisions that reflect the existing 
organizational principle of society ipso facto do not admit 
of rational consensus" (McCarthy, 1978 in Connolly ed., 
1984: 156). Therefore, while Weber looks at rational-legal 
legitimacy as a progressive, neutral element in the modern 
state, Habermas talks about a rationality crisis. In 
Habermas' views, Weber's rational-legality falls to support 
the political system which consists of discrepancies between 
public poverty and private wealth. There is therefore a 
legitimation deficit (Habermas, tr. 1975: 47) and hence a 
legitimation crisis. 
11.1.4 Legitimacy: 011e 
Although Offe takes a stand which is very similar to 
Habermas, he talks about contradiction instead of crisis. In 
Offe's argument, contradictions are "where the necessary 
becomes impossible and the impossible becomes necessary" 
(Ibid.: 132). The basic contradiction of advanced capitalist 
society is one between efficiency and legitimacy (Ibid.: 
130). 
Offe distinguishes two kinds of legitimacy problems: 
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sociological or socio-psychological and philosophical. In 
the former, 'legitimacy means the prevalence of attitudes of 
trust in the given political system". In the latter, the 
legitimacy of a regime or government depends upon the 
justifiability of its institutional arrangements and 
political outcomes" (Ibid.: 268). According to Offe, society 
progresses in three stages. 
If the State is efficient, that is, the society "works" 
- successfully "providing, restoring and maintaining 
commodity relationships for all citizens and for the 
totality of their needs" (Offe, 1984: 268; 138) - then there 
should be no problem of legitimacy. 
Unfortunately, "this happy condition of normality can 
hardly be assumed to be the normal case" (Ibid.: 145). Then 
comes the second stage. If the system fails to function, 
then the attitudes of trust and satisfaction are disturbed. 
This leads to the development of a sense that society does 
not work according to its own established standards" (Ibid.: 
268). Here arises the sociological problem of legitimacy. 
The problem may further develop and even more basic 
questions may be raised. Here comes the third level 
legitimacy problem which concerns "the validity of the 
normative foundations' of the political arrangements 
(Ibid.: 268-69). It is Offe's view that late-capitalism has 
entered into this third stage of philosophical legitimacy 
problems. 
Although Offe implicitly goes alongside Habermas, his 
definition of a legitimacy problem allows a broader inter- 
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pretation. One can apply Offe's notion to any situation 
where the State is not functioning efficiently, without 
necessarily confining it to the framework of late- 
capitalism. 
11.1.5. An Interim Summary 
It sounds sensible to pause here to see the position of 
this study in this sea of theories of legitimacy. 
From Weber to Offe to Habermas, the term legitimacy is 
used in the context of a State theory. Weber talks about a 
normative model of rational-legal legitimacy as salvation to 
the modern state; Offe refers to legitimation problems 
arising from the State's inefficiency due to its basic 
contradictions; while Habermas' legitimation crisis is based 
on deep-rooted economic and political crises of the late- 
capitalist State. 
The theories, different as they are, concurrently 
identify legitimacy as an indispensable element for the 
State to maintain its authority. There seems to be a 
consensus that legitimacy is in the realm of value and 
belief which are not always visible on the surface of the 
formal political and economic systems. This is the notion 
of legitimacy adopted in this study. 
Uowev_erj* in this studyZ the notion of 1egiti2e2y is 
used in a more gengrai sense] that not only the 91aie needs 
to secure legitiaegy to seintain lip. autborityj but 1112 tfe 
v_erious 22111121i actors need to gecu e legitiAecy to 
Maintain theft 22n Qartlcipation and influenge 10 29112y_ 
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making. The notion of 2egitimacY used in this study is not 
restricted to the maintainence of the State. However. the 
use of the term in this study is confined to the realm of 
eolicy_makingj to see the role of legiiimacy in the process_ 
There is no intention 2L further exelaiainq the source of 
legitimacy in a framework of political economy. 
11.2 Senses of Legitimacy in Policy-Making 
There can be four alternative uses of the term 
legitimacy in relation to public policy-making. First, the 
substance of policies per se may aim at acquiring legitimacy 
for the State. For example, there could be a policy to 
indoctrinate citizens to be loyal to the State. Secondly, a 
policy which is believed to be "good" can help to gain 
legitimacy for the State. For example, improvement of social 
welfare helps the State to gain popular support. Thirdly, a 
"good" policy-making process, regardless of the policy 
decisions, may help to legitimate the State. If policies 
are decided with broad citizen participation, the citizens 
tend to think the government is a good government and tend 
to neglect the substance of the policies per se. Fourthly, a 
"good" policy-making process may help to legitimate the 
policy decision. People may feel satisfied with a policy so 
far as it is decided by rational arguments, even if they do 
not like the policy. The last two are closely related but 
are different. In the first three senses the State is to be 
legitimated; in the last sense, the policy is to be 
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legitimated. These will be elaborated, using cases In 
education policies as examples. 
11.2.1. Education "for" legitimacy 
Much has been said about using education as a means for 
the State to acquire legitimacy. Habermas takes educational 
planning, especially curriculum planning, as a typical 
example where cultural affairs which were taken for granted 
now fall into the administrative planning area (Harbermas, 
tr. 1975: 71). This is an attempt to compensate for 
legitimation deficits through conscious manipulation. 
Offe devotes much attention to the study of education. 
He regards education as, on the one hand, a means to 
increase efficiency of the society - by putting individuals 
in a more marketable position (Offe, 1984: 137) - and, on the 
other hand, as affecting the moral consciousness of people 
which may otherwise undermine the legitimacy of the existing 
political order (Ibid.: 144). 
Some theories of political education regard education, 
inter alla, as an instrument for political socialization. 
Education transmits or develops political culture. If the 
former - the so called "conservation" (Portor, ed. 1983) or 
"transmission' approach as contrasting the "development" or 
'emancipation" approach - is the case, then education (in 
the form of political education) reinforces the legitimacy 
for the State to maintain the status quo. 
Weiler (e. g. 1983a; 1984a; 1985) takes the notion 
further to discuss the legitimation function of education 
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and knowledge. 
11.2.2 Education 'as' Legitimacy 
In many developing countries, the expansion of 
education serves as a major means of legitimacy acquisition. 
When alleviation of poverty is a difficult promise and other 
political promises are equally precarious, expansion of 
education becomes the cheapest and most comfortable way of 
making people feel satisfied. This led to Carnoy's remark 
(Speech, 1985) that in many less developed countries, almost 
every coup d'etat is followed by an expansion or a reform of 
education (Carnoy, speech 1985). 
A similar notion of education as legitimacy lies in the 
reproduction function of education (e. g. Apple ed. 1982 and 
Carnoy 1984; Carnoy and Levin, 1985). Education as a social 
policy reproduces and hence legitimates the stratification 
in society. The well discussed screening hypothesis serves 
as an example of this legitimacy function. If education 
provides less an increase of productivity than a 
"credential' (Collins, 1979) to justify the student's 
position in the social strata, then education becomes an 
instrument to maintain the status quo. In other words, 
education legitimates the existing social structure. Bowles' 
and Gintis' Schooling in Capilatist America (1976), which 
has now become a classic in the field, falls also in this 
category. As Blaug summarizes: 
Screening by educational qualifications is economically 
efficient not because 'good' students are always `good' 
workers but because educational credentialism avoids 
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the inherent conflict of interests between workers and 
employers (Blaug, 1983: 21). 
11.2.3 Process to Legitimate the State 
Hans Weller applies the Marxist notion of legitimacy to 
explain the educational policy-making process. In his 
coaparision of education policies in U. S. and FRG, Weiler 
writes: 
Education has a key role in allocating statuses and in 
socializing different groups in society into accepting 
and sustaining existing structures of wealth, status, 
and power (1983b: 261). 
He identifies three strategies used by the State as a 
means of compensatory legitimation, i. e. to compensate for 
legitimacy deficit (See II. 1.3). These are legalization, 
expertise and participation. In particular, expertise refers 
to the utilization of scientific expertise in the policy- 
making process, especially through such devices as experi- 
mentation and planning (Weiler, 1983b: 261). Participation 
refers to the development and stipulation of client 
participation in the policy process' (Ibid. ). 
The use of expertise and participation are particularly 
fashionable in controversial 'issues' which 'are embedded in 
a context of values, choices and conflicts' (1984b: 470). On 
these occasions, planning in technical terms 'presents a 
temptation to remain within a carefully constructed shell 
that is made up of data, targets and projections' and 
'participatory planning' has become popular to solve the 
problem of meeting different societal needs (Ibid.: 471). In 
the end, 
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The notion of 'legitimation by procedure' thus opens up 
the possiblity of authorizing the continued exercise of 
political authority without examining its normative 
`worthiness' - so long as it proves to adhere to 
procedures that can claim to be `rational', 
intelligible and transparent (Ibid.: 476). 
Weller has discerned the forms in which the state 
acquires its legitimacy. The theme in Weller's notion is 
that the "procedures" legitimate the status quo, "for 
avoiding substantive changes in the objective of those who 
exercise power over a society". That is, the process 
legitimates the state. 
One criticism of Weiler's arguments could be that most 
of the time his explanations are "political" and does not 
particlarly refer to "political economy" as Weiler has 
claimed. Particularly when he is discussing the policy- 
making process, Weller is de facto presenting a legitimation 
argument which may be totally detached from Habermas' 
notion. In more precise terms, the fact that the state is 
employing expertise and participation to legitimate its 
policy-making processes does not logically require the 
premise that the state is in a "legitimation crisis" in the 
Habermas category. It may be argued that legitimation has 
become a necessary routine for a modern State, independent 
of whether it is in late-capitalism or whether it is in 
Harbemas' "legitimation crisis". 
Nevertheless, Sections 11.2.3-4 below discuss two of 
Weller's forms of legitimation in educational policy-making, 
viz. expertise and participation. 
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11.2.4 Process to Legitimate Policy 
This can be understood in three levels: (a) 
legitimation as a legal or an institutional procedure, (b) 
legitimation as governmental manipulation and (c) legitimacy 
as a matter of political culture. 
Legitimation as an Institutional procedure. Dye 
(1984: 318) uses the term "policy legitimation" to indicate 
a special stage in policy-making. He refers to the stage 
when policies finally get endorsed in the formal policy- 
making machinery. This is still along the "old' definition 
of legitimacy in the realm of legality and relates little to 
the values and beliefs discussed above. 
In a comparative study of the educational policy-making 
processes in U. K. and U. S., Kogan and Atkin use the term 
'legitimation' as one step in the process by which 
"educational policies become identified, expressed, 
legitimated, promulgated, and tested" (Kogan and Atkin, 
1982: 3). 
Jennings (1977: 39-40) in an education context, 
identifies "legitimization" as the fifth of six stages in 
policy-making. In this "legitimization" stage, 
(Decisions] may be taken by a few influential people in 
the government or by group of policy-makers that has 
power to direct others formally or informally. The 
choice of policy is then ratified or legislated by a 
majority of those policy-makers empowered to do so by 
law. 
Jennings' notion of "legitimization" is still largely a 
matter of legality. Policy-makers are influential because 
they are "empowered by law". 
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Legitimation as government manipulation. In another 
study, Kogan recognises that the many policy committees and 
advisory bodies, which are supposed to be public, are "far 
more "in-house', far more a part of official review, than 
the outward forms seem to suggest' (Kogan and Packwood, 
1974: 23). In this sense, policy committees and advisory 
bodies are means for the government to legitimate its 
policies. 
Similar notions are adopted by Gaziel who studies 
advisory councils in the centralised system of France and 
finds that one of the functions of the advisory councils is 
to provide the government bureaucracy with legitimacy for 
its policies and to shield it from criticism (1980: 399-40). 
Salter and Tapper use the term 'legitimation" as the 
central theme in their thesis (1981). Their notion of 
legitimation covers both the process and the product of 
policy-making. They have noticed the change of the DES 
(Department of Education and Science) in U. K. from using 
external committees to using internal experts in policy- 
making, and attribute this change of process to a change in 
legitimacy. They argue that 
if educational change is to be acceptable to the 
populace at large it has to go through an ideological 
stage. There are, analytically speaking, two aspects 
to this stage: (a) the way in which policy is produced 
and (b) the policies produced. Both require 
ideological legitimation and, in practice, the nature 
of this legitimation may overlap the two aspects 
(1981: 111-112, emphases added). 
Salter and Tapper have the merits of paying special 
attention to the process of policy-making as a way of 
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legitimation. 
Salter and Tapper provide useful tools to approach the 
problem of legitimacy and there analysis of the DES can 
easily find applications elsewhere. One major point of 
criticism could be that Salter and Tapper have taken the DES 
as seemingly a wilful policy-maker. They come near to a 
kind of "conspiracy theory" which precludes the possible 
explanation that such legitimation processes are matters of 
a political culture inevitable in a given polity. 
Legitiaacy as a satter of political culture. Salter 
and Tapper, nevertheless, do hint that legitimacy hinges on 
public opinion. The externally-based inquiry", Salter and 
Tapper state, has "rendered these policies credible and 
acceptable to the general public" (Ibid.: 198). There is 
also the observation that "the DES would acquire increased 
public confidence from greater openness" (Ibid.: 199). Here, 
credibility, acceptability and public confidence are all 
ingredients of legitimacy. 
In an earlier study, Kogan also identifies that 
education policies move "with the climate of opinion` 
(1971: 46-47). 
In his more recent work, Kogan has extended this notion 
of legitimacy to values. He contrasts the liberal 
democratic model with the participative model in education 
accountability. He asserts that there remains strongly 
rooted in practice a tradition of liberal theory which 
emphasizes process and equity, and hence has a firm belief 
in knowledge, expertise and efficiency. Because of this, 
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public and elected authorities (politicians, education 
committees, professional officers and professionally led 
institutions) work with strong assurance of their legitimacy 
(1986: 92). On the other hand, there is the participative 
model which stems from a set of values which start from a 
very different principle that 
no legitimation is permanent but must be constantly 
reinforced by paticipation and consultation with those 
receiving services or providing them (Ibid. ). 
The above discussion points to the very root of the 
difference in sources of legitimacy underlying expertise and 
consultation. 
11.2.5. Interim summary: senses of legitimacy 
The above four senses of legitimacy may help to 
visualize the concept of legitimacy as it occurs in 
educational policy-making. It may be vaguely stated that 
legitimacy is a kind of "second-level objective" which is 
not directly visible from the primary or "first-level" 
policy objectives. In this sense, legitimacy is often an 
unstated yet significant goal in policy-making. 
This reminds us of a more abstract definition of 
legitimacy, as captured by Berger and Guckmann in a 
sociological framework: 
Legitimation as a process is best described as a 
`second-order' objectivation of meaning. Legitimation 
produces new meanings that serve to integrate the 
meanings already attached to disparate institutional 
processes (1966: 110). 
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11.3 Expertise and Legitimacy 
Expertise is taken to mean the 'technical", "objective" 
and "scientific" methods and techniques used in policy- 
making. Finer definitions may not be necessary for the 
discussions below. In the following paragraphs, expertise 
will first be identified as an indispensable element in the 
policy-making process. The role of expertise in the policy- 
making arena will then be discussed in three "layers": 
expertise as impartial analysis; the interaction between 
expertise and politics and expertise as a means for 
legitimacy building. 
11.3.1 Expertise: an indispensable element 
That expertise is indispensable is readily evidenced by 
the fact that 
Public officials, journalists, interest-group leaders 
and interested citizens often join in informed 
discussion... [S]pecialized professional fact- 
finding, research, and policy analyses flourish as 
routine inputs into policy making. A policy maker will 
ordinarily feel naked without help from both Informed 
discussion and specialized professional studies 
(Lindblom, 1980: 13). 
Expertise involves means and techniques which bring 
'information, thought, and analysis into the policy-making 
process". Lindblom labels these as the "intellectual 
components of policy making" (Lindblom, 1980: 11). 
Authors who believe in the "comprehensive rational 
model", as is to be expected, emphasize the importance of 
rational analysis in decision-making and policy-making. 
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However, even if one refutes the rational model of decision- 
making, expertise remains indispensable. (In this sense, 
expertise, information, analysis and rational approach will 
sometimes be used as synonyms. ) 
That expertise becomes Indispensable can be seen in a 
number of aspects. 
First, it can be convincingly argued that expertise 
plays an increasingly important role in modern policy-making 
(e. g. Benveniste, 1977: 4). Modern technological change has 
created more new options for action and has caused rapid 
changes and complicated social relations. Hence, 
"technological change creates uncertainty and uncertainty 
brings about a need for experts" (Ibid.: 30-31). 
Second, there is a strong traditional belief in 
knowledge and efficiency. There is an "epistemological 
assumption" that "knowledge is capable of achieving 
reasonable states of certainty" (Kogan, 1986: 92). That is, 
the classical rational model is still the popular mode. In 
lay language: since they (experts) know more about the 
subject, they should be given control over it, and they are 
likely to make better policies (Peters, 1984: 188). Hence 
the experts possess the legitimacy to make policies, even if 
they do not necessarily make good policies. 
Third, knowledge and information pertain to facts, and 
facts are "objective" and therefore "impartial". This 
impartiality provides expertise with the legitimacy to be 
relied on in policy-making, because expertise is then 
regarded as apolitical and will not bear partisan bias. 
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This isolation from partisan politics allows them 
[experts] to argue that not only are they experts in 
what they do, but also that their decision will not be 
affected by the need to placate voters (Peters, 1984: 
189). 
Fourth, expertise provides rules for decisions. 
Political disputes during policy-making has to be settled by 
some rules of the game (Anderson, 1979: 77). These rules of 
the game, however, are often "competition of analysis" 
(Lindblom, 1980: 30-31): 
In effect everyone agrees not to go further than that, 
that is, not to fight harder than with fact and 
analysis, because escalation [of the dispute] beyond 
that point would demand too much time and energy and 
would incur too many risks. The result is that by rule 
all accept certain solutions, not because actually 
persuaded of their merits but simply because they have 
agreed that the decision goes to those who have, by 
conventional standard, made the best case (Ibid. ). 
The convention works, not because it can produce the 
best policy, but because it secures the credibility among 
the policy actors that this is the best way of settlement. 
In other words, analysis in this case provides legitimacy 
for making policy among uncompromisable actors. 
11.3.2. Experts as actors 
The indispensability of expertise has made experts the 
"rising elite" in the policy making arena (Lindblom, 1980: 
30). The impartiality thus gives expertise the ground for 
exerting its influence, or power, in policy making. 
Information and knowledge become unusually important 
resources for gaining and maintaining influence, and 
various "information and knowledge elites" come to play 
crucial roles in decisions (Dahl, 1984: 70). 
However, it can also be argued that experts have become 
121 
Chapter 3: Theory 
new "elites" not because of their knowledge or information, 
but because of their capacity to interpret information. 
Interpretation, however, is value-oriented. As Carron 
rightly points out: 
The truth is that the expert is not an asocial being. 
He belongs to and identifies himself with a specific 
social group, whose interests he serves either 
implicitly or explicitly. Whether he likes it or not, 
in his work he is constantly oblighed to make 
assumptions and choices which are necessarily based on 
value judgements. The rationality of expertise is 
never socially neutral (1980: 54). 
Either consciously or subconsciously, experts have 
themselves become politiclal actors in policy-making. 
However, experts as political actors are different from 
politicians. Experts have to maintain their legitimacy of 
impartiality if they are to maintain their contribution to 
policy-making. If the expert drops his "mask" of 
impartiality and behaves like a politician (Benveniste, 
1977: 75-76), he would virtually undermine this legitimacy 
and become just another politician. He then has to compete 
with other politicians. He has to regain his legitimacy 
through election votes or other means that are not readily 
generated from his expertise. 
Some writers advocate that the expert should realize 
his own political role and actively participate in the 
political interactions. Referring to educational planning, 
Williams (1979: 128) states that in a 'political model', 
'the role of the planner becomes the tactical one of finding 
a way between the different interests involved" (Also 
Williams, 1972: 383 1983a: 498-99; 1983b: 342). Healey et al. 
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raises a similar point in the context of urban planning, 
that for the planner to maintain a strategic role at all, 
they are forced to develop capacities in the politics of 
influence" (1982: 13). Such a view is widespread in the 
literature and is the central theme of many international 
conferences (e. g. Weiler ed., 1980). 
To achieve this, Carron opines that "the planner will 
therefore have to assume fully the political aspect of his 
role instead of retreating behind his technocratic 
neutrality" (1982: 9). The argument may even go further to 
suggest that 
(The planner] would have a political role in his own 
right in which he would try either to utilize the 
"political space" which the other actors leave him, or 
to affect, with his own power of expertise, knowledge 
of the system, and political alliance within the 
system, the overall direction of the "political 
project" (Wei'ler ed., 1980: 161). 
11.3.3. Expertise and governeent bureaucracy 
Expertise can well be utilized by various actors to 
establish their own authority. The expert may upgrade the 
scientific sophistication of his deliberation or create a 
monopoly of his information base. A politician may 
imperceptibly shift the decision rule to favour his own 
proposal. These are just two examples of how a clever actor 
who knows the power of expertise can manipulate the 
situation to favour his own legitimacy in policy-making. In 
this respect, the position of governemnt bureaucracy has 
attracted much discussion in the literature. The following 
paragraph from Peters (1984) may represent most of the 
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viewpoints: 
The first, and perhaps most important, resource of the 
bureaucracy is information and expertise. To the 
extent that government has at its disposal information, 
this information is concentrated in bureaucratic 
agencies. Going along with the information is the 
technical expertise to understand and interpret it. 
This relative monopoly of information can easily be 
translated into power in several ways (Ibid.: 188). 
In any case, policy-makers require information for 
formulating policies, but the major source of such 
information is still the government bureaucracy, who is then 
most of the time more knowledgeable in the specific policy 
area than the non-government policy participants. Therefore, 
the bureaucracy 'can at least implicitly trade information 
for influence over policy" (Ibid. ). For example, 
"information may be produced selectively to make one type of 
decision a virtual inevitability" (Ibid. ). 
Smith, using his British experience, identifies 
expertise as one of the sources of power for the government 
bureaucracy (1976: 16-23). In one sense, Smith equates 
expertise with experience which the government administra- 
tors may use ag ýainst 
The knowledge 
experience of 
administrator a 
policy-formation 
the ministers: 
Df public policy derived from direct 
its operation gives the senior 
near monopoly of knowledge relevant to 
(lbid.: 102). 
This knowledge is certainly not matched by that of his 
sinister". Although the ministers can sanction or veto, 
they 'find it difficult to do anything other than accept or 
reject the advice given in toto* (lbid.: 104). 
Control of information, or control of the expertise to 
Interpret the information, gives the government virtual 
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control in policy-making, yet saves it from applying overt 
authoritarian measures over the decision process. Under 
these circumstances, the public and the other actors have to 
accept the policy, not because of its merits, but because 
they lack the information and expertise to compete; that is, 
they lack the legitimacy to challenge the bureaucracy. 
11.3.4. Expertise and the State 
We have introduced Weiler's discussion of expertise as 
a means to compensate for legitimacy deficit for the State 
and we shall not repeat the discussion here (See 11.2.3 In 
this Chapter). 
Not only that actors or government bureaucracies make 
use of expertise to legitimate themselves, but also the 
State makes use of expertise or experts to maintain its 
legitimacy as the authority. Legitimacy is here itself an 
"end", not only a "means', in State activities. The power 
of expertise to legitimate the State is derived from the 
same source where experts acquire their legitimacy, i. e. 
information and impartiality. 
Benveniste quotes a number of basic patterns whereby 
the Prince, the policy-maker, makes use of experts to 
legitimate policies. 
Legitimation can have several dimensions. Sometimes it 
consists of providing the rationale for decisions that 
have already been made. Sometimes it may be a rationale 
for not taking any action. At times it may be used to 
test resistance to a contemplated action (Benveniste, 
1977: 61). 
In sum, Benveniste's notion of legitimation is to reassure 
125 
Chapter 3: Theory 
everyone that decisions taken for other motives appear to 
have been taken for rational, technical reasons` (Ibid.: 55). 
Benveniste's notion of legitimation is echoed by Knorr: 
[The experts'] data and arguments are used selectively 
and often distortingly to publicly support a decision 
that has been taken on different grounds or that simply 
represents an opinion the decision-maker already 
holds... [Decisions] are made intelligible and are 
legitimized only after the resolution (1977: 171-72). 
However, Benveniste's and Knorr's notion pertains to 
only one aspect of legitimation, viz. legitimation of 
policies. They do not address the fact that legitimation by 
expertise could well be less a matter of dishonesty than a 
matter of belief and convention. Expertise provides the 
most readily acceptable convention whereby citizens may 
maintain their confidence in the State. Therefore it has 
become a convention that policies have to be presented in a 
form justified by expertise. The policy-maker may or may 
not be dishonest; the policies may or may not be good; but 
that has no direct casual connection with the process of 
legitimation. The State has to rely on expertise if it 
wants to be or at least to look impartial. 
II. 4. Consultation as Legitimacy 
Participation and expertise lie on different sides of a 
dichotomy. While expertise pertains to facts and 
impartiality, participation is related to values and 
interests (Carley, 1980: 12; McGrew & Wilson, 1982: 3). 
Lindblom bases his conception of policy-making on the 
dichotomy of efficacy versus popular control which he sees 
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as "the two overriding questions asked about governmental 
policy making': 
In short, a deep conflict runs through common attitudes 
toward policy making. On the one hand, people want 
policy to be informed and well analysed. On the other 
hand, they want policy making to be democratic, hence 
necessarily political. In slightly different words, on 
the one hand they want policy making to be more 
scientific. On the other, they want it to remain in the 
world of politics (1980: 12). 
This hints that participation is as indispensable an 
element as expertise in policy-making. 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the 
legitimation function of participation and pay particular 
attention to consultation. The latter is another major 
concern of this study. 
11.4.1. Participation in Policy-Making 
Fagence, who has done perhaps the most comprehensive 
survey in the literature on participation (1977), starts 
with a not very enlightening definition of the term. 
The term and concept of 'participation' has attracted 
to Itself in recent years a diversity of meanings and a 
seemingly inexhaustable variety of practical 
expressions. In addition, 'participation' has become 
at various times the focus of sympathy, antipathy, 
comprehension, incomprehension, delay, frustration, 
challenge and other similar emotional responses; it 
seldom seems capable of attracting rational 
consideration and expression (Ibid.: 20). 
Therefore, any attempt to define participation may add to, 
rather than eliminate, confusion. Participation will better 
be discussed in substance than in abstraction. 
To this end, some hierarchy of participation proves 
useful. Evans, for example, proposes three levels of 
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participation: nominal, consultative and responsible (1977: 
29). Spiegel and Mittenthal, in the context of urban 
planning, proposes a hierarchy of seven elements: 
information, consultation, negotiation, shared decision, 
joint planning, delegation and neighbourhood control (cited 
in Fagence, 1977: 128). Kwok identifies four processes of 
citizen participation: public hearing, institutional review, 
citizen participation and community participation (1980). 
There are numerous other hierarchies or typologies of 
participation. 
Among others, Arnstein's "Ladder of Participation" 
(1969) may prove particularly helpful (Fig 3.2 on the next 
page). Arnstein presented a continuum of eight "rungs" of 
participation with different degrees of citizen influence. 
The eight rungs are further classified into three 
categories: non-participation, tokenism and citizen power. 
Although Arnstein's notions originate from urban planning in 
a community context, it is generally applicable to public 
policy-making at large. 
Informing, consultation and placation are regarded as 
"tokens" of participation, because citizens are expected to 
feel respected when they are being informed, consulted or 
placated, but may not be respected in real decisions. This 
"tokenism" lends itself to the notion of legitimation. In 
other words, participation may play two roles: (a) a real 
contribution in policy-making; (b) a "token" that the 
policy-making process is legitimate. Sometimes only the 
latter role is assumed. 
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Figure 3.2 Arnsteln's Ladder of Participation 
(Source: Arnstein, 1969: 217) 
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The relevance of Arnstein's "ladder" to this study is 
to find the place of "tokenism" in a continuum. However, 
Arnstein's 'ladder concept" does not make clear whether the 
"rungs" refer to activities or effects. There are, for 
example, various consultative committees which are meant to 
conduct "consultation", but whose effects may range from 
"informing" to "delegation". On the other hand, there could 
be arrangements of "delegation" whose effect is no more than 
"placation". In reality, it is risky to assume that each 
degree of participation is represented by one and only one 
form of activity, or one may be blinded by mere rituals. 
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Furthermore, by equating activites with effects, Arnstein's 
"ladder" assumes that there is only one ultimate democracy - 
"citizen control" - thereby neglecting the significance of 
difference in political cultures (Almond and Verba, 1965). 
In fact, the subject matter of legitimacy studies is 
precisely that political activities may carry secondary 
effects which are not directly implied by their primary 
functions. The latter are usually taken for granted in their 
forms. In terms of legitimacy, a form of participation is 
accepted by the citizens as long as they believe that it is 
the right form. It does not really matter to what extent 
citizens actually contribute to policy-making. 
The discussions that follow will concentrate on 
consultation. The definition is again vague. Arnstein in 
fact does not define "consultation'. 
Jaques defines consultation as a contrasting concept to 
participation: 
Consultation is a process in which a manager hears 
views and himself decides how much to take those views 
into account; participation is a process in which 
elected representatives take part in establishing 
policies and objectives within which managers must work 
(Jaques, 1974: 297). 
The distinction is never so clearcut in reality. We shall 
look at two particular cases of consultation: advisory 
committees and third party consultations. 
11.4.2. Advisory cosaIttees for exchange of legitimacy 
Advisory or consultative committees refer to those set 
up by the policy-maker to solicit policy inputs from the 
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community at large or its representatives. 
Such committees may or may not be established by 
legislation. If not, they are established administratively 
to aid policy-making. They may be either "standing" or ad 
hoc in nature. Members of such committees may either be 
elected by some parent constituency, or appointed from 
above. The members may either represent interest of 
particular interest groups, various areas of professional 
expertise or ideology (Griffiths, 1960). The most powerful 
committees may approve or veto a government proposal; they 
are near policy-makers. More often, they enjoy the legal 
obligation to be consulted and provide an input to policy- 
making. In this case, their advice may receive different 
degrees of respect: from total acceptance to total 
rejection. Those committees which do not enjoy a legal 
status may still be consulted because they are tacitly 
"legitimized" for consultation (Kogan, 1975). Still other 
committees may not enjoy this "legitimization", they may 
have informal and unbinding dialogue with the policy-maker. 
There are basically two interpretations of these 
committees. On the one hand, such committees are channels 
of representation. On the other hand, they provide 
legitimacy for policy-making. 
Many authors regard advisory committees as an 
'important medium of communication between the government 
and organised interests" (Smith, 1976: 69). Theoretically, 
the advisory committee provides a forum for the various 
interests and value systems to interact; the job of the 
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government then is to provide administrative support and to 
implement the policies made by the policy-maker. 
However, in reality, the government has grown into a 
bureaucracy and has its own interests to defend. There are 
then not only interactions among the interest groups, but 
also between the government sectors and the interest groups. 
Interaction of the latter type is even more 'political'. 
Under these circumstance, the advisory committees provide a 
channel for political exchange. On the one hand, the 
government bureaucracy needs information and support from 
the interest groups in the making, defending and 
implementing of its policies. On the other hand, the 
interest groups need access to and influence over policy- 
making (Peters, 1977; Richardson and Jordon, 1979 abridged 
in McGrew and Wilson, 1982: 275-276). Advisory committees 
satisfy both. 
In this context, Peters discerns four "modes" of 
interactions between the government bureaucracy and the 
various interest groups: (a) where legitimate groups are 
legally and officially Involved in making policies; (b) 
where legitimacy is only granted to one particular group; 
(c) where there is "kinship" between the "hegemonic' policy- 
maker and an interest group; and (d) where illegitimate 
groups not compatible with the system of legitimacy then act 
'outside the pale of normal political actions" (Peters, 
1977: 262-270). 
The political exchange between the government 
132 
Chapter 3: Theory 
bureaucracy and the interest groups can be expressed in the 
currency of legitimacy: the government bureaucracy gains 
legitimacy through accumulation of information and 
acquisition of support; the interest groups gain legitimacy 
for being involved in the policy-making process. The 
transaction of legitimacy takes place in the advisory 
committees. 
It is therefore essential to understand how the 
government bureaucracy selects the membership of advisory 
committees, i. e., to separate the "insiders' from the 
"outsiders" (Grant, 1977: 16). In this respect, Kogan 
classifies groups which are consulted into legitimised and 
non-legitimised groups. Three points are central to Kogan's 
classification: First, interest groups are legitimised if 
they have a statutory or conventional right to be consulted. 
Second, the right to be consulted is never specific and the 
decision to consult is in the gift of the government. 
Third, although the authority rests with the government, 
it takes a major dislodgement of the power system for 
an identifiable interest group to be disregarded on any 
decision affecting its members (Kogan, 1975: 75). 
Hence, effectively, the legitimacy system of 
consultation is closely geared to the power system and to 
the conventions in the society. Jennings further argues 
that because of conditions based on assessments of power and 
influence by parties, there are restrictions on who may be 
consulted and when. He states: 
These restrictions... tend to distort the meaning of 
consultation by a priori selection of those to be 
consulted and by delaying consultation until the 
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political metes and bounds of decisions have been well 
established (Jennings, 1977: 184). 
11.4.3. Advisory committees for legitimation 
Peters' classification, however, does not address the 
case where the government has control over policy-making, as 
is the case in this study. Here, the government, formally or 
informally, is held responsible for making policies. 
Under these circumstances, the advisory committees may 
play two roles: legitimating the policies and legitimating 
the government. 
In the first role, the committees provide the 
government with the necessary information to formulate and 
implement policies with confidence. Or, in a "conspiracy" 
context, the government may use advisory committees to 
"camouflage", i. e. to legitimate a policy by "impartial" 
recommendation (Smith, 1976: 70). The government may also 
use advisory committees to delay taking a decision, to 
capture the support of organised interests by involving them 
in the policy-making process, or to "nobble" the opposition. 
Critics can be pacified by the appointment of a 
committee which creates the impression that something 
is being done when it is not, or that consultation is 
being taken when it is not (Ibid. ). 
Gaziel has similar observation in his study of the 
French case (1980). There, the advisory councils play the 
dual role of constituting an objective appraisal of 
government performance and confirming the policies of the 
government, shielding it from criticism (See also 11.3.4. of 
this Chapter). One of Jennings' points is also that the 
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committee "fulfils a political purpose in that it makes 
consultation amenable to control and the results more 
predictable" (Jennings, 1977: 184). 
In this way, the government bureaucracy passes its 
policies by the endorsement of some legitimate machinery - 
the advisory committee - but it manages to control this 
machinery. Legitimation again has nothing to do with the 
appropriateness of the policy. 
The second role of advisory committees pertains to what 
may be called "second level legitimation': the government 
manages to develop or is obliged to entertain a convention, 
or belief, that working through advisory committees is the 
most acceptable means of making policies. If this can be 
established, then the advisory committees not only 
legitimate the policies, but more importantly legitimate the 
government itself. 
This ideology can be developed to the extent that the 
government puts tremendous efforts into building this 
legitimacy (convention and belief that advisory committees 
are amenable), even at the cost of accepting some policies 
that may be detrimental to the bureaucracy. In this last 
case, the government trades benefits in specific areas for 
the legitimacy of its general authority. 
11.4.4. Third-party consultations 
Third-party consultation differs from the consultations 
discussed above in that the consultant is not an interested 
party in the policy involved. There are two common instances 
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of third-party consultations. The third party could be 
composed of high-prestige and supposedly neutral community 
leaders. It could also be a special mission from overseas. 
Third-party consultation can be regarded as a kind of 
conflict management, or constructive crisis management, 
which is typical of organization development (OD) once 
prevalent in the United States. Third-party consultation, 
also known as third-party intervention, is a particular form 
of process consultation whereby people in the same 
organization better understand one another and hence 
eliminate unnecessary conflicts (Schein, 1969: 9; French and 
Bell, 1969: 137; Huse, 1980: 330). 
Little is mentioned in educational policy-making of 
third-party consultation, or OD at all (an exception could 
be Carron, 1982: 16), but it could be argued that the concept 
is readily adopted by many governments. 
During the crisis of an uncompromisable conflict, the 
third-party has the merit of being impartial. It does not 
represent the interests of the conflicting parties and 
therefore has no vested interest in the solutions. Hence, 
the impartiality gains legitimacy for both the third party 
and whoever invites the third party. In this sense, third- 
party consultation is an alternative to expertise whose 
legitimacy again dwells in its impartiality. 
Whether the third-party does a good job or not, whether 
the conflict is solved or not, Is a secondary concern. If 
the government initiates a third-party consultation, the 
initiation per se allows the government to withdraw itself 
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from the conflict and evade accusations of biased value 
judgements. 
11.4.5. Public opinion 
The above discussions already involve the notion of 
public opinion. If public opinion favours rational 
expertise, experts get the legitimacy to participate in 
policy-making; if public opinion endorses top-down 
consultations, committees acquire the legitimacy to make 
policies; if, after all, the government make policies in 
ways favoured by public opinion, then the government gains 
the legitimacy of being a policy-making authority. 
However, `public opinion' is a subtle concept. In 
reality, what the public opinion is is open to 
interpretations. Nevertheless, public opinion constitutes 
another currency in the policy-making arena. 
Actors who represent a significant body of public 
opinion have a stronger say in policy-making. Such a 
representation may be acquired through the leadership of a 
large organization (union, pressure group, ... ) or coalition 
of organizations, or through majority support by election 
votes. The policy-maker may feel obliged to involve such a 
representative in the policy-making machinery, or at least 
to enter into dialogue with this representative. Otherwise, 
the policy-maker may be accused of neglecting the public. 
Actors may also carry weight if they can demonstrate 
that they have access to public opinion. Those who conduct 
opinion polls and public hearings are examples of such 
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justifications. A government may well claim legitimacy for 
a "White Paper" if the preceding "Green Paper" has undergone 
a process of public consultations. 
In a way, public opinion provides an actor with the 
"ticket" to the game of policy-making. In more academic 
terminology, representation of or access to public opinion 
provides the actor with the legitimacy to participate in 
policy-making. 
The legitimacy provided by public opinion can be a very 
strong one. Actors who appear to represent or have access 
to public opinion may claim to play judge in the legitimacy 
game. They are supposed to know what is legitimate and what 
is not, because they may claim they represent the norm or 
belief that constitutes legitimacy. 
The legitimacy due to public opinion is also different 
from that due to expertise. They belong to different sets 
of value principles. The legitimacy of expertise comes from 
the belief that policies are good if they are produced by 
experts who possess the knowledge, who can handle 
uncertainties and who are independent of biased interests. 
The legitimacy of public opinion comes from the belief that 
policies are good if the all interests are represented. 
11.5. Summary on Legitimacy 
In this section, the concept of legitimacy and its 
application to interpreting various aspects of the policy- 
making process have been discussed at length. This 
138 
Chapter 3: Theory 
explanation of the policy-making process is an attempt to 
find an alternative to the various rationality explanations 
elaborated in the previous section. 
While the three types of rationality (See 1.7 of this 
Chapter) are concerned with producing some "good" policy or 
a 'good" process to produce some acceptable policy, 
legitimacy is concerned with the process per se. As far as 
the process is "legitimate", legitimacy is achieved. 
The notion of legitimacy in this thesis is adopted in 
its broadest sense. It does not delimit itself to the 
legalization of public policies in a formal way, nor does it 
follow the framework of a legitimation crisis in a State. 
In this thesis, legitimacy is taken to mean the framework of 
values, beliefs and conventions people hold to judge policy- 
making. Hence, legitimacy is a type of "second-level 
objective" which is not directly visible from the form of 
the policy-making activities, let alone their products. It 
is seen only through the system of values, beliefs and 
convention people hold towards policy-making. 
Some effort is devoted to explain, in legitimacy terms, 
the role of expertise and consultation in public policy- 
making. It becomes apparent in the explanations that there 
could be two kinds of objectives or two levels of objectives 
in the process of legitimation. At one level, expertise or 
consultation is employed to legitimate policies. That is, 
as an alternative to saying that a policy is "right", 
employment of expertise and consultation allows the 
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government to say that the policy has been produced in the 
"right" manner. At a higher level, when employment of 
expertise and consultation in policy-making is commonly 
believed to be "good" then the government which employs them 
acquires the legitimacy of being a "good" government. 
By the same token, there could be a fifth sense of 
legitimacy in addition to the four senses of legitimacy in 
educational policy-making (See 11.2 of this Chapter). In 
this fifth sense, each actor in policy-making has to be 
conscious of his own legitimacy. 
Further elaboration in this direction will be left to 
the conclusions in Chapter Six. 
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III. The Multipioity of Models 
Before ending this chapter of theories, it is necessary 
to discuss the issue of multiple models. It is quite 
possible for authors to explain the same policy-making 
process using parallel but distinctively different 
explanations. As will be seen in the following chapters, 
this is of particular concern to this study. If different 
models can explain the same event, what is then the status 
of each of these models? What are their inter-relations? 
What is then the "reality"? In this respect, the seminal 
work by Graham Allison: The essence of decisions: explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis is frequently quoted and his models 
borrowed. The discussions below starts with the Allison 
models and proceeds to see how different authors view this 
multiple model approach. 
111.1. The Allison Models and their Interpretations 
111.1.1. Allison: parallel explanations 
The best known case of parallel explanation is that 
presented by Allison who explains the Cuban Missile Crisis 
by three models. In the three models, decision-making is 
viewed as rational, organizational and political process 
respectively. In each model, he tries to ask the same 
questions, but the three models provide completely different 
types of answers. There are therefore three different 
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explanations of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
With hindsight, the models themselves do not seem to be 
excessively impressive. For example, Lindblom is quoted by 
Allison as example of governmental political model (Allison, 
1971: 154), and not of organizational process model. This 
may not meet unanimous endorsement from contemporary 
writers. In his concluding chapters, Allison in fact finds 
difficulties in strictly separating discussions of his Model 
II (Organizational Process Model) from those of Model III 
(Governmental Politics Model). 
The merits of Allison are mainly in the approach. His 
pluralistic approach presented a challenge to the tradition 
of accepting any one model as the model. By presenting three 
parallel explanations, Allison illustrated the possiblity of 
adopting a multiplicity of perspectives. Based on the same 
facts, each model proceeds within its own framework and adds 
its own value judgement: 
Each conceptual framework consists of a cluster of 
assumptions and categories that influence what the 
analyst find puzzling, how he formulates his question, 
where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an 
answer (Allison, 1971: 245). 
Therefore, what are presented as facts are not merely facts, 
Rather, they are points that emerge when one mixes 
traces of evidence with judgement; one is inclined to 
accept or reject the judgements depending on the logic 
of the model within which he is working (Ibid.: 248). 
The implication of Allison's approach is not only the 
multiplicity, but also that any single model is never value- 
free. Hence it is difficult to talk about the model. 
However, by the end of his book, Allison was tempted to 
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move away from pluralism and to incorporate the three models 
in a "grand model" (Ibid.: 255). He attempts to see the 
models as consecutively complementing the previous one: 
Model I fixes the broader context, the larger national 
patterns and the shared images. Within this context, 
Model II illuminates the organizational routines that 
produce the information, alternatives and action. Within the Model II context, Model III focuses in 
greater detail on the individual leaders of a govern- 
ment and the politics among them that determine major 
governmental choices (Ibid.: 258). 
This view does not seem to be shared by those who borrow 
from Allison's models to explain other policy-making events. 
III. 1.2. Karat: alternative perspectives 
Karst (1977) renamed the Allison models as the 
economic, political and organizational models and applied 
them to analysing the decision-making process in school 
districts (in the U. S. ) to see how this affected the 
resulting expenditures after a school finance reform. He 
agrees with Allison in that the models represent different 
perspectives: 
The model used in an analysis critically influences 
what information is considered relevant, how the 
decision-making process is viewed, and how the outcomes 
of that process are interpreted (Ibid.: 308). 
However, his conclusion remains pluralistic, that 
"alternative models used in concert increase the likelihood 
of a clearer grasp of the whole" (Ibid.: 308-9). 
Such an approach is also used by Tyack (1976) who uses 
five models to explain the cause of compulsory education. 
He observes that 
Alternative ways of seeing not only draw on different 
kinds of evidence, but also depict different levels of 
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social reality and so aid us in gaining a wider and 
more accurate perception of the past (Ibid. ). 
III. 1.3. Peterson and Williams: multiple dimensions 
Peterson and Williams studied the Chicago School Board 
and used exactly the Allison models to analyse the decision- 
making process. They view each of the models as observation 
in a particular dimension: 
Each of the three models ... offers a distinctive way of understanding the decision-making of the school 
board. It should be clear from the beginning, however, 
that we believe that each model presents only one facet 
of the totality of the situation. Although the analogy 
may not be exact, it can be said that the model is like 
one snapshot of a three-dimensional event. Only by 
interrelating the three models does the full picture 
emerge (Peterson and Williams, 1977: 153, original 
emphasis). 
This notion is near to the conception of the blind men 
and the elephant". This is somehow shared by Harman, who 
opines that the multiplicity of approaches 
should ... be thought of partly as different ways of thinking about different kinds of policy processes and 
partly as tools that can be used in combination 
(Harman, 1978: 25). 
111.1.4. Lane: the 'right' model 
Lane (1983) applies four decision-making models to 
Swedish higher education: incrementalism, the demographic 
model, the rational model and the garbage-can model. His 
view on the multiple models is that 
Different models satisfy different situations. The 
different models ... must be confronted with a common body of data in order to make possible the evaluation 
of their different claims to truth in terms of the 
extent to which the models satisfy the situations 
derivable from the data (Ibid.: 521-22, original 
emphasis). 
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His effort was therefore to seek whether any of the four 
models fits the data concerning higher education in Sweden. 
In the end, Lane discovers that none of the four models is 
satisfactory and proposes a particular "public administra- 
tion model" that will successfully explain policy-making in 
Swedish higher education. 
The assumption in Lane's study is that for any 
particular situation, there should be one model that can 
match the truth. The difference in models is therefore not 
a matter of perspectives, or a matter of dimensions, but a 
matter of appropriateness to particular situations. 
Implicitly, there should be a "correct" model for each 
situation. 
Lane's approach seems to have confused the objective 
reality and the subjective interpretations of the reality. 
The danger of such an approach is that once a model is 
adopted, one tends to become blind to other alternatives and 
hence excludes the possibility of alternative theories. 
111.1.5. Crowson: models as prescriptions 
Crowson (1975) also used exactly the Allison models. 
However, he treats the rational model as obsolete because 
"assumptions of rationality are no longer adequate for the 
development of educational planning theory" (Ibid.: 57). 
Crowson therefore urges that attention should be paid to the 
organizational and political constraints which are best 
delineated by Allison's other two models. 
This prescriptive use of the Allison models is less 
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appropriate than other models in educational planning. For 
example, Williams contrasts the technocratic model which was 
suited to the expansionists' 1960s with the political model 
which gradually replaced the former (1979: 125). Kogan 
distinguishes a second generation planning model, which 
takes the multi-value political mode, from the first 
generation planning model which emphasises the quantifiable 
and the predictable" (1980: 8). 
111.1.6. Benjamin and Kerchner: actors' perspectlves 
Benjamin and Kerchner (1982) attempted to 
operationalise and quantify the Allison models to which they 
added the garbage-can model. The four models were then 
operationalised as 15 key concepts. A-methodology (60 A- 
sort items) was then applied to higher education decision- 
makers (each with four scores) to test their perceptions of 
the decision-making processes. 
Apart from questions in the methodology, Benjamin and 
=Kerchner substituted "insider" views for 'outsider' 
analysis, and individual feelings for holistic perceptions. 
There is also the doubt why the four models should be the 
'only' models and what should be done when the subject does 
not conform to any one of the models. Such a study can 
easily be criticised as purely a juggling of research 
techniques and a misuse of the models. 
111.1.7. Bush: a comprehensive model 
Although Bush Works in educational administration 
rather than policy-making, his theories are'near to those 
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used in the latter. In his recent publication (1986), he 
describes five different types of models: formal models, 
democratic models, political models, subjective models and 
ambiguity models. The different models represent different 
perspectives with different assumptions about the basic 
aspects of an organization. He views that these models 
'differ along crucial dimensions but taken together they 
provide a comprehensive appraisal' of the situation. He 
calls this notion a comprehensive model (Bush, 1986: 126). 
He quotes Baldbridge et al.: 
[... ] the search for an all-encompassing model is 
simplistic, for no one model can delineate the 
intricacies of decision processes in complex 
organizations (1978: 28). 
In fact, earlier, Bush (with Goulding, 1984) used four 
of these models to explain the decision processes in one 
institution (Bush and Goulding, 1984: 260-262). 
Bush's notion of a comprehensive model comes near to a 
multiple perspective approach which is adopted in this 
study. 
111.2. A Multiple Perspective Approach 
The co-existence of parallel explanations lead to the 
notion of multiple perspectives. 
IIl. 2.1. Parallel explanations and reality 
Do the parallel explanations all tell the "truth? Or 
does anyone of then offer superior explanation? Or are they 
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simply arbitrary propositions? Or, .... The answers to 
these questions depend on the researcher's attitude towards 
reality. There could be three such attitudes, as have been 
put forward by Lincoln and Guba (1985: 82-87)(They put 
forward four, which are now collapsed into three in this 
thesis). 
First, there is no reality at all. The parallel 
explanations are simply arbitrary constructions of 
individual minds. 
Second, there is an objective reality. Each of the 
parallel explanations are is a different interpretation of 
the same reality. These parallel explanations are partial 
and incomplete and full knowledge is never possible. 
Third, there is an objective reality. This reality can 
be fully understood in the long run. The parllel 
explanations therefore represent approximations or partial 
"truth" and may eventually converge to some "ultimate 
theory". 
Every researcher has to take a stand and make a choice 
among these attitudes. 
111.2.2. The multiple perspective approach 
The author of the present thesis believes in an 
objective reality external to the human mind, but he does 
not follow the notions in either the second or the third 
cases above. The following are some elaborations: 
(a) Take policy-making as an example. Compared with the 
complexity of policy-making processes, one can safely say 
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that the existing theories are still relatively simplistic. 
While human knowledge about the policy-making process is 
ever growing, the process itself is getting ever more 
complex. To hope for an ultimate theory of policy-making is 
simply a static point of view and is unrealistic. 
(b) The parallel explanations are not merely partial 
and incomplete perceptions. The parallel explanations as 
they stand each contributes to the understanding of the 
reality. Each of them provides a perspective of the whole 
reality. If we take each explanation positively, then the 
totality of all the parallel explanations form the body of 
knowledge of the reality. We shall call these the multiple 
perspective approach. 
(c) The multiple perspective approach is not the case 
of the 'blind men and the elephant'. Each of the blind men 
perceives only a part of the elephant, whereas each of the 
parallel explanations pertains to the whole body of reality. 
The knowledge of the blind men can be integrated to one 
coherent piece. Multiple perspectives do not always lend 
themselves to coherent integration. 
(d) The multiple perspective nature of the explanations 
is determined by the fact that analyses of policy-making 
process rely on subjective data. The data collected about a 
political process (and in fact all social processes) reflect 
'facts' as well as the perception of supplier of data. This 
Is however, the only way complex political processes can be 
understood. 
(e) The multiple perspective approach is not the same 
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as the notion of multiple reality. The latter as it is used 
in the literature usually connotes a denial of a reality 
external to the researcher, or that "reality" is simply a 
synonym for "interpretations". The multiple perspective 
approach provides a multiple perspective picture of the 
social reality. 
(g) It may be true that the different explanatins do 
not apply evenly to all parts of the political process. A 
certain model may better explain certain type of processes. 
Each political process has its own characteristics and does 
not entertain all explanations equally. 
As can be seen in Chapters Four and Five, the two 
Episodes are analysed using two different frameworks. each 
of the explanations contribute to the understanding of the 
reality in policy-making. The message here is that trying 
to explain a political process by one single theory or model 
is inadequate. 
IV. Sua*ary of Chapter Throe 
This chapter has surveyed theories on policy-making 
encountered during the course of the study. In particular, 
the typical models and theories are analysed starting with 
Simon's notions of rationality as a frame of reference. The 
notion of legitimacy is then discussed in detail In the 
context of policy-making. 
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A distinction begins to emerge. On the one hand, there 
is the rationality line of thinking. Whether it is 
substantive, procedural or 'partisan", the rationality 
models look at the policy-making process as an important 
means to arrive at some policy, be it "optimal" or 
"satisfactory'. That is, the success of the process is 
assessed by the extent it achieves its primary function. On 
the other hand, there is the legitimacy notion, where the 
design of the policy-making process aims not so much at the 
goals as at the procedures of policy-making. Thereby, the 
policy-making process legitimates the policy and the policy- 
maker. Hence, there is a secondary function in the policy- 
making process which is not directly related to its primary 
function. Both notions of rationality and legitimacy will 
be adopted in Chapters Four and Five to explain the two 
Episodes. 
There is also an attempt to survey different authors' 
views on the approach of using multiple models, and to 
clarify the stand of this study towards the multiple 
perspective approach. 
There will be a further discussion of the theories in 
the conclusions in Chapter Six when the analyses have been 
made. 
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THE CRE REVIEW C1980-1981) 
0. Introduction 
The Committee to Review Higher and Technical Education, 
the CRE, which operated in 1980-81, is the first Episode to 
be examined in this research. As mentioned in the 
Introduction to this thesis, little was known to the public 
except the announcement of its establishment and some 
scattered pieces of news. Information included in this 
chapter therefore comes mainly from research interviews and 
survey of unpublished documents. The chapter will be 
divided into four sections: (a) basic facts about the CRE, 
its operation and its outcome; (b) the development of the 
manpower model which was seen to be central to the episode; 
(c) a preliminary analysis of the episode by way of 
identifying and describing the actors who significantly 
influenced the decision-making (This analysis of the actors 
will also be significant in the other episode, the OECD 
review, analysed in Chapter 5); and (d) analysis of the 
episode, using two different perspectives: the rational 
explanation and the legitimacy explanation. 
152 
Chapter 4: CRE 
I. Operation and Outcomes of the CRR 
This section is devoted to describing the basic facts 
about the operation of the CRE. The description is largely 
based on documentary data extracted from published as well 
as unpublished sources. 
I. I. The Appointment 
On November 18,1980, the Hong Kong Government 
announced: 
With the approval of the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Ken Topley is to 
relinquish on Thursday (November 20) his appointment as 
Director of Education to undertake an in-depth study of 
Hong Kong's higher education requirements as full time 
chairman of a Committee to Review Post-secondary and 
Technical Education (Government Press Release, November 
18,1980). 
The Committee, usually abbreviated as the CRE is also 
nick-named the "Topley Committee". It was announced that 
the CRE, which had broad terms of reference, would report to 
the Governor-in-Council within 6 months. On completion of 
the Review, Topley would become the newly created Secretary 
for Education in the Government Secretariat (Ibid. ). 
A few days later, the CRE invited recommendations from 
the public (Government Press Release, November 24,1980). 
Meanwhile, major educational bodies received formal 
invitation for written representations. 
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1.2. Terms of Reference of the CRE 
The terms of reference of the CRE were presented in the 
form of six considerations, and recommendations were 
expected In five aspects. 
1.2.1. Six considerations 
The CRE was required to pay regard to six 
considerations (DSCRE/1). These, in concrete terms, 
specified the background for the setting up of the CRE. The 
six considerations were: 
Firstly, the advice of the UPGC about the 
"uncomfortable Implications' of the slow growth rate 
for universities and the Polytechnic. 
The UPGC worries referred to the annual growth rate of 
3% for the universities and a ceiling of 12,000 full-time- 
equivalent students at the Polytechnic. These were policy 
targets laid down in the 1978 White Paper (Development, 
1978). It felt that a significant proportion of the 3% 
annual expansion had been pre-empted by the requirements of 
the new medical and dental schools (the former in The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong and the latter in the 
University of Hong Kong), leaving little scope for the 
introduction of new courses or the expansion of departments 
outside the medical and dental fields (DSCRE/0: 15). In 
September, 1980, the Governor-in-Council decided that the 
growth rate at the universities should be raised from 3% to 
4% per annum (Ibid.: 8). Given that, UPGC members still felt 
that this 1% increase only covered the extra expansion due 
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to the new projects, but did not to real terms improve the 
3% growth rate <ISUO3). 
Secondly, the concern of the Advisory Committee on 
Diversification that (i) the current higher education 
policy might not meet both the social and economic 
demands; lii) technical institutes should be more 
flexible and responsive and (lii) part-time adult 
education should be a means for upgrading Hong Kong's 
manpower. 
The Advisory Committee on Diversification was an 
independent committee set up by the Governor in 1977, to 
advise whether the process of diversification of the 
economy, with particular reference to manufacturing 
industries, can be facilitated by modifying existing 
Government policies or introducing new policies" (Report, 
1979b: 2). The Committee produced its report in 1979 (Ibid. ). 
A full chapter was devoted to education and training (Ibid.: 
Chap IX). The Advisory Committee noted in its report that 
the small increases in university and Polytechnic enrolments 
proposed in the 1978 White Paper contrasted sharply with the 
growth rates of earlier periods. It was also worried that 
the necessary provision of craftsmen might be jeopardised 
by the potential students being drawn away to the expanded 
senior secondary sector" (DSCRE/0: 16). The Advisory 
Committee also proposed to remove the technical institutes 
from the Education Department and to place them under the 
Hong Kong Training Council. 
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Thirdly, the likely decrease of students going overseas 
in view of the fee rise. 
The increase of fees for overseas studies can best be 
exemplified by the British situation: 
Table 4.1 Fees payable by overseas students on first 
degree courses in Britain (in sterling pounds): 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
940 existing students 1165 1389 
(all courses) new students: - 
( ) Arts 2000 2500 
( ) Science 3000 3600 
t ) Medicine 5000 6000 
Similar developments occurred in Australia and Canada, 
both of which traditionally attracted a large number of 
students from Hong Kong (DSCRE/O: 17-18). 
It was always difficult to reckon the exact number of 
Hong Kong students in overseas universities, but the general 
estimate was that this number exceeded that of students in 
local Institutions of higher education. 
Fourthly, the likely increase of post-sixth form 
candidates as a result of the expansion of secondary 
education. 
The concern with the significant increase in post-sixth 
form candidates was reflected in a report of the Committee 
on Sixth Form Education which was set up within the Board of 
Education in 1978. A report was published in June, 1979 
(Report, 1979a). This provided a framework to streamline 
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the matriculation system in Hong Kong where the two 
universities had different durations of undergraduate 
courses and different matriculation requirements. There 
were, therefore, two matriculation examinations held one and 
two years respectively after completion of Form 5. The so- 
called Sixth Form Report also put forward the theme of 
broadening the sixth form curriculum so that it does not 
only prepare university entrants (Board, 1978). 
Fifthly, the right mix of trained manpower for 
employment demands. 
This pertains to the priority of manpower training as 
indicated by the estimated technologist-technician-craftsman 
ratio. The Hong Kong Training Council continued to predict 
that there would be a shortfall of craftsman. However, 
whether this would be the real case and what should be the 
methodology to do the prediction were open to question. 
Sixthly, the high proportion of the educational vote 
already devoted to higher education. 
This pertains to the priorities in resource allocation. 
In practice, the development of higher education in Hong 
Kong was "demand-led" (ISBOI) and not "resource-led", i. e. 
programmes were financed once they were justified (ISU01a; 
ISOR2), and therefore real competition for resources did not 
exist (ISX08). However, the CRE was reminded of the high 
proportion - some 29% - of the educational vote for higher 
education as a matter of resource priority when the 
population in general education was 40 times greater than 
that in higher education. 
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1.2.2. Areas of Study of the CRE 
The CRE was then required to advise on five aspects: 
(1) the adequacy of the present pattern and range of 
institutional provision for post-secondary 
education; 
(2) current and projected educational and training 
needs at different levels, including university 
education, teacher education, vocational and 
professional education and technical and community 
education; 
(3) student enrolment targets for the decade commencing 
with the next triennium (See Chapter 1) in 1984 in 
the range of available and prospective courses; 
(4) policy options with recommendations relating to 
(a) the expansion of existing institutions; 
(b) the creation of new institutions; 
(c) relationships between institutions; 
(d) the use of distance learning; 
(e) alternative courses of action and development 
(5) the feasibility or desirability of instituting 
public scholarship (or other schemes) for degrees 
overseas either generally or in particular fields 
of study. 
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1.3. Membership of the CRE 
I. 3.1. The list 
There were fourteen members plus one secretary for the 
CRE. They were (DSCRE/0): 
K. W. J. Topley 
Chairman of the CRE, 
Director of Education, 1974 to 1980, 
Secretary for Education Designate 
E. L Alleyne (Mrs) 
Registrar of the University of Hong Kong 
W. M. Bradley 
Secretary of the UPGC since 1979 
Chen Fong-ching 
Registrar of The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Chen Shou-lum 
Industrialist 
Vice-Chairman of the Hong Kong Training Council 
Member of the Legislative Council 
Henry Ching 
Deputy Financial Secretary 
Ching Yuen-kai 
Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Polytechnic 
C. H. Haye 
The newly promoted Director of Education 
E. P. Ho 
The Secretary for Social Services 
D. G. Jeaffreson 
The Secretary for Economic Affairs 
Daniel Lam See-hin 
Member of the Board of Education 
Manager of the Hong Kong Baptist College 
Lee Quo-wet 
Banker 
Unofficial Member of the Executive Council 
Chairman of the Board of Education 
Andrew Li Kwok-nang 
Barrister-in-Law 
Member of the UPGC 
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C. J. Symons (Rev) 
Principal of Diocesan Girls' School 
Senior member of the Anglican Church 
Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council 
Member of the UPGC 
Member of the BoE 
N. C. L. Shipman 
Secretary of the CRE (Senior Civil Servant) 
1.3.2. Representations of the CRE 
In general, the CRE was represented by all the relevant 
government departments, the major educational advisory 
bodies and the institutions of higher education. 
Quite a number of members possess dual representations. 
The Government representation included the Social 
Services Branch (which used to take care of Education), the 
prospective Education Branch, the Economic Branch, the 
Financial Branch and the Government Secretariat. 
The presence of the Secretary-level officials in the 
CRE guaranteed that the CRE was a high-power committee. The 
direct involvement of the Financial Branch and the Economic 
Branch gave the CRE the status that its decisions, pending 
rubber-stamping, represented Government decisions. 
The major advisory bodies were represented. BoE was 
represented by its Chairman, A. W. Lee and its members Joyce 
Symons and Daniel Lam. Topley himself was Vice-Chairman of 
the BoE. 
The HKTC was represented by S. L. Chen who was rumoured 
to be the government designated Chairman for the new 
statutory body for training, and Dr Y. K. Ching who also 
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represented the HKP. 
The UPGC was represented by Bradley who was the 
Secretary, Joyce Symons who was also a member and Andrew Li 
who was a young Barrister-in-Law. 
The major institutions of higher education were each 
represented by E. L. Alleyne, Registrar of HKU, Dr. Chen 
Fong-ching, Secretary of CUHK, Dr. D. K. Ching, Deputy 
Director of HKP and Daniel Lam, member of the the Board of 
Directors of the Hong Kong Baptist College. 
1.3.3. A brief introduction of the members 
The Chairman, Kenneth Topley, had been involved with 
the development of higher education since 1964 when the 
Special Committee on Higher Education attempted Hong Kong's 
first manpower forecasting (see Chapter 1,111.3.1). He was 
also one of the architects of the Hong Kong UGC (University 
Grants Committee, the predecessor of the UPGC) (ISUO1) and 
was seconded from the then Colonial Secretariat (later the 
Government Scretariat) in 1965 to become the first Secretary 
of the Hong Kong UGC (University, 1976: 2). He had been 
Director of Education since 1974 and was involved in all the 
education policy evolutions since. The Government 
announcement said: 
Mr Topley, aged 58, first joined the Civil Service as a 
Cadet Officer in November, 1955. He was promoted 
through the ranks to Administrative Officer Staff Grade 
A in November, 1972. During that period, he held many 
senior appointments, including those of Commissioner 
for Co-operatives and Fisheries, Deputy Commissioner of 
Labour, Secretary of University Grants Committee, 
Commissioner for Census and Statistics and Director of 
Social Welfare (Government Press Release, November 18, 
1980). 
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The newly appointed Director of Education, Colvyn Kaye, 
had a very different career path. He was in the teaching 
profession right from the beginning in 1953 and was promoted 
within the Education Department up to the post of Deputy 
Director before his CRE appointment. 
The Secretary, Nigel Shipman, was a Government 
Secretariat officer who was very much involved with 
education. He had headed the production of the major 
educational policy papers before the CRE. In particular, he 
was involved in the drafting of both the Green Paper and the 
White Paper in the 1977-78 period. 
A. W. Lee was basically a banker with the largest bank 
with local origin (Hang Seng Bank which is famous for its 
Hang Seng Index). His involvement in education started when 
the CUHK was being established and he became its Treasurer. 
He was then also made Treasurer for the HKP. He was 
appointed an EXCO member since 1968 and became Chairman of 
the BoE in 1977. For health reasons, he left the political 
scene for a while, and rejoined the EXCO In 1984. He was 
often able to enter into direct dialogue with the Governor 
(ISX07). 
Rev. Joyce Symons was the Principal of a prestigeous 
school and was a senior person in the Anglican Church (Sheng 
Kung Hui) which had long been one of the most influential 
school sponsoring bodies in Hong Kong. She was famous for 
her openness in criticising Government education policies 
and was the first educator appointed a LEGCO member. She 
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was for a long time member of the BoE and right before the 
CRE was made a UPGC member, the first local educationalist 
to be made so. 
Daniel Lam was a businessman, but was a member of the 
BoE presumably because of his status as one of the Managers 
of the post-secondary Baptist College. 
S. L. Chen was an industrialist and was an experienced 
member of the LEGCO. He was well known for being 
articulate in industrialists' views in matters of education 
and training. He was always apprehensive of the likely 
shortage of low-skilled manpower because of the expansion in 
education. 
Table 4.2 on the next page may help to summarise the 
situation. 
1.4. The Process 
The CRE held its first meeting on December 4,1980 and 
the final meeting on June 24,1981. It held a total of 32 
sessions, including regular weekly meetings and special 
sessions to hear the views of educators, students and 
interested members of the public (DSCRE/0: 1-2). 
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Table 4.2. Representation of the CRE 
Advisory 
Member Government Bodies 
Toolev 
Al leyne 
Bradley 
Che n 
Ching, H. 
Ching, Dr 
Haye 
Ho 
Jeaffrson 
Lam 
Lee 
Li 
Symons 
** 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
** 
Institution 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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There were 80 Committee papers. A list of the papers 
used during the research can be found in Appendix K. 44 
pieces of written evidence were studied. These were 
submitted to the CRE in response to the open invitation 
issued by the CRE at the outset of its work. Of these 44 
pieces, there were 15 representations from educational 
organizations and the others were made by individuals or 
institutiions. The CRE also invited others to give oral 
evidence. There were 16 pieces of oral evidence. (DSCRE/0: 
App C) 
The CRE paid particular attention to overseas 
experience. Peter Williams, who once advised the 
Government on the 1978 White Paper, was formally invited to 
be the Adviser. He was then Professor of Education in 
Developing Countries in the University of London Institute 
of Education. He visited Hong Kong from March 21 to April 
9,1981. A. Christodoulou, former Secretary of the British 
Open University and Secretary-General of the Association of 
Commonwealth Universities was also met by the CRE. The CRE 
also made use of the opportunity to meet a large number of 
Commonwealth vice-chancellors when the Association of 
Commonwealth Universities held its conference in Hong Kong. 
Bradley, Secretary of the UPGC and member of the CRE, 
visited Australia in February, 1981 to study the structure 
of higher education in New South Wales and Victoria. The 
CRE also received a report from Bray and Leung who visited 
Singapore to study its arrangements for industrial training 
and technical education (DSCRE/0: 3). 
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In March, 1981, the Chairman envisaged that a draft of 
the report would be finished by mid-July and this could be 
finalised after the draft had been studied by the UPGC in 
its September meeting. The Chairman even comforted the 
members that there was no hurry to rush out a final report 
before September. 
(The] drafting of the report will be put in hand 
immediately, with a view to the first draft of the 
report being ready for consideration by the Committee 
in May. June would be devoted to revising the drafts 
of the report with the aim of reaching agreement by 
mid-July. ... If it should turn out that it is not 
possible to adhere to this schedule, it is proposed to 
adjourn the Committee in mid-July, in view of the 
holiday period, and to reconvene the Committee in early 
September for the purpose of completing the report 
(DSCRE/51). 
However, the final Report actually came out in June. 
1.5. The Methodology 
The CRE took a rather "rational" approach which 
believed that policies could be formulated by logical 
deduction based on measurable parameters that can be 
obtained objectively. The following is a brief description 
of the approaches adopted by the CRE in arriving at its 
recommendations. 
The CRE looked at the "demand" and compared this with 
the "supply" of post-compulsory education. The "demand" is 
taken in a broad sense under the title "criteria for 
development". The measurement comprised five aspects: 
students' aspiration, students' abilities, requirements of 
qualified manpower, overseas provisions, and demographic 
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changes. The basic framework was similar to the Working 
Party prior to the 1977 Green Paper (See Chapter 1, 
111.3.3. ), but with much greater depth and the Committee 
collected its own data. 
Z. 5.1. Students' aspirations 
Students' aspirations were examined from four angles: 
(a) the past record of application for places in 
universities and higher institutions; 
(b) a survey of students' preferences among Forms 5,6 and 
7 classes in a representative sample of 30 secondary 
schools; 
(c) the students' opinions as conveyed in the evidence put 
forward by two joint student bodies; and 
(d) an account of Hong Kong students overseas as a measure 
of demand for higher education. 
1.5.2. Students' abilities 
Students' abilities were measured in two dimensions: 
(a) trends in the number of senior secondary students, 
examination candidates and matriculants; 
(b) number of students capable of meeting the present 
academic standard of higher education Institutions. 
I. S. B. Manpower Requirements 
The measurement of manpower requirements was perhaps 
the most substantial part in the entire CRE exercise. The 
measurement was done through seven alternative approaches: 
167 
Chapter 4: CRE 
(a) The Hong Xong Training Council's survey. This had been 
a continuous exercise carried out by the Hong Kong 
Training Council and its predecessor since 1967 (see 
Chapter One, 111.3.2). The survey adopted the 
"employers' opinion method" and surveyed manpower 
requirements in selected industries. In a nutshell, the 
survey looked at the present labour structure in 
individual enterprises and asked for the employers' 12- 
month prediction. This was extrapolated by an "adaptive 
filtering" mathematical technique to a five year 
projection. In this technique, data were so manipulated 
that more recent figures were given more weight (See 
also Chapter One, 111.3.2). 
(b) International comparison. The CRE limited itself to the 
comparison of "density ratio" of skilled manpower: the 
proportion of graduates per 1,000 workers in the labour 
force of developed overseas countries. This was based 
on the data arranged by Prof. W. A. Reynolds of the 
University of Hong Kong. 
(c) Graduate employment surveys. This looked into the 
employment opportunities, earnings and job satisfaction 
of the graduates of the existing institutions. Surveys 
were carried out by the two universities, the 
Polytechnic, the Baptist College and the government 
division in charge of the technical institutes. The 
CRE compiled an integrated picture by listing the 
proportional distribution in three major employment 
sectors: (1) commerce/industry/public utilities; (11) 
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Government and (Iii) teaching. The compiled picture 
also provided some information about graduates' 
starting salaries and their growth. 
(d) Tracer studies. Here the CRE referred to tracer 
studies of the employment history of past graduates. 
Only a pilot study had been done with one of the 
technical institutes (Morrison Hill Technical 
Institute). 
(e) Earnings-education Profiles. This was a survey of level 
of earnings in relation to educational attainment. 
It made use of the 1981 Census data and tried to plot 
the earning-education profiles for Hong Kong. This was 
done by the CRE. 
(f) Manpower Model. This was entirely a CRE endeavour. It 
occupied the two largest paper in the whole CRE 
exercise. The model was built in two stages. In stage 
one, a projection was made by assuming the existing 
occupational structure and arrived at a minimum 
requirement. In the second stage, projection was made 
by anticipating changes in the occupational structure 
which would mean a redistribution of manpower. This 
was done through mathematical models, trends analysis 
and consultations. 
(g) Manpower requirement of particular sectors. This was 
estimated through commissioned studies carried out by 
government departments and professional bodies. The 
study includes a regression-analysis projection made by 
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the government Civil Services Branch; and projections 
submitted by the Director of Social Welfare, the 
Secretary for Social Services, the Public Works 
Department, the Hong Kong Society of Accountants, the 
Hong Kong Management Association Electronic Data 
Processing Committee and the Committee on Management 
and Supervisory Training of the HKTC. 
Z. 5.4. Overseas Provision 
The fourth measure of demand was provision in overseas 
countries. This was based on OECD's 1981 publication which 
provided an international comparison of 
(a) enrolment ratios in higher education, 
(b) public expenditure on higher education. 
Z. 5.5. Demography 
The last concern of demand was demographic factors. 
The CRE looked at the trends in the size of the relevant age 
population using the projections which were carried out by 
the Census and Statistics Department as a regular exercise. 
1.6. The CRE Report 
The CRE forwarded its Report (also broadly known as the 
"Topley Report') on June 24,1981. 
1.6.1. Contents of the CRE Report 
Since the CRE Report was never published, it becomes 
necessary to introduce the contents of the CRE Report. The 
Report was divided into 6 chapters. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. This set the scene. It 
described the background, the considerations and the working 
of the CRE. 
Chapter 2: Criteria for development. In this chapter, 
the CRE worked out the targets for expansion in higher and 
technical education based on various aspects of demand. The 
target was worked out with reference to the five criteria 
mentioned above: students' aspirations, students' abilities, 
manpower requirements, overseas provisions and demographic 
changes. 
Chapter 3: The development of tertiary education 
institutions. This chapter worked on the "supply" side of 
the issue. The supply was worked out on an institutional 
basis, scanning all existing post-secondary institutions. 
Chapter 4: Special Issues. This chapter Identified 
four special areas and made proposals thereupon. These 
areas were (1) part-time and adult education, (2) distance 
learning, (3) colleges of education and (4) assistance to 
students overseas. 
Chapter 5: Summary of principal recommendations 
Chapter 6: Posteript was a rather polemic piece of 
fifteen paragraphs, supplementing the body of the report 
with views that were in the minds of the CRE but which were 
not included in the previous chapters. 
Z. 6.2. Conclusions of CRE 
The comparison of the calculations at the demand side 
and the supply side led the CRE to arrive at a number of 
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conclusions on the demand of higher and technical education. 
Firstly, if students' aspirations were to be respected, 
then the CRE discovered that the students' demand well 
exceeded the existing provision. It reckoned that if every 
post-sixth form applicant were to secure a place, it would 
probably require a three-fold increase in the number of 
places. It also reckoned that twice as many Hong Kong 
students went to universities overseas compared with those 
who went to local ones. Many of these never applied locally 
and so the demand should be greater than what was 
demonstrated in the local scene (DSCRE/0: 30-31). 
Secondly, with respect to student abilities, the CRE 
discovered that even if the number of places expanded to two 
to three times of the existing provision, there should be 
sufficient suitable candidates to meet the academic 
standards that the courses required (DSCRE/0: 41). 
Thirdly, most of the manpower measurements mentioned 
above pointed to 
(a) a shift in distribution of employment to industries 
which require a greater proportion of highly 
educated manpower; and 
(b) a change in the occupational structure of 
industries towards a higher content of professional 
and technical administrative and managerial workers 
(DSCRE/0: 75-76). 
Fourthly, the study of provisions in overseas countries 
showed that the provision of higher education in Hong Kong 
172 
Chapter 4: CRE 
had been remarkably low. The CRE "felt concerned that Hong 
Kong's relative economic position in the world contrasted so 
markedly with the opportunities it provided to enter higher 
education" (DSCRE/0: 88). 
Fifthly, the demographic trend revealed that there 
would be a decline in the relevant age group and this would 
be helpful to facilitate an increase in the opportunities 
for higher education (Ibid.: 91). 
1.6.3. The Proposed Targets 
The CRE proposed dramatic expansion in higher and 
technical education. 
The CRE proposed that the 2% of age group in degree 
courses should be increased to 8%. The non-degree courses 
were to be doubled. Craft-courses were to be increased to 
more than three times the existing provision. Table 4.3 
gives a summary: - 
Table 4.3 Targets for subsidized tertiary education: 
first year students 
(Source: DSCRE/0: 100) 
1980-81 1989-90 1994-95 2001-02 
(% of age group) 
Degree courses 2.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 
Non-degree courses 16.1 32.5 32.8 32.8 
Craft-courses 9.1 23.5 23.8 23.8 
Total 27.2 62.0 64.6 64.6 
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Z. 6.4. The Recommendations 
The CRE made 32 recommendations (See Appendix J) on the 
"supply" side. These were mainly development targets for 
Institutions. Highlights of the recommendations included: 
(a) expansion of the existing universities, Including a 
new campus for the University of Hong Kong, but not 
a new university; 
(b) Inclusion of degree courses in the Polytechnic and 
Baptist College; 
(c) planning for a second polytechnic; 
(d) establishment of an engineering faculty in The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong; 
(e) building of the seventh and eighth technical 
Institutes; 
(f) creation of a new government department for 
technical education and industrial training; 
(g) experimenting with a purpose-built adult education 
accomodation; 
(h) setting up a working party to oversee teacher 
education; 
(i) preference of increasing local opportunities over 
assistance for overseas studies; 
The main theme of the recomendations was highlighted in 
the Postcript: 
The prime requirement, it appears, is to cater for the 
wider range of aptitudes emerging as a result of the 
expansion of secondary education and to do it as far as 
possible by providing for diversity of opportunity in 
institutions equal in prestige though differing in 
purpose (DSCRE/0: 184). 
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1.7. Fate of the CRE Report 
Z. 7.1. The Executive Council Decision 
The CRE Report, a 195 page volume, was forwarded to the 
Executive Council for discussion and endorsement on July 14, 
1981 (DSXO1). The meeting decided that 
(a) the CRE Report was acceptable as a basis for 
discussion and 
(b) the UGPC was to be consulted. 
The Executive Council also added its own comments. 
These were: 
(a) that economic demand should be given priority 
over social demands in manpower assessments; 
(b) that the set ratio of technologists/technicians to 
craftsman did not seem to match international norm; 
(c) that the pros and cons of financing students 
overseas was to be explored in more detail; 
(d) that there should be provision for certain 
specialists studies overseas; 
(e) the possibility of a Hong Kong university outside 
Hong Kong should be explored; 
(f) the increase of university and polytechnic fees to 
10% of costs should be considered; 
(g) the issue of the 4-year course duration and a 
separate matriculation examination for The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong should be tackled. 
The Chief Secretary, Jack Cater, wrote immediately 
after the Executive Council meeting to the UPGC on July 22, 
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1981 (DSX02). The letter conveyed the following sentiments: 
(A) the Executive Council in general endorsed the CRE 
Report; 
(B) the Executive Council wanted to have the opinions 
of the UPGC on 
(a) a third university, 
(b) the size of the existing universities, 
(c) a second polytechnic, 
(d) degree courses in Baptist College, 
(e) UPGC's taking over of the Baptist College, 
(f) an engineering faculty in the Chinese Univer- 
sity of Hong Kong 
(g) the growth rate of degree courses, 
(h) the expansion of post-graduate studies; 
(C) the Executive Council's additional comments on the 
CRE Report, as mentioned on the previous pages. 
Z. 7.2 . The UPGC Reply 
The UPGC's replied on October 19,1981 after its 
September meeting (DSX03). (The UPGC normally met twice a 
year, in March and in September. ) 
The UPGC's reply started by reiterating its own 
programme target for the tertiary institutions. While the 
Report recommended changing this to 7%, the UPGC maintained 
the 4% growth rate for the universities up to the year 1989- 
90. It explained that "rapid development" was "harmful". It 
would prefer a pace which was "moderately brisk". The same 
principle applied to the growth of other institutions. 
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In reply to the specific questions, the UPGC stated: 
(a) A third university should be considered only after 
1990. 
(b) Expansion of the sizes of the existing universities 
was not agreed with. 
(c) The second polytechnic should be an independent 
Institution (there was a proposal that this could 
be an extension of the Hong Kong Polytechnic). 
(d) The UPGC was glad to take over policy matters in 
connection with the Baptist College. 
(e) "No" was the answer to the proposal of an 
engineering faculty in the CUHK. 
(f) There should be substantial expansion in post- 
graduate studies. 
The Final Decisions 
The UPGC's reply apparently put the Executive Council 
in difficulties. The latter further discussed the issue on 
February 9,1982. The Government was in a dilemma, because 
there were some expectation among the press and 
educational pressure groups that the Committee's Report 
would eventually be published and not to publish the 
Report would incite some pressure groups to campaign 
for publication. However, in the event of publication 
it would be necessary to explain in detail why so many 
of the recommendations have been changed on the basis 
of advice from the UPGC. This could give rise to 
controversy, in particular over the role of the UPGC in 
the formulation of higher education policy (DSX04). 
To publish, or not to publish? The decision was that 
the Report should not be published, 
though it may be necessary for government spokesmen, if 
pressed, to reveal certain findings and recommendations 
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of the Report. As an alternative to publishing the 
Report, it is proposed that the Government should issue 
a policy statement of its own. It is not considered 
appropriate to issue a White Paper at the present time, 
as education policy will be subject to further review 
later in the year following the report of the OECD 
panel. Under these circumstances, it would seem 
appropriate to issue a briefer policy statement 
(Ibid. ). 
However, in the end, the proposal for a replacement 
statement was indefinitely deferred. Since, nothing about 
the CRE has been heard of. This may be considered the end of 
the CRE policy episode. 
I. S. After the CRE 
While little was known to the public about the CRE and 
its report, attention to education was soon drawn to the 
OECD review which was announced in June, 1981 even before 
the completion of the CRE Report. This was meant to be an 
Overall Review of the Hong Kong Education System. A study 
of the OECD provides the substance of Chapter Five. 
However, a number of significance points should be made. 
I. B. 1. What the public knew 
The public knew very little about the CRE. The press 
has a short memory. The news focus soon turned to the OECD 
review. However, one or two papers persisted in probing the 
CRE. 
On January 28,1982, the Sing Tao Jih Pao (a leading 
Chinese daily newspaper) quoted Shipman, Secretary of CRE: 
'A report has been competed for quite some time, but there 
is no fixed date for publication'. It also quoted Topley 
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who said that the OECD panel had 
comment. It further quoted some 
publication of the Topley Repor 
if its recommendations did not 
panel might make. This was the 
EXCO meeting. 
On February 20,1982, the 
read the report but did not 
senior person who said that 
t might cause embarrassment 
agree with those the OECD 
case before the February 9 
South China Morning Post (a 
leading English daily newspaper) released a number of more 
substantial points under the title: "Topley review: April 
release". It was apparently a Government statement in 
reaction to intensive probing. The paragraphs that follow 
was the only official news about the CRE since completion of 
its report: 
The ECRE] report was submitted to the Government on 
June 24 last year. Since that time extensive consulta- 
tions have taken place, especially with the UPGC who 
will consider the matter further during their next 
visit at the end of next month. Following that visit it 
is expected that a comprehensive announcement on the 
Government's policy for the development of tertiary 
education will be made". 
The Morning Post further attempted to confirm news from 
"sources" that the Government has decided against publishing 
the full report; that the CRE called for the establishment 
of a second polytechnic in lieu of a third university; and 
that in 10 years' time there would be an addition of 10,000 
university places, i. e. double the capacity. 
The SCM Post yesterday asked the Education Branch for 
confirmation on these three points but in its response, 
the Branch compeletely evaded the questions. 
On March 31,1982, the Sing Tao Jih Pao revealed that 
"there is high possibility that the Topley Report may become 
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a confidential internal paper and will never be published". 
The paper analysed that besides the "embarrassment" due to 
possible disagreement from the OECD panel, there was a 
second possible explanation that the recommendations were 
too "idealistic" and had encountered strong objections from 
"pragmatists" in the Government. Members of the CRE and its 
Secretariat refused to say anything about the report. 
1.8.2. An Internal document 
The Sing Tao Jih Pao did say that the report was 
circulated among officals at the Director grade and that the 
abridged version was available to administrations of higher 
education institutions. 
The former was confirmed. The CRE Report was issued to 
senior officials of relevant government departments (ISX08; 
CSL02). Its status was dubious. On the one hand, it is not 
a policy document; on the other hand, there has been no 
policy paper to replace it as a guideline for development in 
higher and technical education. At one point in 1984, an 
Executive Councillor said in categorical terms that The 
Topley Report is being updated! " (ISX04), but there was no 
further confirmation of this. 
1.8.3. Policy developments after the CRS 
Despite the lack of a policy paper, technical and 
higher education did not stand still in the five years that 
followed. A number of new developments was closely related 
to the CRE recommendations: 
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In 1982, a statutory Vocational Training Council (VTC) 
was established to replace the Hong Kong Training Council. 
The VTC was equipped with its executive arm, a newly created 
Technical Education and Industrial Training Department 
(TEITD) which was in fact a merger of three divisions: the 
Technical Education Division in the Education Department and 
the original Training Council Division and the Apprentice- 
ship Division under the Labour Department. The VTC took 
over the technical institutes. 
The establishment of the VTC and the TEITD was within 
the recomendations of the CRE report (DSCRE/0: 175). However, 
such arrangements had long been underway with the general 
course of the HKTC which dissolved itself in March, 1981 
before the CRE report was made. 
In 1984, the VTC announced that the seventh and eighth 
technical institute were to be built. This was formally 
recommended by the CRE (DSCRE/0: 131-141). 
In 1984, a second polytechnic, the City Polytechnic, 
started to operate. This was again one of the major 
recommendations of the CRE (DSCRE/0: 117). In fact, in its 
First Report, the Planning Committee for the Second 
Polytechnic attributed its appointment to the CRE proposal 
and the subsequent endorsement by the UPGC (Planning 
Committee, 1982). 
Starting from 1984, the Baptist College was brought 
within the ambit of the UPGC, this was also recommended by 
the CRE (DSCRE/0: 128). 
In 1984, the Financial Secretary, in his annual budget 
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speech, disclosed the plan for higher education development, 
which aimed to provide first degree places for 8% of the 
mean age group 17-20 in 1994-95. This was the target 
proposed by the CRE (DSCRE/0: 171). 
In 1985, both the polytechnics and the Baptist College 
began operating degree courses, another recommendation of 
the CRE (DSCRE/0: 115; 119; 122). 
In 1986, The Chinese University of Hong Kong announced 
its plan to establish an Engineering Faculty, this 
implemented another CRE recommendation (DSCRE/0: 110) which 
was not endorsed by the UPGC. 
However, not all policies agree with the CRE 
recommendations. As an example, the Government announced in 
1986 its commitment to establish a Third University, a point 
refuted by the CRE (DSCRE/0: 115) but favoured by the UPGC. 
Subsidy to overseas undergraduate studies started in 1983, 
although it was restricted to U. K. Meanwhile, the re- 
organization of teacher training facilities and the co- 
ordination of adult education were seemingly neglected after 
the CRE episode. 
According to a Government official: "In sum, the Topley 
Report is a document that has not been accepted, but it 
still conditions our thinking" (ISX09). 
In 1986, under pressure from the elected members of the 
LEGCO, a summary table was released to review the state of 
affairs of the recommendations put forward by the CRE. This 
is included in this thesis as Appendix J. 
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11. Development of the Manpower Model 
The position of the manpower model was conspicuous in 
the CRE episode, as reflected in the CRE Report. It would 
not be an exaggeration to say that the manpower model was 
virtually the backbone for the CRE recommendations. It is 
therefore worthwhile to spend more time to examine how this 
manpower model took shape and what were the reactions to the 
model during the CRE exercise. 
Before we start looking into the details, a time line 
may help: 
Dec 1,1980 CRE Secretary's Paper 
- scene setting for manpower forecasting 
Dec 4,1980 CRE Secretary's letter to Secretary for the 
Civil Services, for manpower survey 
Dec 6,1980 HKTC Secretary's paper 
- the manpower assessment methodologies 
adopted by the HKTC 
Dec * 1980 CRE Chairman's paper 
- manpower studies for educational planning 
Dec 19,1980 Second CRE meeting 
- decided on manpower modelling 
Jan 8,1981 CRE Secretary's paper 
- commenting HKTC survey results 
Feb 1981 Yip's First Report on manpower model 
Mar 13,1981 HKTC's comment on Yip's First Report 
Mar 26,1981 Report of manpower requirements in three 
sectors 
Apr 2,1981 Williams' comment on Yip's First Report 
Apr 15,1981 Yip's Second Report on manpower model 
1981 Williams' reaction to the Second Report 
(*1 Exact date not available. 
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II. i. The Stated Objective 
Why was manpower forecasting adopted as a basic 
approach? We may start from what the CRE claimed as the 
importance of assessing future manpower requirements, that 
there is a need to be satisfied that economic growth 
and the development of the social services would not be 
impeded by deficiencies in educational standards among 
new recruits to the labour force; 
changes in the output from the education system can 
have major repercussions on the labour market and it is 
important that trends within education and within 
employment should be understood; 
they (assessments of manpower) may serve to draw 
attention to particular areas of shortage where 
additional graduates, given the right kind of training, 
may be usefully employed (DSCRE/0: 41-42). 
To substantiate this claim, it is necessary to look at 
the Committee's working papers, to see how the manpower 
approach was actually placed in the process of the CRE 
Review. 
In a scene-setting paper (DSCRE/4) the CRE Secretary 
outlined the responses of the Government to the 
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Diversification 
(ACD). After all, the ACD recommendations formed one of the 
major considerations in the terms of reference of the CRE. 
And two out of the six considerations were on manpower (See 
1.2.1 of this Chapter). 
This paper could be regarded as laying out the basic 
manpower issues and the related controversies to be 
considered by the CRE. These issues included: 
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(1) regular review of the manpower forecasts, 
(2) the 'crisis' for the craft-courses, 
(3) the line between craft and technician courses, 
(4) the governance of technical education, 
(5) the attraction of part-time day-release courses, 
(6) the co-ordination of adult education. 
Immediately after, the Secretary sent a letter to the 
Secretary for the Civil Service, asking the latter to 
conduct a sort of employer's opinion survey in the public 
sector. 
11.2 The HKTC methodology 
Next to this, the CRE Secretary distributed a paper 
from Horace Knight, Secretary of the Hong Kong Training 
Council, who explained on December 6,1980 Its method of 
manpower assessment. 
The HKTC assessment was a biennial exercise for ten 
major industries. Similar exercises were started for six 
service industries. It used the employers' opinion survey 
to obtain data about 
(a) current employed workers with income ranges; 
(b) current workers under training; 
Cc) existing vacancies; 
(d) forecast of additional vacancies; 
(e) education and training workers should have. 
The HKTC used what it called the 'adaptive forecasting 
technique for manpower planning" (See also Chapter 1, 
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III. 3.2) 
Briefly, in this method the available data are weighted 
as the basis for forecasting. The weights used are 
geometric series with heavier weight given to the more 
recent data (DSCRE/5: para 5). 
That is, the method required moderate history of data 
and was more dependent on the recent data. 
HKTC claimed that besides the assessment made by 
Williams, it had consulted the Bureau of Labour Statistics 
of the Department of Labour in the United States, and also 
the Education and Labour Market Policies Branch of the 
International Labour Office. The ILO expert, Keichi Inore, 
commended the HKTC exercise as "an unique method" that 
"contains many lessons to be learnt by other countries" 
(DSCRE/5: Annex D), although he also pointed out that 
substitutability and internal promotion, monitoring and 
cost-benefit analysis should also be taken into account. 
11.3. The Williams' Papers 
Then came the two papers Williams wrote during his 
visit in 1977/78 pertaining to the use of manpower 
forecasting and rate-of-return analysis in educational 
planning. These papers were originally prepared for the 
drafting of the 1978 White Paper. 
In the first paper "Manpower forecasting as a basis for 
educational planning for Hong Kong", Williams briefly 
surveyed the development of manpower forecasting approaches 
elsewhere and concluded that "at the present time, overall 
manpower forecasting is likely to be only very modestly 
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useful to Hong Kong' (DSCRE/6: Annex A: para 6). 
He called for attention to manpower planning which is a 
broader concept than forecasting and involves policies and 
programmes in such fields as wages and incentives, analysis 
of the employment situation, employment creation, labour 
training and retraining, mobility of labour, etc. (Ibid.: 
para 7) 
He went on to evaluate the manpower forecasting method 
used by the HKTC and made strong criticised both the 
technical and conceptual aspects of the method. This had 
received heavy backfire from the HKTC, but that was in 1978. 
The second paper tried to introduce to policy-makers in 
Hong Kong the rate of return approach to educational 
planning. Reference was made to the Hong Kong system, the 
relevant data required, and its implications for policies 
related to the 1977 Green Paper. 
II. 4. The Choice of Manpower Modelling 
The CRE Secretary, in a following paper, addressed the 
difficulties in finding a "reliable method" for manpower 
forecasting (DSCRE/7: 1). He listed 4 different methods at 
hand and tried to justify the adoption of the manpower 
modelling approach (Ibid.: 5). This was regarded as being 
the one most likely to produce useful results", because 
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it makes use of predictions of changes in the size and 
in the composition of the labour force which are 
already available and because the results would be 
constrained within limits on which reasonable 
confidence can be placed (Ibid.: 4). 
Meanwhile, it was emphasized over and over again that 
results of the employers' opinion survey obtained by the 
Training Council will be taken into account' (Ibid.: para 
11; 13), although the overall comment on the survey method 
was its weakness in longer term planning, a comment made by 
Williams in an earlier visit. 
The paper also outlined the two stages in which such a 
manpower model would be developed. 
11.5. Comments on HKTC results 
Before long, on January 8,1981, the Secretary 
distributed another paper on manpower supply and demand 
(DSCRE/12). In this paper, the results of the most recent 
Training Council (79-80) manpower assessments were 
presented. It was disclosed in this paper that in a meeting 
on December 19,1980, the Training Council methodology was 
discussed and a 9-point qualification of the method was 
suggested. Given all these, the assessments pointed to the 
broad conclusion that by 1985 
(1) the supply of technologists should be adequate; 
(ii) the shortfall in the supply of technicans should 
have been reduced and 
(iii) there would continue to be a very serious short- 
fall in the supply of qualified craftsmen. 
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The technologists : technicans : craftsmen ratios would 
be as presented in the following table. 
Table 4.4 Manpower Density Ratio (Technologists as 1) 
Technologists Technicians Craftsmen 
demand 1 3.8 8.4 
supply (1981) 1 2.6 2.1 
(Existing) 
supply (1985) 1 2.6 2.9 
(Projection) 
Two points here might be noticeable for future 
discussions: 
(1) The CRE did not find the HKTC methodology desirable. 
(2) the HKTC assessement pointed to a demand for more 
craftsmen but not technologists nor technicians. 
11.6. The First Report 
The manpower modelling materialized in two reports, 
pertaining to two stages in the development of the Model. 
Stage I was to assume the existing structure of occupation 
and educational levels and to arrive at a minimum 
requirement picture. In Stage II, requirements were 
calculated based on a future structure of occupation and 
educational levels. Both results were done by Yip, a Senior 
Statistician working in the Education Department. 
The First Report (DSCRE/36) was the result of Stage I. 
There were four steps in this stage: (1) projecting the 
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total employment; (2) projecting by industries; (3) 
projecting by occupational groups and (4) translating into 
educational levels. The assumptions in the preceding 
paragraph came into play in steps (c) and (d). 
The nature of the Stage I exercise was best explained 
by one paragraph in the First Report: 
This method is a modification of the OECD Mediterranean 
Regional Project approach which starts from a 
projection of output instead of employment... It may be 
argued that the approach adopted is not linked to the 
targeted output and is therefore looking at the supply 
side of the equation rather than the demand. The 
rationale is that the nature of the Hong Kong economy 
and the flexibility of its labour market are such that 
one can safely assume that there is always full 
employment (Ibid.: 4). 
The findings of Stage I concluded that firstly, the 
whole economy would shift away from primary production 
sectors and accordingly workers would shift towards higher 
educational qualifications. Secondly, comparing supply and 
demand, there would be a shortfall of university graduates 
in 1986 and 1991, but not in 1996 and 2001; however, there 
would be over-provision in other types of post-compulsory 
education. 
The second conclusion apparently ran against the 
conclusions of HKTC findings discussed in DSCRE/12 which 
pointed to an adequacy of technologists (graduates) and a 
serious shortfall of craftsmen. 
The author of the First Report was quick to point out 
that what had been obtained in stage one was only a minimum, 
that is, over-provision might not really mean over- 
provision, but shortfall meant more serious shortfall, given 
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the expanding nature of the Hong Kong economy. 
This First Report was considered by the CRE at its 
sixth meeting held on March 14,1981 (DSCRE/62: 1). It was 
then commented on by the Hong Kong Training Council, the 
Education Department and Williams. 
II. 6.1. The HKTC Response 
The HKTC Secretary, Horace Knight, immediately made a 
brief comment on the First Report. He queried the source of 
data and put forward a large amount of evidence to prove the 
existence of potential errors in the data. In a short 
concluding paragraph, Knight said 
The errors in the data source might be very high and 
would be magnified many times in the process of long- 
term projection. Nevertheless, the quantitative results 
may be used as qualitative indicators for policy 
formation (DSCRE/36a). 
Although this was followed by a vague sentence reiterating 
the importance for a flexible technical and tertiary 
education system, the comments did not seem to represent 
fierce opposition about the implications of the First 
Report. 
11.6.2. Williams' comments 
Williams came to Hong Kong after the First Report was 
completed. Williams made his response to the First Report 
on his way to Hong Kong (DSCRE/47). 
In this paper, he spent a few paragraphs trying to 
distract the CRE from indulgence in pure 'economic 
desiderata'. The main body of the paper was devoted to 
191 
Chapter 4: CRE 
commenting on the First Report. He pointed out a number of 
possible errors and a number of unpredictables, and 
concluded 
My conclusion on the manpower forecasting model that 
has been developed is that whilst it has been 
constructed with a high level of technical competence 
and enormous care its main value to the Committee is to 
illuminate the pitfalls of forecasting rather than to 
lead it to a definite conclusion (Ibid.: 9). 
In more concrete terms, Williams pointed out that 
Since we know that the labour force will become on 
average more educated ...., the model by its nature is bound to show a future large deficit of low-level 
skills and a surplus of high level skills (Ibid.: 10, 
original emphasis). 
He further opined that the change Hong Kong was undergoing 
was not marginal: 
I can't think of any country which has moved as rapidly 
as Hong Kong from more or less universal primary 
education to more or less universal secondary. This 
may produce something of a labour shortage in respect 
of young unskilled workers in the short-term and result 
in rising wages for uneducated labour: in a few years 
time, the basic level of education of new entrants to 
the labour force will be much higher (Ibid.: 11). 
Williams went on to reiterate the possible application 
of rate of return analysis to Hong Kong's education. The 
remarks revolved round the high rate of return of Hong 
Kong's tertiary education: high cost and scarce provision 
in the public sector; and inequity between the public and 
the private sector. 
In short, it could be said that besides giving all 
kinds of technical advice, Williams diplomatically warned 
against the danger of relying heavily on manpower planning 
approaches. 
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11.7. Three Manpower Calculations 
Before Williams made his comment, the CRE Secretary 
distributed three papers containing manpower forecasts for 
three sectors: the Civil Service, the Social Welfare 
Department and the construction industry (DSCRE/44). 
The three calculations all pointed to the future 
inadequacy of high skill manpower. By high skill manpower 
here was meant university and polytechnic graduates as well 
as post-graduates. In the case of the construction industry, 
deficiencies were noted also in the training schemes of 
technicians, craftsmen and operatives. 
II. 8. The Second Report 
After all these comments, a Second Report was produced 
by Yip on April 15,1981 (DSCRE/62). 
M 8.1. Results of the Manpower Model 
The Second Report admitted that although the First 
Report was meant to give a minimum, this minimum had been 
conservative (Ibid.: l). On the supply side, the Second 
report took into account also returning graduates from 
overseas, and this had been considered in greater detail by 
Williams in a separate paper (DSCRE/57). 
The two constants: occupational distribution within 
industries and educational composition of workers within 
occupations had now changed. 
The occupational distribution was projected after (a) a 
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trend analysis, (b) consultations and (c) International 
comparison with reference to Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. 
The educational composition was replaced by the 
"desirable" composition based on consultations and the 
manpower survey conducted by the Hong Kong Training Council. 
Based on this desirable composition, two sets of projections 
were derived: a high projection assuming the target year as 
1991 and a low projection assuming the target as 2001. 
The Second Report concluded, in a typical planning 
language: 
The shortfall of university places in 1980-86, at only 
about 340 a year, seems to suggest the creation of new 
places in existing institutions, while the anticipated 
shortfall after 1986 justifies the creation of a new 
institution. The shortfall of technician and craft 
places in 1980-1986 means the need for at least one 
additional technical institute; to meet the shortfall 
in 1997-2001 requires 8 new technical institutes, or i 
new polytechnic and about 3 technical institutes 
(Ibid.: 25). 
At two points in the Second Report, reference was made 
to the HKTC manpower survey and the Advisory Committee on 
Diversification respectively. 
The ratio of workers with degree to workers with 
technician or equivalent post-secondaty education was 
projected by the Model as betwen I: 1.5 and 1: 1.9. The 
HKTC manpower survey arrived at a figure of 1: 3.3. The 
Second Report argued that if non-technical workers were to 
be included (and these had not been covered by the HKTC), 
the ratio at 1979,1980 were I: 1.3 and I: 1.4 
respectively. The ratios as calculated by the Civil Services 
Branch were I: 1.8 and I: 1.7 and was projected to I: 1.4 
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for 1990/91. The following table may help to visualize the 
situation. 
Table 4.5. Manpower Ratios: Non-degree/Degree Holders 
1979 1980 1990 
CRE Manpower Model 1.3 1.4 1.5 - 1.9 
HKTC --3.3 
Civil Services Branch 1.8 1.7 1.4 
The old debate reappeared in the form of numerical 
data: More degree holders or more sub-degree graduates? 
(DSCRE/62: 13) 
In connection with the point of additional technical 
institutes, the construction of a few more technical 
institutes ran against the Advisory Committee on 
Diversification's apprehension about difficulties of filling 
craft places. This might be even more so when 70% of the F3 
leavers would obtain a place in an ordinary school. This 
made apparent the real problem in planning technical 
education, that provision of places did not guarantee a real 
supply (DSCRE/62: 26). 
11.8.2. Williams' comments on the Second Report 
Williams welcomed the Second report for its more 
realistic approach, particuarly for its employment of actual 
data (DSCRE/62a: para 1-2). 
However, Williams criticised the unrealistic forecast 
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caused by the recognition of only formal qualifications. He 
also warned against the tendency of "trying to impose rigid 
hierarchical classifications on jobs and appropriate 
qualifications for them". 
This seems likely to inhibit mobility and versatility 
of labour which has been one of the great stengths (as 
I understand it at least) of the Hong Kong labour 
scene. The direction of policy and planning in Hong 
Kong should not, in my opinion, be in the direction of 
greater specification of occupation - qualification - 
salary links (DSCRE/62: para 9). 
Williams addressed the problem of under-subscription 
for craft courses and called for a re-structuring of the 
craft courses, given the fact that there were theoretically 
enough Form 4 places for Form 3 leavers. 
In this comment, Williams was more out-spoken on his 
views about manpower forecasting: 
I have a more general set of doubts about the logic of 
what is being attempted through the long-range 
forecasting model used in Phase I and Phase 2. The 
basis for the estimates of manpower required is a 
forecast by the Census and Statistics office of the 
future distribution of employment by industrial sector. 
But this distribution must surely depend on the supply, 
productivity and price of labour and these will depend 
in part on the quantity and quality of the supply. To 
attempt to derive the scale of the education system, 
supply, from a forecast of labour force distribution is 
in some senses a back to front operation, or at best a 
circular one (Ibid.: para 15). 
He called for emphasis on "manpower planning" at least as 
much as manpower forecasting, so that the absorptive 
capacity of the economy for educated labour and the growth 
of productivity of labour had to be studied in order to see 
the "economic need" for post-secondary education (Ibid.: 6- 
7). 
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III. Actors In the CRE 
Before analysing the CRE Episode, it is necessary to 
examine the principal actors and their roles. The actors 
identified and described here will also be significant in 
the OECD review to be discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, it is perhaps necessary to clarify the meaning 
of an actor as adopted in this thesis. There could be at 
least three levels in which people study actors in policy- 
making. At the first level, the attention is on the 
behaviours of the individual participants in the policy- 
making process, to understand how decisions are made in a 
group. This often occurs in the realms of psychology or 
behavioural science and the actors are individuals. At the 
second level, the subject of study is the interaction 
between different organized forces which contribute to 
policy-making. Here, the actors are policy organizations 
and the study usually takes a framework in political 
science. At the third level, the participants in policy- 
making are identified as representing interests of different 
social groups (or classes) in the larger society. Such 
studies often assume a sociological framework, or a 
framework of Marxian political economy. 
In this thesis, the second level meaning of actors is 
adopted. That is, actors are the identifiable organizations 
which participate in the policy-making process. The purpose 
of this study is to understand how these organizations 
interact with each other to yield policy decisions. There 
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will be little discussion, unless necessary, on the 
behaviours or personalities of the individual actors in the 
process; nor will discussion go into the sociological 
background of the groups the actors are representing. 
In this context, the CRE itself is an actor, but since 
the CRE has been discussed in detail, we shall not repeat 
its description. In this section, we shall examine the 
roles played during the CRE exercise by the EXCO, and the 
three advisory bodies - BoE, HKTC and UPGC. 
111.1. The Executive Council (EXCO) 
The EXCO was evidently the chief decision-maker of 
education policies. In this CRE episode, it decided firstly 
the adoption (or non-adoption) of the CRE Report; secondly 
that consultations to be carried out (in this case the UPGC 
as the consultant) and thirdly ways to handle the report (in 
this case non-publication and no substitution). 
As is mentioned in Chapter 1, the EXCO was virtually 
the top decision-making body from which the Governor 
generated his decisions. The Governor seldom made decisions 
without informing or discussing these with the EXCO. The 
farthest the Governor would go was perhaps like the extreme 
case in 1977 when he instituted nine-years compulsory 
education. In this case, only Topley and A. W. Lee were 
"consulted" (See further analysis in Chapter 6,1.1). 
However, it is also evident that the EXCO did not 
prescribe policy decisions. There Is, no evidence that the 
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EXCO had any pre-determined policy options that they would 
have liked the CRE to endorse; or the EXCO would like to 
steer decisions to any certain direction when things were 
"going off the track'. On the contrary, the EXCO was in 
dilemmas when it had to face conflicting constraints. 
For example, when the CRE did not come to terms with 
the UPGC, the EXCO had to find a way to compromise. 
The decision for the non-publication of the CRE Report 
was another example. On the one hand there was the unsolved 
conflict of options and publication of the Report was bound 
to embarrass someone or another; on the other hand, there 
was the public pressure for some outcome from the CRE. 
It was the dilemma, rather than the solution to the 
dilemma, that was indicative of the role of the EXCO. If we 
can single out the CRE episode, the EXCO was more concerned 
with smooth running of policy-making than the substance of 
the policies. 
The EXCO did exercise its "power" to have the final 
say. It added to the CRE recommendations its supplementary 
comments (See I. 7.1 of this Chapter). However, even then, 
the "comments" were new questions more than directives and 
did not play judge in the debate. 
However, these supplementary comments do present a 
challenge to the values behind the CRE recommendations. The 
supplementary comments emphasized economic needs over social 
demand. Its query of technologist : technician : crafstmen 
ratio are inclined to the HKTC viewpoints. Many informants 
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that these reflect the opinions of Sir S. Y. Chung, the Chief 
Unofficial Member of LEGCO and EXCO, himself an engineer and 
identified spokesman for the industrialists. He was the 
architect for the idea of a polytechnic and then the second 
polytechnic. It is also believed that he was the strong 
proponent who gained the Governor's sympathy to start the 
third university which would concentrate on engineering. 
During the EXCO discussion of CRE Report, Chung refuted the 
CRE approach and favoured an education system that would 
give room to production of more craftsmen (ISX08). However, 
on the whole the EXCO comments were still Interrogative in 
nature. 
A number of other points are worth noticing. First, 
the subsidy of overseas students went against CRE decision. 
This eventually became a policy. Second, the increase of 
tuition fees was not within the terms of reference of the 
CRE, not even that of the UPGC. Third, the reminder to 
tackle the CUHK problem was particularly spectacular. This 
was against an earlier Governor decision to drop the topic 
and that was supposed to be a result of consultation with 
the EXCO (see Chapter 6,1.2). 
The proposal of a Hong Kong university outside Hong 
Kong sounds like a casual joke, but that helps to understand 
the attitude of the EXCO members towards the CRE. 
III. 1. The UPCC 
The Importance of the UPGC can be realized in the fact 
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that it was the only body that the EXCO consulted after the 
completion of the CRE report. It could be argued that the 
the importance of the UPGC was by virtue of its terms of 
reference of planning higher education, but then the HKTC 
should have been given equal status. 
The role played by the UPGC In the CRE episode was 
an ambivalent one. On the one hand, it was at least 
partially the UPGC's "uncomfortable" feeling about the slow 
growth rate of higher education that initiated the entire 
CRE exercise. This was actually written into the terms of 
reference and became first of the six basic considerations 
upon which the CRE deliberated (see 1.2.1 of this Chapter). 
On the other hand, it was apparently the UPGC's disagreement 
with the CRE's ambitious recommendations that caused the CRE 
report to remain unpublished (see 1.7.2-3 of this Chapter). 
The relation between the UPGC and the Governor was a 
very special one. The UPGC was not a statutory body and has 
no legal relations with the EXCO (See Chapter 1,11.3.3). 
That the EXCO wrote to the UPGC for consultation itself was 
a very unusual move. 
111.3. The Training Council (HKTC) 
The HKTC was not formally consulted during the CRE 
exercise, as was in the case of the UPGC. However, as 
technical education was a major component in the entire CRE 
exercise, the HKTC was actively involved in the CRE. This 
was evident from (1) the presence of Chen Shou-lum in the 
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CRE, (2) the HKTC's input during the proceedings of the CRE 
and (3) the HKTC's input from outside the CRE. 
The HKTC's input during the CRE was mainly its manpower 
calculation. The Secretary of the HKTC, Horace Knight, 
presented a paper to the CRE to illustrate the manpower 
assessement methodology adopted by the HKTC. This was 
Included as one of the seven approaches to manpower 
calculations in the CRE Report (DSCRE/0: 43-49). Although 
the usefulness of the HKTC manpower survey for educational 
planning was controversial, it provided the most consistent 
set of data on the stock of skilled manpower in Hong Kong. 
The debate between the HKTC and the CRE concentrated on 
the density ratio of high-level manpower. In the area of 
technical education and vocational training, the HKTC almost 
had the full say. 
The HKTC did not agree with the CRE Report but did not 
attempt to veto the Report. It had its own objectives which 
paid more attention to the well-being of the industries and 
therefore held very different concept about educational 
planning. 
The later transformation (1982) of the HKTC Into the 
VTC with a new Technical Education and Industrial Training 
Department as its administrative arm, and which takes over 
the technical institutes were well planned by the HKTC 
independent of the CRE. This might explain why the HKTC was 
not too opposed to the CRE Report, because anyway the HHTC 
did not feel it would be seriously affected. 
202 
Chapter 4: CRE 
111.4. The. Board of Education 
The BoE's reaction to the CRE recommendations was much 
less significant than the other two advisory bodies. There 
are two reasons for this. First, the issues under study by 
the CRE was very much beyond the scope of the BoE. 
Second, BoE was very much treated as an "internal' 
consultative body and did not have any identifiable sphere 
of influence. 
The BoE, however, was more significant in other 
episodes such as the Overall Review which is discussed In 
Chapter Five. 
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IV. Analyses of the CRE 
IV. O. Introduction 
In the previous sections, the entire episode of the 
CRE has been described. The description has been mainly 
based upon analysis of documents, both published and 
unpublished and can be regarded as "facts". It is the task 
of this section to explain the Episode. We shall present two 
alternative explanations: the rational explanation and 
legitimacy explanation. 
In order to reduce the explanations to some manageable 
size, the explanations will restrict themselves to three 
specific questions: 
Why was the CRE Report not published? 
What was the role of the manpower model in CRE? 
Why was the CRE review launched? 
The reasons for choosing these three questions are 
obvious. The fate of the CRE Report was the most dramatic 
point in the entire exercise. However, the fate of the 
Report is subject to interpretation. Can we say that the 
UPGC rejected the report? Is that Report dead, or was it 
virtually adopted as a policy paper? The only thing that 
is definite is that the CRE Report was not published. 
Therefore, this is taken as the starting point of the 
explanations. Moreover, the manpower model was the crucial 
part of the entire CRE exercise. It is therefore sensible 
to choose this manpower model as the axis around which the 
explanations revolve. The answers to these two questions 
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will inevitably lead one to explain why the CRE exercise was 
ever started. 
In the explanations, interview data will be extensively 
used. This is an attempt to make sense of perceptions of 
the 'insiders' during the policy-making process. The 
sources of all these interviews are, as explained in Chapter 
Two, confidential and are therefore coded. Discussions in 
this section therefore differ from previous sections in that 
it deals more with interpretation of facts than presentation 
of factual information. 
IV. 1. The Rational Explanation 
The rational explanation assumes the broad notion of 
rationality as discussed in Chapter 3. It works under the 
assumption that the actors in the CRE episode were concerned 
to produce some policy (See Chapter 3,1.7). The actors may 
either be substantively rational to arrive at some optimal 
policy, procedurally rational to get satisfactory decisions, 
or as discussed in Chapter 3, partisan rational to try 
whatever means to produce policies that favour their 
respective interests. 
IV. 1.1. Why was the CRE Report not published? 
The EXCO decision not to publish the Report resulted 
from the lack of endorsement from the UPGC. 
There was obvious disagreement between the CRE and the 
UPGC. This has been evident in the discussions in the 
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previous section and was implicitly confirmed in the EXCO 
discussion that "in the event of publication it would be 
necessary to explain in detail why so many of the (CRE] 
recommendations have been changed on the basis of advice 
from the UPGC" (DSX04 , see 1.7.3. of this Chapter). The 
disagreement between the CRE and the UPGC can be understood 
at three "levels". 
Level 1 The goal: expansion of higher education. 
There did not seem to be any disagreement between the CRE 
and the UPGC about the goal of expanding higher education. 
In fact, it was the UPGC's "uncomfortable feeling" about the 
slow growth rate that prompted the Government to launch the 
CRE review. 
The UPGC in general felt uncomfortable with the 3% 
university growth rate. This was not expressed in 
paper, in any formal document, nothing of that sort. 
The feeling made the Governor to raise the 3% to 4%. 
The UPGC did not have the time to further investigate, 
and therefore advised the Governor to do a review 
(ISU12)(slmilar remarks by ISUO3). 
This was actually written in the terms of reference of 
the CRE as the first item to be taken into consideration. 
It refers to the "advice of the UPGC about the 
`uncomfortable implications' of the slow growth rate for 
universities and the Polytechnic" (See 1.2.1 of this 
Chapter). We can therefore safely assume that the CRE and 
the UPGC agree in principle that there should be a 
considerable improvement in the growth of higher education. 
Level 2 The approach: "social demand". 
The UPGC did not endorse the "social demand approach" 
which was exhibited in the CRE deliberations. This was 
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strongly put forward by one informant (I5U04) who was a 
member of the UPGC at the time of the decision. His opinion 
was that Topley was planning higher education as if it were 
mass schooling. He called the CRE recommendations a result 
of 'social demand planning': 
UPGC members were quite sensitive about Topley's social 
planning demand (sic]. UPGC would not like to see the 
top higher institutions impeded by unsound policy. 
Implicitly, who won the policy debate would get the 
money. Therefore, Topley could win, only because he 
had grand ideas. If you ask Topley what is the 
difference between policies for higher education and 
that for mass schooling, he could not answer, he did 
not know. UPGC had struck Topley a blow. Topley had 
once been Secretary for UPGC, he left UPGC perhaps he 
was tired of the elitism of UPGC (ISUO4). 
This member actually perceived elitism as a basic 
deviation of the UPGC from the CRE. This conflict of ideas 
is to some extent confirmed by one of the key figures in the 
CRE: 
In a way, we are coming to the stage of doing mass 
education at higher education level... It is a 
demographic issue <ISX08). 
Other members of the UPGC shared similar views, 
although they did not spell out elitism as the banner of 
UPGC <ISUO4; ISUO3). As an example, another informant from 
the UPGC, who participated in the discussion of CRE 
recommendations, said: 
The expansion of higher education [in the CRE Report] 
was calculated with manpower considerations which the 
members of UPGC, with their experience elsewhere, had 
some mistrust. We would rather consider the demand of 
the students (ISU02). 
It is noticeable that although both sides agree to base 
higher education developments on "student demands', they 
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interpret the term "student demand" very differently. The 
"demand of students" in the CRE Report meant demand for 
quantity. The "demand of students" Interpreted by the UPGC 
was one for quality. 
Level 3 The method: a new university? 
If "elitism" was really behind UPGC's objection of the 
CRE recommendations, why was it, as mentioned in the terms 
of reference of the CRE, that UPGC had worried about the 
"uncomfortable implications" of the 3% slow growth rate? 
Another informant seemed to have answered this puzzle. 
This informant, another UPGC member during the time of the 
CRE discussion, said: 
UPGC was always of the idea that 3% was a small rate. 
There had always been a low emphasis on tertiary 
education. The later increase to 4% included medical 
(expansions) and meant nothing to non-medical courses. 
Topley's task was just to reverse the mistakes. The 
rule of thumb, however, was the establishment of new 
institutions (ISUO3). 
This is compatible with the two earlier opinions that 
UPGC was against too great an expansion at institutional 
levels. 
The bone of contention then, using universities as an 
example, was whether or not a new university should be 
established as a means of expanding education. The CRE 
recommended expansion of university education within the 
existing universities, by installing a second campus of the 
University of Hong Kong. The UPGC proposed the 
establishment of a third university some time after 1990. 
ISUO2 laid out the general principles on institutional 
limitations: 
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Expansion of higher education institutions have a 
number of limitations to be taken into consideration: 
the physical building, the financial constraints and 
most importantly the recruitment and training of the 
staff. Therefore the expansion rate has to be limited 
to a few percent. Because of this, it has always been 
the case that the UPGC has to advise the Government to 
spend less, and it is not always easy to keep this 
dialogue to the Government (ISUO2). 
This also explains the UPGC proposal that a new university 
be considered only after 1990 and not before. 
There was also an explicit explanation for the need of 
a new university: 
We found the expansion of the University of Hong Kong 
on its existing site quite unlikely; expansion can 
materialised on a remote site and that is inappro- 
priate. Expansion could be done in The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, but this is not likely before 
it has changed its structure to make it less expensive 
(ISUO2). 
A more elaborate version of this opinion was put 
forward by another UPGC member: 
The cost [of a second campus) may not be much less than 
building a third university, and we thought a further 
expansion of the HKU might change its character. On 
the other hand, expansion with a second campus (of HKUI 
might provide us with more or less the same sort of 
course HKU was running; it would not provide us with 
the flexibility as we would have with a new university. 
Flexibility is essential for the 21st Century (ISU12). 
After all, both the CRE and the UPGC were in favour of 
expansion in higher education, but there was marked 
difference in the interpretation of what is social demand, 
in weighing quality against quantity. This difference boils 
down to the debate of whether or not a new university should 
be established instead of building a second campus of HKU. 
This argument was more fairly put forward by another 
senior member of the UPGC who retired from UPGC after the 
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CRE episode. He perceived that 
Topley's Report was not refuted by the UPGC, but was 
put into a different perspective by the UPGC... The CRE 
differed from the UPGC in that it had different 
projections and different kinds of scrutiny <ISUO5). 
This view was shared by one government official who 
specified the difference as that 
Topley was of the belief that Hong Kong, like 
Singapore, was a place where economic needs dictated 
individual needs. The UPGC believed that individual 
needs should come before the needs of the state(ISX06). 
It is interesting to see how one OECD Overall Review 
member perceive this difference as a third party (130R3): 
In my impression, the UPGC was not a very imaginative 
lot. They seemed to regard higher education as their 
pet child. They stuck to the 3%, 4% growth rate and 
did not consider higher education in the context of the 
social structure. They had a type of immunity from a 
broader consideration of the entire society. This is 
perhaps very much the pattern in UK and in Australia. 
The rational explanation assumes that both the CRE and 
the UPGC were rational in their decisions. That is, both of 
them were concerned with a considerable expansion of higher 
education. The conflict was therefore a serious difference 
in approaches or ideologies of planning higher education. 
Under these circumstances, the UPGC did not endorse the CRE 
Report. Since the OECD Review was pressing, time was not 
enough to resolve this disagreement. Hence, nothing could 
be published as an acceptable policy document before the 
OECD Review. 
The rational explanations may lead to a question of why 
the UPGC objection was not represented through its members 
in the CRE. This was explained by ISU12: 
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The three members participated as individuals in 
personal capacities. They did not represent the 
collective view of the UPGC. 
IV. 1.2. What was the Role of the Manpower Model in CRE 
This pertains to a number of questions: Why was the 
manpower model adopted in the CRE? How did the manpower 
model affect the final recommendations of the CRE? Given 
the fate of the CRE Report, what was the position of the 
manpower model? 
In the rational explanation, the reason for using the 
manpower model was straightforward. As expressed in 
DSCRE/7, the method was objective because it depended on 
data of the existing labour force. This was reiterated in 
the CRE Report (DSCRE/0: 63): 
The reason for developing a manpower model is to make 
projections of manpower requirements in the future 
starting from a basis of knowledge of the activities 
and qualifications of the present labour force. 
For a number of reasons, the HKTC's manpower survey was 
not used (DSCRE/0: 49): 
that the findings of the Training Council's surveys are 
a useful point of reference but that fairly wide 
confidence limits must be placed on the estimates they 
provide; 
their usefulness in educational planning is limited by 
their application only to roughly the next five years 
ahead, whereas significant adjustments in the output 
from tertiary education may take much longer to 
achieve; 
that they are so far concerned only with engineers and 
other technical manpower and not with the full range of 
educated and skilled manpower, and they cannot 
therefore provide guidance about the total desirable 
output from the educational institutions. 
In reply to Peter Williams' warnings about the pitfalls 
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of manpower forecasting in a free market economy, the CRE 
stated in its Report: 
although manpower modelling is a precarious activity 
with many potential pitfalls, it offered a better means 
of making long-term projections of manpower require- 
ments than any othr means available to the Committee 
(DSCRE/0: 63). 
The results of the manpower modelling did enter the CRE 
Report in a rather significant way. The manpower model 
results were referred to as "requirements of the economy" 
(Ibid.: 75). The increase in the demand of highly educated 
and trained manpower was mainly a projection using the 
manpower model. The major recommendations about expansion 
of higher education was mainly based on this projection. In 
other words, the manpower model forecasts that there would 
be 
a shift in distribution of employment to industries 
which require a greater proportion of highly educated 
manpower; 
a change in the occupational structure of industries 
toward a higher content of professional and technical 
or administrative and managerial workers, as a conse- 
quence of a tendency for manufacturers and providers of 
services to move up-market. 
On two other occasions, the manpower modelling results 
were listed together with the HKTC survey results to 
evidence the potential shortfall of supply of craftsmen 
(Ibid.: 98; 103). This led to the recommendation of two 
additional technical institutes. 
On the whole, the manpower model gave the CRE the 
rational information base upon which recommendations were 
made. 
The rationality which resided in manpower modelling, 
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however, did not gain the sympathy of the UPGC. As 
mentioned in previous paragraphs, the UPGC in general had 
'mistrust' in manpower methods (See VI. 2.1 of this Chapter). 
The conflicts between the CRE and the HKTC was again 
one of rationality. The CRE and the HKTC agreed in 
expanding technical education, but they have different 
criteria and different methods in policy deliberation. 
The HKTC's basic starting point was the well being of 
the most industries, and later the service industries, which 
most likely suffers from manpower shortage. As one member 
of the former HKTC said: 
We never claimed that we were doing educational 
planning. That would be a false claim. What we were 
concerned were the demands of technical manpower and 
personnel in the industries. Our manpower survey is a 
basis, but not the basis for planning (ISVOI). 
Therefore, its success lay in the detection of 
shortfall and the subsequent supply of manpower in the 
industries, and not in designing a desirable education 
system. The deliberation of the HKTC was purely led by 
manpower needs of the economy. With the expansion of the 
education system and with near universal attendance up to 
F5, it was natural for the HKTC to worry about serious 
shortfalls in craftsmen training designed for F3 leavers. 
Meanwhile, the supply of graduate manpower was not the 
HKTC's immediate concern. 
The CRE's concern was overall planning of education and 
training. It had to take into consideration both the 
economic needs and the social demand. Even on the economic 
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side, based mainly on the manpower model, the entire labour 
force was taken into account. Under such considerations, 
the manufacturing industry became only one sector, the 
sector with a lower technologist-technician-craftsmen ratio 
compared with other sectors. Therefore, the CRE also 
concluded that there would be a shortfall of craftsmen, but 
with a different density ratio. On the other hand, the CRE 
detected a higher demand for university graduates in the 
future. 
The CRE worked out with its manpower model a density 
ratio (technologists: technicians: craftsmen) of 1: 2.6 :4 
in 1986, escalating to 1: 1.5 :3 in 1996. The HKTC, with 
its 'employers' opinion" manpower survey and "experience of 
the industrialists which is not easily expressed in 
quantifiable terms" (ISUIO), found this ratio too low to be 
acceptable (CSL02; ISVO3); and if this were taken as a basis 
for planning educational provisions, the shortage of 
craftsmen would be even more severe. This difference was 
once a subject of heated debate within the CRE. As one 
informant described: 
Most of the (rational] exercises were non- 
controversial. The manpower model was the only thing 
that remained highly controversial. It was not 
compatible with other approaches. It was not a matter 
of 5% incompatible. It was 5 or 6 times incompatible. 
There was a heated debate (ISPO4). 
Nevertheless, in the CRE final Report, the conflict 
about provision of craftsmen and technicians training seemed 
to have come to a compromise. Despite the difference in 
approach and the difference in the calculated requirements, 
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both the CRE and the HKTC favoured significant expansion in 
the training of craftsmen and technicians and this was 
expressed in the recommendations. 
However, the conflict between the HKTC and the CRE had 
led to objections within the EXCO where the industrialists 
were strongly represented. 
IV. 1.3. Why was the CRE review launched? 
If the above arguments stand, then the launching of the 
CRE was a natural step in the development of education in 
Hong Kong. This was reflected in the terms of reference of 
the CRE in connection with the growing demand for post- 
compulsory education. As one CRE member remarked: 
It followed naturally from the development of education 
in Hong Kong. We had a white paper for primary 
education, one for junior education and another for 
senior education and it was time to have a paper on 
higher education (ISPO4). 
This was felt also internally within the higher 
education sector. The UPGC felt uncomfortable about the 
slow growth. 
This feeling had made the Governor raise the 3% growth 
rate to 4%. The UPGC did not have time to further 
investigate, and therefore advised the Governor to do a 
review (ISU12). 
The problem seemed more serious than expected in view 
of the drastic increase of tuition fees overseas. 
On the other hand, there had already been proposals to 
re-organize technical education and vocational training and 
the CRE was expected to include this in a comprehensive plan 
(CSLO2). 
But why was this policy exercise not carried out by the 
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normal advisory bodies, viz. the UPGC and the HKTC? One top 
level official explained: 
We.. need an independent body to take the general view 
about education. In areas like education, we had to 
handle with great caution, almost uncertainty, as you 
can see in the field of higher education... This was 
why there was the Topley Committee (ISX01). 
The Independence of the CRE is also due to the fact 
that the policies under examination were cross-sectoral. 
They ran across higher education as well as technical and 
vocational education and could not be deliberated 
independently by the separate sectors. 
On the other hand, the deadline of the CRE was pre- 
empted by the coming of the OECD Review. If the OECD was 
supposed to review the overall policy, there was a need to 
fill the blank of higher and technical education with some 
policy statement (ISP04). In this sense the CRE was a 
preparation for the OECD review (IS002), so that the 
Government might present the OECD panel with a comprehensive 
range of policy papers running from primary to higher 
education. This argument may also be used to explain why 
the Report was rushed out in June, instead of a farther time 
limit as expected by the Chairman of the CRE in March (See 
I. 4 of this Chapter). It has to meet the deadline before 
the beginning of the OECD Review. 
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IV. 2. The Legitimacy Explanation 
The legitimacy explanation provides an alternative to 
rational explanation. The notion of legitimacy is discussed 
at length in Chapter 3. Legitimacy can be used to explain 
the CRE Episode in a number of ways. 
For example, the CRE based its recommendations very 
heavily on manpower modelling, at the same time claiming 
that it intended to satisfy the social demand for higher 
education. This inconsistency in approach can be explained 
away by assuming that there was an intention of expanding 
higher education and both manpower modelling and social 
demand only served to legitimate such an intention. That 
is, the process was to legitimate a pre-determined policy - 
the fourth sense of legitimacy as classified in Chapter 3, 
11.2.4. Such an explanation, however, is just one of the 
traditional understanding of 'rationalization" of policies. 
What is discussed in this section is a different sense 
of legitimacy. In short, the legitimacy explanation here 
assumes that the interactions between the actors in policy- 
making may not be prompted by a desired policy output, but 
that the acquisition or defence of legitimacy could itself 
be the "goal'. If this stands, then the concern is often in 
the process rather than the policies per se. 
In this legitimacy explanation, the conflicts, which 
obviously existed, were not ones of approaches. nor of 
interests, but one of legitimacy. The policy-advisory 
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bodies each acquired or defended its own particular 
legitimacy to make ('advise on") policies. 
As was in the rational explanation, the same three 
questions are asked and answered, but in a different order: 
Why was the CRE Report not published? 
Why was the CRE review ever launched? 
What was the role of The Manpower Model? 
IV. 2.1. Why was the CRE Report not published? 
In March 1981, when the Chairman of CRE laid out his 
schedule, he made it clear that 
It was the Governor's intention that this view should 
proceed in consultation with the UPGC, who have a close 
interest in the subjects covered by the terms of 
reference (DSCRE/51). 
The CRE had noted in the Postcript of its report that 
although the Chairman had a preliminary discussion with the 
UPGC in January, 1981, the CRE was not able to test its 
developed ideas on the UPGC (DSCRE/0: 180). Very cautiously, 
the CRE Report wrote: 
While the Committee (CRE] felt that it should indicate 
its own views, it accepts that a firm decision on these 
matters should not be reached until the UPGC's advice 
has been obtained (Ibid). 
The CRE's apologetic tone revealed one of the major 
controversies during the CRE meetings. The issue was: 
Should the UPGC be consulted before submission of the Report 
to the Governor-in-Council? (ISU12; ISPO4; ISUO2; ISUO6). 
ISP04, a CRE member who was not a member of the UPGC, had 
this description: 
The Topley Committee started In November, 1980 and my 
impression was that there was a tacit assumption that 
218 
Chapter 4: CRE 
the UPGC would not mind 'intruding its territories', 
until April 11981], when Bradley, the Secretary for 
UPGC who was in the Topley Committee, suddenly made a 
lot of noise about consulting the UPGC. He insisted 
that he would have reservations over any report if the 
UPGC was not consulted. The three UPGC members more or 
less held the same stand. To me, it was as if the UPGC 
was suddenly waken up in April and felt they were not 
appraised well enough... At one time, things became 
extremely difficult (ISPO4). 
The controversy was not only on substantive issues 
such as the third university, or an Engineering Faculty in 
the CUHK. Bradley's complaint applied to any report. UPGC 
consultation per se was the issue. In this case, it is not 
surprising that the UPGC objections were not represented 
through its three members in the CRE. The three members 
participated in their personal capacities. What the UPGC was 
after was not any informal interaction or communication to 
solve the disagreements. What it required. was that it 
should be consulted in a formal procedure, and that should 
come from the Governor. 
Therefore, the crucial issue was 'procedural' and not 
"substantive", borrowing the terms from Herbert Simon. It 
was not a matter of whether the UPGC agreed with the 
substances of the CRE recommendations, but a matter of 
whether UPGC was procedurally consulted. In other words, the 
UPGC took the case politically. 
The situation was confirmed by the UPGC members who 
participated in the CRE: 
The major contribution from the three UPGC members was 
that they insisted that the UPGC should be consulted 
before submission of the Report... We did sign the 
Report with the understanding that the UPGC would 
eventually be consulted (ISU12). 
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We once thought that we might walk out, but we didn't 
(ISU11). 
At first sight, if the UPGC disagreed with the CRE 
recommendations, the disagreement could be carried forward 
by the three members of the UPGC. Yet the three members, 
including the UPGC Secretary, signed the Report. One of 
these members remarked: 
You [the researcher] did not ask if I object. I did 
object. The three members did object .... I was away for two months and when I came back home, it was out! We 
did have input before the report was written. I was 
prepared not to sign it. If it was not known that they 
would go to the Governor, we were prepared to make a 
minority report! They simply hoped they would win, but 
they lost! (ISUO6) 
That the UPGC objection was against the process rather 
than the policies could further be confirmed by the fact 
that many of the CRE recommendation which the UPGC had 
objected during the CRE episode were de facto adopted by the 
UPGC after the episode (See I. 8.3. of this Chapter). 
In the end, the CRE Report was submitted to the 
Governor and then to the EXCO. The UPGC was consulted only 
after the EXCO discussion (ISU123 ISUO2) and, what made the 
issue even more sensitive, the consultation was hosted by 
the EXCO, not the Governor. The UPGC took this seriously. 
The UPGC was (and still is) non-statutory. Legally 
the UPGC was only an administrative convenience (ISX09). 
The UPGC was answerable only to the Governor (Griffiths, 
1984). This formed the entire legitimacy whereby the UPGC 
worked. The UPGC members felt honoured as guest advisers to 
the Governor, but not as part of the Hong Kong Government 
machinery (ISU01b). The UPGC members regarded their 
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membership worth the while because they were given the 
legitimacy to deliberate higher education policies 
independent of the Government bureaucracy and political 
undercurrents (ISU08; ISU12). They therefore regarded the 
EXCO letter as an action which might undermine this 
legitimacy. Opening formal communication with the EXCO 
would erode this legitimacy and the UPGC felt its role at 
stake if it accepted this formal communication. 
Then comes the question of why the Government decided 
to consult the UPGC only after the EXCO discussion, given 
the overt confrontation within the CRE. The interviews did 
not provide any consensual answer to this question. There 
could be several answers. 
Answer 1 It was a matter of time. 
'Topley did not have time to consult the UPGC before the 
submission of the Report' (ISU12). On March 27,1981 the 
CRE Secretary proposed two alternative schedules for the 
completion of the Report: arriving at some agreement in mid- 
July or to adjourn and re-convene in September (DSCRE/51: 4, 
see 1.4 of this Chapter). The latter would allow for UPGC 
consultation: 
It is therefore proposed that the Committee's report 
should be considered by the UPGC during their meeting 
in September. The Committee could, if necessary, 
reconvene thereafter to consider whether to modify 
parts of their report in order to accommodate views 
expressed by the UPGC (Ibid. ) 
Apparently, the CRE followed neither schedule. There 
was a change of schedule and the Report was eventually 
rushed out in June. One UPGC member who sat on the CRE 
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(ISUO6) was away from Hong Kong and was not even informed of 
the change. When he came back, the Report was already 
written. 
The Report was rushed out in June and was submitted to 
the Governor who put the Report forward for discussion in 
the EXCO. There was therefore no time to wait for official 
reactions from the UPGC because it would not meet before 
September. 
The question is then: What caused the rush? One easy 
explanation for the rush was that it had to meet public 
expectations. When the CRE was appointed In November, it 
was also announced that it would present its report in six 
months' time. The change of schedule might be a casual move 
on the part of the Chairman or the Secretary, but this 
obtained no sympathy from the Governor. One CRE member 
recalled: 
I do remember Topley once thought of having a summer 
break and resuming after summer. Most likely, the idea 
was rejected by the Governor who insisted on the 
original deadline (ISU12). 
This answer is a highly possible reason for the rush, 
because the later discussion in the EXCO confirmed that 
there was pressure from the public and the press to have a 
CRE report (See 1.7.3. of this Chapter). If the Government 
failed to produce a report, it would lose its credibility, 
or legitimacy, among the public. To complete the report 
according to the announced schedule was then an Important 
factor where the Government upheld its legitimacy. 
Answer 2 The pressure of the OECD review. 
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The tight schedule can also be explained by the fact that 
the OECD Panel was due to pay its first visit in October, 
1981. If the Report was to be completed after the September 
UPGC meeting, it would not be included in the list of policy 
papers for the OECD review. If this happened, it might be 
an embarrassment for the Hong Kong Government. One CRE 
member shared this view: 
The Government might feel uneasy that it had done very 
little in higher education and therefore would like to 
produce something... as a way by which the Government 
could restore its credibility and confidence when 
facing the OECD review (ISPO4). 
This seemed to be supported by the fact that in the 
background report (Hong Kong Education System, 1981) 
produced by the Government Secretariat for the OECD review, 
the part on higher education policy lacked substantial 
presentation. Proposals of the 1979 Working Group (see 
Chapter 1, I. 2) which was a government internal group were 
quite exceptionally quoted as the most recent policy 
(ISX11). 
In this answer, the substantive recommendations were 
less important than something to show 'where we stand' in 
higher education" (Ibid. ). The implication is that at that 
moment, the OECD review had to be seriously faced, and this 
could only be done at the expense of the UPGC. That is, to 
produce something on higher education for the OECD review 
was more important than consulting the UPGC. Therefore, 
even if it was known that the UPGC might be annoyed, the CRE 
report had to be rushed out in June. This "credibility' 
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and 'confidence' factors are exactly what we mean by 
legitimacy. 
In other words, if there is a blank in the area of 
post-compulsory education policy, it would significantly 
reduced the Government's legitimacy in hosting the OECD 
review. To compensate for this, a policy paper was to be 
produced before the OECD visit. This technically did not 
fit into the UPGC time-table, and hence offended the 
latter's legitimacy as the virtual policy-maker in higher 
education. 
Answer 3 It was bureaucratic negligence. 
In the same March document (DSCRE/51), the Secretary 
was quite conscious that the UPGC was to be consulted, but 
he did not seem to realize the political difference between 
the alternative schedules. He did not seem to realize that 
producing the final report before or after UPGC's September 
meeting might make a critical difference. 
Anyway, the CRE Secretary did not specifly the status 
of the UPGC consultation. There was no mention whether the 
UPGC would be consulted before or after submission of the 
Report to the EXCO. The Secretary might not have even known 
that the Report would go to the EXCO before the UPGC. The 
Report went to the Governor and it was the Governor who 
decided to consult the EXCO before consulting the UPGC. The 
CRE Chairman might be have been misled by the Governor's 
promise of UPGC consultation, without noticing the 
procedural problems when the EXCO discussed the CRE 
recommendations before the UPGC. Or the CRE Chairman might 
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have been over-confident and thus underestimated the 
objection from the UPGC. One CRE member recalled: 
After completion of the Report, we held one meeting 
when the Report was already submitted to the Governor 
and was due to be considered by the EXCO. My 
impression was that even at that meeting, Topley was 
quite optimistic that the Report would soon be 
released. If you check the newspapers around June 
(19811, Topley was already "leaking" away some of the 
bits and pieces of the Report. Obviously, Topley had 
over-estimated the situation.... (ISPO4). 
Even the Governor might have underestimated the UPGC 
reaction. He might not have regarded consultation after 
EXCO discussion a serious offence to the UPGC. In fact, it 
was already very exceptional for the Chief Secretary to 
write to the UPGC for "endorsement". There was no formal 
communication between the EXCO and the UPGC, and the EXCO 
never sought any similar external "endorsement". What the 
EXCO did was already paying extraordinary respect to the 
UPGC. However, the UPGC felt this to be unacceptable. 
Answer 4 It was a deliberate political move. 
The embarrassment at the end of the CRE episode may 
also be explained as the result of a political battle 
between the CRE and the UPGC. 
The omission of UPGC consultation before submission of 
the Report was a deliberate move, presumably due to the 
Governor. Since the CRE Report was submitted to the 
Governor, it was the Governor who had the discretion to put 
it to the EXCO or the UPGC as the next step. The Governor 
apparently chose the former. It was very unlikely that the 
Governor had not expected the UPGC objection. If the UPGC 
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objection had been expected, then the omission of UPGC 
consultation before EXCO discussion was a deliberate 
political move. 
That is, the avoidance of UPGC consultation was a 
deliberate move to put the UPGC into the hands of the EXCO. 
In effect, this meant undermining the traditional legitimacy 
of the UPGC, to replace it with some direct communication 
with the EXCO. 
In sum, in the legitimacy explanation, the UPGC's 
objection was mainly not one to the recommendations of the 
CRE. It objected rather to the procedure that the UPGC was 
not consulted before the Report was put forward for 
Government (EXCO) discussion. For one reason or another, 
the CRE Report was submitted to the Governor who decided to 
put it to EXCO discussion before UPGC consultation. This was 
felt by the UPGC as undermining its legitimacy for policy- 
making. This in effect resulted in a failure to secure UPGC 
endorsement of the CRE Report and this embarrassed the 
Government. Hence the CRE Report was not published. 
ZV. 2.2. Why was the CRE review ever launched? 
If we can push the arguments in the last answer 
further, the omission of UPGC consultation might well be a 
part of a larger political move. 
This reminds us of a more basic question: Why was the 
new Seceretary for Education to be established in the first 
place? 
The simple and straightforward answer is that there was 
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the need to coordinate the fragmented machinery for policy- 
making in education. Topley himself made this point to the 
press during the announcement of the CRE exercise: 
I think the concept is to look at education as a whole 
- almost as a seamless garment - with an education 
secretary for the era that is coming up. 
We still have a lot of questions to be decided in 
education and we want to get a good degree of balance 
between the different levels, we want to look at all 
these interfaces, we want to get our access right, the 
scales right, and the balance between the proportion in 
the system right so that if you have a Secretary for 
Education he could sort of overview the whole thing 
(SCMP, November 19,1980). 
Since the UPGC, the HKTC and the BoE were already 
legitimate makers (advisers) of policy responsible to the 
top administration (either the Governor or the Governor-in- 
Council), the establishment of the Secretary for Education 
was in effect to insert a new layer between the top 
administration and the three existing advisory bodies. 
There was therefore a coordinating role for the new 
Secretary for Education to play. To assume this co- 
ordinating role, the new Secretary: for Education would 
inevitably need the legitimacy which was never there. Thus, 
the exisiting legitimacy system that worked with the 
original policy bodies needed to be adjusted. 
Although there was no specification in the CRE's terms 
of reference, the coordinating nature of CRE was implicitly 
a legitimacy-building exercise for the new Secretary for 
Education. As a new-comer in the arena, the CRE would 
inevitably work in the areas where the existing policy 
bodies (the UPGC and HKTC in particular) used to have full 
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control. The CRE, in its process to coordinate educational 
policies, could implicitly establish for itself the 
legitimacy to coordinate the advisory bodies. This 
legitimacy would soon be inherited by the new Secretary for 
Education, which happened to be the CRE Chairman. 
This legitimacy issue was also evident in the 
appointment of the CRE. The formal announcement of the CRE 
started with the mention of approval from the "Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs" of U. K. 
(Government Press Release, November 18,1980; see quotation 
in I. I. of this Chapter). 
The mention of the U. K. approval was extremely 
exceptional. Although the CRE was "ordered by the Governor- 
in-Council" (Ibid. ), the announcement emphasized the 
Chairmanship of the CRE which was taken up by the Secretary 
for Education designate. 
Seen in this light, it was a deliberate move for the 
CRE to lay out higher education policies independent of the 
UPGC. The UPGC was not too sensitive at the beginning of 
the CRE exercise and regarded it as a Government exercise 
within the boundaries of established legitimacy. 
The insistence among the UPGC members in the CRE that 
the UPGC should be consulted was really an "awakening" of the 
UPGC, and particularly its Secretary, that the CRE might 
subtly change the status of the UPGC. In fact suspicions 
had developed among the UPGC members that the UPGC was being 
downgraded: 
I felt UPGC had not got the freedom it used to have. 
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It was losing its influence over policy issues. It 
depended on the goodwill of the Governor. I used to go 
to MacLehose and talk to him in person: "See, we got to 
do something about this...... ' (ISUO5). 
The UPGC objection was not on the substance of the 
policies. Its objection was neither a mere matter of 
procedures. It was a battle to restore its legitimacy to 
overseeing higher education. 
With this sensitive issue at hand, the omission of UPGC 
consultation could be a determined move of the Governor so 
that a new legitimacy for higher education policy-making 
would be granted by the EXCO, or the Governor-in-Council, 
and not the Governor. If this could be successful, the 
UPGC's advisory role would be assumed under the Government 
umbrella. This would pave the way for the new Secretary for 
Education to take over. 
Sensing the implications of this move, the UPGC 
insisted to the end that, as a matter of legitimacy, it was 
to be consulted before the submission of the report. 
Failing that, the UPGC made full use of its legitimacy at 
hand and refused to endorse the CRE report. This 
effectively put the EXCO into difficulties. It could be 
said that in this battle, the UPGC succeeded in restoring 
its legitimacy as the overlord of higher education. 
Recollection from the OECD panel members, who visited 
Hong Kong immediately after the CRE episode in October, 
1981, seemed to support the antagonism between Topley and 
the UPGC. There was evidently an effort after the EXCO 
decision to restore the legitimacy built up by the CRE 
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through the help of the overseas panel. Two members 
separately relayed the same incident that during their first 
visit one of the key figures of CRE once attempted to 
persuade the OECD panel to say something to support 
expansion of higher education (See Chapter 5, II. 4. ). 
This incident may be viewed with this interpretation: that 
the CRE had hoped the OECD panel could give it support in 
its battle against UPGC. 
The battle went on even after the CRE. The OECD review, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, raised the same issue of co- 
ordination and suggested the setting up of an Education 
Commission. The UPGC member who made the "downgrading" 
remark (see quotation on preceding page) actually resigned 
shortly after the CRE. A local UPGC member opined that the 
status of the overseas UPGC members have been downgraded 
since the CRE. 
[The UPGCI is now headed by someone of lower status. 
The local members of the UPGC used to be LEGCO and EXCO 
members. ......, for example, is now replaced by ... and I doubt if the latter has the same say.... The same 
happens to the overseas members. If Ted Parkes left 
the UPGC, there would be no `Sirs' nor 'Lords' In the 
UPGC. There used to be Sir John Butterfield and Lord 
Briggs. Ted Parkes could debate with McLehose face to 
face. He enjoys even a higher status than Sir Edward 
Youde back home in U. K. Now it is different. There 
are also more people from the technical sector (the 
polytechnics), increasingly more. They are good, but 
they seem to know little about universities (ISUO9). 
The Government, eventually succeeded at some later time 
in putting the Secretary for Education (later the Secretary 
for Education and Manpower) Into direct dialogue with the 
UPGC (ISU12; ISX09). 
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IV. 2.3. What was the role of the Manpower Model 
The legitimacy of coordination was also provided by 
expertise. The CRE possessed the unique expertise through 
its independent access to cross-departmental information, 
the sophistication in its technical deliberations and the 
employment of international experience. 
The CRE was not the first one to adopt manpower 
requirements approach. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, 
both the Special Committee on Higher Education and the 1977 
Green Paper attempted to apply manpower forecasting to 
educational planning. The CRE was special in that it tried 
to establish its own planning ideology and to support it 
with its own methodology, based on its own data base. 
Unlike previous endeavours, the CRE seldom relied on 
established data base. It carried out its own extensive 
consultation, but none of these used the channels originally 
established, for example, by the Education Department. The 
CRE summonded whatever evidence it desired. Its 
representative membership provided it with the legitimacy to 
put its fingers on any sector of the Government bureaucracy 
and the relevant sectors. In fact, the demand by the CRE for 
data on the civil service (see II. 1 of this Chapter) 
eventually led to the formation of the Staff Planning 
Division in the Civil Service Branch in June, 1981 (ECSOI). 
The unique data base possessed by the CRE gave it the 
legitimacy to claim the unique overview of the territory- 
wide situation. 
It was in this context that the CRE carried out three 
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independent pieces of research of its own: the building of 
the manpower model, the earnings-education profile and the 
student preference survey. Comparatively, the latter two 
were peripheral and the manpower model was the major, 
endeavour in the entire CRE exercise. Out of the 80 
Committee papers studied during the CRE, the two reports for 
the manpower model (DSCRE/36 and DSCRE/62) were by far the 
largest volumes (58 and 80 pages respectively). It would 
not be exaggerating to say that the building of the manpower 
model was the central activity of the CRE exercise. 
Therefore, in two senses, the manpower model added to 
the legitimacy of the CRE to claim overall coordination. 
Firstly, it tried to overcome the fragmentation of 
education policy-making by something that would give overall 
authority. Here, "overall demand of the economy" was 
something that the other fragmented policy-makers could not 
claim knowledge. It legitimates an overall manpower 
; forecasting which involved the entire labour force. 
Secondly, it made use of the information base that was 
not accessible to other policy-makers and deliberated with 
a level of sophistication denied other policy-makers. In 
fact, apart from Peter Williams and perhaps Horace Knight, 
the HKTC Secretary, the farthest CRE members could go was 
perhaps the query, by Chen Shou-lum, about the technologist- 
technician-craftsman ratio. 
If successful, the CRE could have developed its own 
planning ideology to which the other policy advisory bodies 
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had to submit. 
If these arguments were valid, it really did not matter 
whether the manpower modelling was accurate in its 
forecasting, so far as it pointed to the rough direction of 
expansion in tertiary education. After all, the fact was 
that even if all the CRE recommendations were to come true, 
there would still be a long way before Hong Kong had to 
worry for over-provision of higher education. In other 
words, with full respect to the manpower modelling per se, 
a policy of dramatic expansion in higher education could be 
made by simple intuition. In the short run, the manpower 
model in the CRE Report legitimates its recommendations. In 
the long run, it helps to legitimate the coordinating 
authority of the newly created Secretary for Education. 
If this was the case, it is not surprising that both 
the UPGC and the HKTC felt reluctant to accept the manpower 
model. The 'mistrust" (see IV. 1.1 of this Chapter) of the 
UPGC could be read not only as a difference in planning 
ideology but also that the manpower model could serve to 
undermine its legitimacy. If manpower modelling could be 
accepted as the basis for planning higher education, the 
entire legitimacy of "expert judgement" (ISUO4; ISUO8) would 
no longer have the central place in policy-making. The 
HKTC's criticism of the the manpower model could be 
interpreted as again a matter of legitimacy. If manpower 
modelling could replace 'employers' opinion survey', then 
future training policies would be handled by the Secretary 
for Education who mastered the manpower model and emphasized 
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"overall needs". There would then be no way to legitimate 
the employers' own estimate of their needs. 
At the end of the day, the failure to publish the CRE 
Report symbolized the failure of the Government in its co- 
ordinating attempt. The policy making of education in Hong 
Kong remained fragmented. This derivation could well be 
supported by attempt after the Overall Review to set up an 
coordinating Education Commission. But that was another 
episode. 
The bottom line was that the manpower model was almost 
completely ignored after the CRE exercise. 
V. Summary of the CRE Review 
The CRE Review was a rather exceptional exercise where 
all the major government branches and policy advisory bodies 
were involved in deliberating overall policies for post- 
compulsory education. The exercise tried almost all means 
available at the time to arrive at policy recommendations 
using a comprehensive manpower model. The result of the 
review was rather dramatic. The report was not published, 
apparently due to disagreement between the CRE and the UPGC. 
Research seems to point to the conclusion that the 
outcome of the CRE episode was caused by interactions among 
the policy advisory bodies, largely between the CRE and the 
UPGC, and between UPGC and HKTC to a smaller extent. The 
234 
Chapter 4: CRE 
nature of the interactions could be interpreted both ways: 
either as a matter of difference in rationality, or as a 
conflict of legitimacy. 
Two points are outstanding in the analysis of the 
episode. First, the legitimacy explanation provides a sound 
alternative to rational explanations. In the rational 
explanations actors in policy deliberation concentrate their 
attention on the output of the policy-making process. In 
the particular case of the CRE, it was the difference in 
planning ideologies and methodologies that caused the 
conflicts. In the legitimacy explanation, the attention of 
the political actors was not so much on the policies per se, 
but on the "secondary" concern of whether or not they have 
the right legitimacy to make policies. 
Second, the manpower model, which is typical of 
rational deliberations in educational policy-making, could 
play an essential role by providing the legitimacy, by way 
of the expertise involved, for making policy. Here, what 
matters is not so much the validity or reliability of the 
manpower model and its results, but the fact that the user 
of the manpower model acquires its legitimacy through the 
unchallengeable sophistication of the model. 
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THE OECD REVIEW C198 1- 19823 
0. Introduction 
The OECD Review, also known as the Overall Review, is 
the second Episode examined in this study. It occurred 
almost immediately after the CRE episode. The main body of 
the OECD review took place in 1981-82. The OECD Review was 
basically a `third party" consultation in which an OECD 
Panel conducted an overall review of the education system in 
Hong Kong. The report of the review (also known as the 
Llewellyn Report) aroused much controversy, but on the whole 
its recommendations became the focus of discussion in all 
matters of educational policy after its publication. All 
policy developments in the years afterwards claim that they 
are based on the OECD review results. 
The construct, the process, the reporting and the 
events during and after the OECD review demonstrated vividly 
the dynamics in the arena of education policy in Hong Kong. 
As was in the case of the CRE, it demonstrated the 
interaction among the actors in the policy-making machinery, 
but it also demonstrated the relation between those inside 
and those outside the policy-making machinery. 
There will be four sections in this chapter. The first 
section is a delineation of the picture as known to the 
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public, i. e., the scene as perceived before the research. 
This is based largely on published materials. The second 
section is a finer description of the happenings as a result 
of the research. This includes confidential materials 
obtained during the research as well as published materials 
which might have escaped public attention. The aim is to 
delineate the "facts" of the episode as closely as possible 
to what both the outsiders and the insiders perceive. A 
number of policy junctures are identified in this section. 
An analysis is made in the third section which attempts to 
explain the policy decisions at the junctures. As has been 
done in Chapter 4, two separate perspectives will be adopted 
during the explanations. 
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I. What the Public Saw 
1.1. The Appointment 
On June 18,1981, the then Secretary for Education 
designate, Kenneth Topley, announced in a press conference 
that "an international Panel of visitors has been appointed 
by the Government to conduct an Overall Review of Hong 
Kong's education system" (Government Press Release, June 18, 
1981). Also present at the press conference were Colvyn 
Haye, the Director of Education, and A. W. Lee, the Chairman 
of the Board of Education. 
The context in which the overall review was conducted 
was summarised in the following paragraphs in the official 
press release: 
Mr Topley said the Review would examine both current 
and proposed education programmes. 
"Despite the benefits that have been derived from the 
growth in school places, there remains concern among 
educators and parents about whether the education that 
children are receiving is that best suited to 
developing their talents and enabling them to 
contribute fully to the life of the community, " Mr 
Topley explained. 
Mr Lee stated that following the completion of various 
reviews of different areas of education the Board of 
Education had proposed that a broad look should be 
taken at the whole of the education system, from an 
international as well as a local perspective. 
Mr Haye said that the Education Department welcomed the 
initiative taken by the Board since the Review would 
present an opportunity to take stock of current targets 
and facilitate decisions about the future direction of 
education and the pace at which it should develop. 
(Government Press Release, June 18,1981) 
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People were reminded that the Government's agreement to 
have such a review had first been announced by the Governor 
in his address to the Legislative Council in October, 1978 
(Ibid. ). Topley emphasized that this was not an official 
OECD exercise, that "the Review had been set in train by the 
Government in close consultation with officers of the OECD" 
(Ibid. ). He said: 
Members of the Secretariat of the OECD have provided 
valuable guidance and advice on the organization of the 
Review, on the detailed procedures to be followed and 
on the selection of the independent visitors who will 
conduct the Review. 
The members of the Panel were announced: 
Sir John Liewelyn (Chairman), former Vice-Chancellor of 
Exeter University and Director-General of the British 
Council; 
Dr Greg Hancock, full-time member of the Schools 
Commission, Australia and Chief Education Officer, 
Australian Capital Territory Schools Authority; 
Dr Karl Roeloffs, former Head of the Planning Division 
of the Federal German Ministry of Education and Vice- 
Chairman of the OECD Education Committee, now 
Secretary-General of the Federal German Academic 
Exchange Service; 
Professor Michael W. Kirst, Profesor of Education, 
Stanford University, California and former President of 
the California State Board of Education (Ibid. ). 
It was also announced that the Panel would be assisted 
by two Special Advisers: Q. W. Lee representing the BoE and 
James Mchugh representing the UPGC. Their roles were 
to ensure that the Panel had ready access to informed 
views on Hong Kong education from sources other than 
official ones. This was in keeping with the spirit of 
an open forum, which the review was designed to be 
(Ibid. ). 
The terms of reference for the Panel were: 
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Having regard to approved and proposed policies for the 
development of education in Hong Kong at all levels, to 
identify the future aims of the education system, to 
consider the coherence and effectiveness of the 
service, to identify areas which may require streng- 
thening and to make recommendations on priorities in 
its further development. In particular, advice is 
sought on the relationship between the various sectors 
and levels of education and the place of teachers in 
the education system (Ibid. ). 
The methodology to be adopted was also mentioned in the 
announcement: 
The visitors, although independent of the OECD, will 
follow the well-established practices of the 
organization in examining the education systems of its 
member countries. Such reviews have been carried out 
in many advanced countries, which have welcomed 
independent views on their education systems. 
The concrete procedures as planned were: 
* The Panel would spend about 14 days in Hong Kong in 
late October and early November, 1981, in order to meet 
and seek the views of student groups and individuals, 
parents, academic associations, teachers and government 
officials on all aspects of education; 
* The Panel would provide a list of questions in early 
1982; 
* The questions would be discussed with Hong Kong 
officials at a series of final review meetings in Hong 
Kong which would probably take place in April, 1982. 
* The final report of the visitors was expected to be 
sent to the Government in mid-1982 (Ibid. ). 
The announcement emphasized the openness of the Review, 
that it was designed to have the spirit of an open forum'. 
It placed particular emphasis on the final reviewing 
meetings: 
The final reviewing meetings will provide for a lively 
forum of questioning and discussion between the 
visitors and Hong Kong participants in a concluding 
examination of education policies. To add further 
objectivity and breadth to this final assessment, 
overseas representatives specialising in different 
aspects of education will also be invited to take part 
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in the discussion. These representatives will be drawn 
from several different countries (Ibid. ). 
At the announcement of the overall review, Topley 
promised that an invitation would be extended "to interested 
individuals and groups to present their views on any aspect 
of Hong Kong education for consideration by the visitors" 
(South China Morning Post, June 19,1981). 
This promise was formalised a week later when the 
Secretary for Education (designate) made a second 
announcement on June 25,1981. The announcement invited 
"written representations on any aspects of Hong Kong 
education". The representations might be in Chinese or 
English and "should be as concise as possible". The 
deadline for the submission was set at September 4,1981 
(South China Morning Post, June 26,1981). 
However, there was a additional invitation: 
people or groups wishing to appear personally before 
the panel should make their requests in writing and 
provide an outline in not more than two pages of the 
points they wish to discuss. 
The deadline for the requests was August 7,1981 (Ibid. ) 
It was also announced that the Panel would visit Hong 
Kong in the period October 25 to November 6,1981 (Ibid. ). 
The next public news about the Overall Review was made 
by Topley on October 2,1981, in a Lions Club luncheon 
meeting. He revealed that the Panel would arrive at Hong 
Kong on October 24,1981 (South China Morning Post, October 
3,1981). 
Topley also revealed that the budget for the entire 
review exercise would be one million Hong Kong dollars 
241 
Chapter 5: OECD 
(around US$200,000 at the 1981 exchange rate) (Ming Pao 
Daily, October 3,1981). 
He answered a number of questions on the legitimacy of 
spending so much money to invite foreigners to review, Hong 
Kong education. He warned against any "unrealistic 
expectations" and that "we should not expect formal 
pronouncements on every last detail of Hong Kong education" 
(South China Morning Post, October 3,1981). 
1.2. The Two Visits 
The Panel arrived in Hong Kong and met the press on 
October 26,1981. Llewellyn told the press that they had 
been reading more than 60 written papers that were sent to 
the Panel members before they came to Hong Kong. These 
included the written submissions and other background 
documents (South China Morning Post, October 27,1981). 
During the press conference, Llewellyn identified three key 
issues the Panel would examine: 
* the question of setting up a smooth transition through 
the educational system so that you get the right people 
as technicians, technologists and craftsmen; 
* the medium of instruction in schools; and 
* the relationship between the education system and 
future industrial and economic development (South China 
Morning Post, October 27,1981). 
He responded to the question of 1997 (the year when the 
lease of Kowloon would expire) and said: 
We are making the assumption that Hong Kong will 
continue to be a free society in which the individual 
student will be given the opportunity to develop his 
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abilities to the greatest degree and that there will 
remain for him a free choice of job opportunities 
(Ibid. ). 
Llewellyn used an apology to describe the nature of the 
Overall Review: 
the individual trees in the forest have all been 
examined in great care, now we have to see what the 
forest looks like" (Ibid. ). 
During that conference, Llewellyn also faced questions 
that doubted their competence since they were foreigners. 
There were also suspicions that they might tend to transform 
Hong Kong's school system into a Western European model. He 
reportedly emphasized that the Panel could not necessarily 
solve all the problems that existed: 
We can point the way. But the solution to the problems 
and the implementation of that solution must lie with 
the people who live here and whose responsibility it is 
to do this" (Ibid. ). 
In the two weeks' of the Panel's stay, there were 
reports that the Panel visited the major policy-making 
bodies, a cross-sectional sample of educational institutions 
and met all those who asked for a meeting. There were 
around 30 non-government bodies who asked for a meeting 
(Ibid. ). These meetings were held on October 30 and 
November 3 respectively (Wah Kiu Yat Po, October 26,1981; 
Wen Wei Po, November 4,1981). 
In March, 1982, the Panel returned to Hong Kong and 
held two public plenary sessions on March 29 and 31,1982. 
The plenary sessions were held in the Conference Room of the 
Legislative Council, a sign of respect, and in chair was 
George Papadopoulos, Deputy Director for Social Affairs, 
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Manpower and Education, OECD. The sessions drew active 
participation from representatives of the main educational 
groups in Hong Kong - some 80 representatives (South China 
Morning Post, March 30,1982) from non-governmental groups 
sitting together with top officials in education and members 
of the top policy-making bodies. This was without precedent 
in the history of Hong Kong education. The entire sessions 
were broadcast live to the public through the government 
radio, Radio Television Hong Kong. 
Attending the sessions were also invited representa- 
tives from six other countries (Ibid. ): 
Royal Professor Ungku A. Aziz 
Vice-Chancellor, University of Malaysia; 
Mr Chan Kai-yau 
Director of Education, Singapore; 
Mr. Ernst Goldschmidt 
Under Secretary, Ministry of Education, Denmark; 
Mr. James S. Hrabi 
Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Education, 
Alberta, Canada; 
Mr. Akio Nakajima 
Director, Upper Secondary Education, 
Ministry of Education, Japan; and 
His Excellency Mr. Arthur Maddocks 
U. K. representative to the OECD 
It was only during the session that the non-government 
participants were told of the "agenda" (South China Morning 
Post, March 30,1982; Order Paper, 1981). It was again only 
then they were told that the Panel of visitors had prepared 
a preliminary draft report as well as a list of questions 
which would be used as the basis for discussions (South 
China Morning Post, March 30,1981). 
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This caused much dissatisfaction with the first 
session, but this was soon remedied in the second session 
which was more fruitful. Both pressure group leaders and 
academics gave good marks to the plenary sessions (South 
China Morning Post, April 2,1982). The Panel's summary of 
five "big flaws" received much endorsement, although there 
were people who were dissatisfied that there was no 
indication for immediate action (South China Morning Post, 
March 31,1982). 
I. 3. The Report 
There was a period of silence after the second visit. 
By the end of 1982, it was rumoured that the Panel had 
submitted a report but this was not endorsed by the 
Executive Council and might not be published. 
On January 26,1983, after addressing a luncheon 
meeting of the Zonta Club, Colvyn Haye, the Director of 
Education, disclosed to the press that the report on the 
overall review would go before the Executive Council "within 
the next three weeks to decide if it should be published". 
However, according to the report, Haye said that " he was 
confident the report would be published because of public 
concern". He declined to disclose details of the report, 
but under forceful questioning, he revealed that the report 
had dealt with four major areas: language, simplifying the 
school system, examination pressure and control and 
administration of school management (South China Morning 
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Post, January 27,1983). 
The report entitled "A Perspective on Education In Hong 
Kong: Report by a Visiting Panel" was eventually published 
on May 6,1983. Against all public expectations, the 
Government made no indication on adoption of the report. 
Instead, the public was invited to submit written comments 
to the renamed Education and Manpower Branch by August 31, 
1983, and "no decision will be taken by the Government until 
public comments have been considered" (South China Morning 
Post, May 7,1983). 
The report admittedly adopted a "political" approach 
(Perspective, 1982: 16) and included very little technical 
calculations or quantitative presentations. 
There are four sections in the report. 
Section I is a brief background description laying out 
the context in which the review was conducted. 
Section II is a crucial section which is totally 
devoted to policy and planning. It gives a rather thorough- 
going, critical analysis of the existing machinery and 
proposed the setting up of an Education Commission which 
would coordinate BoE, UPGC and the newly established VTC. 
The Panel suggested that the BoE should be restructured 
to "include representatives of the major interest pressure 
groups which at present have no recognised voice in 
educational governance" (Perspective, 1982: 20). 
It also suggested that the UPGC should establish an 
executive group consisting mainly of local members, so as to 
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cope with the increasing number of institutions. The UPGC 
could then be renamed Higher Education Planning and Grants 
Committee (HEPGC) and should be answerable to the propsoed 
Education Commission, meanwhile retaining its privilege of 
reporting its advice to the Governor (Perspective, 1982: 22). 
The membership of the proposed Education Commission 
would then consist of the chairmen of the BoE, HEPGC and 
VTC, 3 persons of "high standing in the community" and 4 
officials from relevant government Branches (Ibid. 22-23). 
The Panel also proposed that the Education Commission 
should report directly to the Governor-In-Council and 
would have the formal authority and responsibility for 
advising the Governor on all matters relating to the 
development and planning of education in Hong Kong and 
that it would have the power to enquire into such 
matters, and through its 'official members' to require 
such information as would be needed to fultil its 
functions (Ibid.: 24). 
Section III consists of 9 chapters pertaining to 
policies in. connection with language in the classroom, 
sorting and sifting, the kindergartens, the schools, beyond 
the schools, continuing education, special groups, the 
teaching service and labour market implications. 
In each of these chapters, the Panel addressed very 
sensitive controversies and made relevant proposals. The 
proposals in general echoed the sentiments of the vocal 
pressure groups. We shall not go into the details of these 
chapters because most of them are beyond the scope of this 
study. 
Section IV Is a forward looking chapter on Prospects 
and Priorities. In this concluding section, the Panel 
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identified five issues as top priorities: language policy, 
teacher improvement, selection and allocation, post school 
education and "a standing capacity" for research, policy and 
development. These correspond to the five "big flaws" 
summarised while the Panel was in Hong Kong (Perspective, 
1982: 111-114). 
In sum, the Panel made 32 recommendations and these can 
be found in Appendix J of this thesis. 
It was only from the Report that the public realized 
the whole picture of the process of the review: that 56 
written submissions were received before the first visit; 
that the Panel had visited the major policy-making bodies 
and once actually sat in the BoE meeting; that the Panel had 
prepared a draft report after their first visit; that they 
had discussions with the UMELCO Educational Panel, the UPGC, 
the education officials and the invited experts from the six 
countries about the draft report (Perspective, 1982: App II, 
III, IV and V). 
The education community immediately became divided over 
the published report. The non-government groups in general 
hailed the report. The groups felt that the report echoed 
most of the points raised by the public but not taken 
seriously by the Government. The Government and government 
officials in general kept a low profile and their silence 
was taken as a sign of disagreement. The division was 
highlighted by an open split in opinions among the 
Legislative Councillors on July 13,1983. 
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i. 4. The LEGCO Debate 
The Unofficials, i. e. the unofficial members of the 
LEGCO, led by Fr. Patrick McGovern, sought to give the 
Government "a gentle nudge" to get on with the OECD review 
report and to make sure that it does not just lie on the 
shelves gathering dust, as has been the fate of other 
reports" (South China Morning Post, July 13,1983). They 
therefore proposed the following motion in the LEGCO: 
"That this Council receives with approbation the report 
A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong and commends it 
to the Government as a basis on which continuing 
improvement of education in Hong Kong should be 
implemented" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1983-84: 18). 
The Government, on the other hand, was resolutely 
opposed to being pinned down "at a time when we are still 
seeking public opinion" (South China Morning Post, July 13, 
1983). Topley reportedly admitted that the Government had 
not made up its mind (Ibid. ). Topley therefore proposed an 
amendment to the motion: 
That this Council receives with approbation the report 
A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong and commends it 
to the Government as a valuable contribution to the 
consideration of future policy on the development of 
Education in Hong Kong" (Ibid. ). 
A split was likely, with the Unofficials antagonizing 
the Officials. There was likely to be a 24 versus 23 
situation if voting took place, with the Unoffiocials on the 
winning side. "This unexpected turn of events", reported 
Halima Guterres of the South China Morning Post, "believed 
to be unprecedented in the history of the Council, is likely 
to lead to another rare occurrence for the Council -a 
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division in the voting" (Ibid. ). The Unofficials therefore 
decided to meet the press after the voting. 
It was under this pressure of the press report that the 
voting took place. It took four "gruelling " hours for the 
eight Unofficials to speak against the amendment before the 
acting Governor, Sir Philip Haddon-Cave, called for a 
recess. After the recess, Topley withdrew his amendment and 
all the Officials eventually voted for the Unofficials' 
motion (South China Morning Post, July 14,1983). The press 
referred to this as "a dramatic, last-minute reversal of 
position" (Ibid. ). 
The entire Unofficial group held a press conference 
after the LEGCO meeting to clarify their stands and made a 
24 point statement of their unanimous views. In general, the 
24 points endorsed the Panel's views and pressed for 
implementation (South China Morning Post, July 14,1983). 
Despite the fact that result of the LEGCO debate 
confirmed the status of the Panel report, Topley's 
successor, Nell Henderson, remarked later in November that 
"the overall review contains not a single HK$ sign, nor does 
it relate its ideas to the human and material resources 
required to carry them out" (South China Morning Post, 
November 10,1983). He added in a rather sour tone that 
in the overall review, we have a sweet-shop full of 
`goodies' for all - even including a few acid-drops for 
some - but gorge them all at one go, we cannot, without 
the most dire consequences to our digestive system 
(Ibid. ) 
Henderson said that the Executive Council would be 
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consulted on the implementation of the "acceptable" 
strategies proposed by the OECD review report. He further 
hinted that the idea of an Education Commission could be a 
problem area. He said that 
it could be counter-productive to have an Education 
Commission whose introduction interferes with co- 
ordination rather than improves it, 
and that the Government is carefully considering "the 
feasibility of smoothly interfacing a commission with the 
existing consultative machinery" (Ibid. ). It is noticeble 
that in so saying, Henderson was echoing Francis Tien, 
Chairman of the Vocational Training Council (VTC) which was 
one of the bodies supposed to be coordinated by the proposed 
Education Commission (Ibid. ) 
On the same occasion, Henderson disclosed that his 
Branch (Education and Manpower Branch, the former Education 
Branch renamed) had received the volume of comments on the 
overall review which contained probably more words than 
"either the Bible or the Complete Works of Shakespeare". 
This was being analysed and would be presented to the 
Executive Council by the end of 1983 (Ibid. ). 
1.5. The Education Commission 
On February 22,1984, there was a report on the press 
that on the day before, the Executive Council had failed to 
reach a decision on the establishment of an Education 
Commission as proposed by the Panel. The crucial issue, as 
reported, was whether or not this Commission should seek to 
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coordinate the existing policy advisory bodies such as BoE 
and UPGC (South China Morning Post, February 22,1984). The 
problem with the proposed Commission was 
that a commission, as proposed by the panel of 
education experts led by Sir John Llewellyn, would have 
meant the creation of an all-powerful body with members 
of the highest calibre who had the authority to by-pass 
the EXCO entirely, the supreme decision-making body, 
and report directly to the Governor. 
The establishment of such a commission would be 
something of a constitutional anomaly and would raise 
some awkward question for EXCO. 
If EXCO was to approve the establishment of a 
commission of so much clout would it mean, for example, 
that its own advice was no longer needed on all things 
educational? 
A compromise solution might be to set up a committee 
with highly respected members that would report to EXCO 
and be charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating 
all educational matters. 
But might it not be construed as another cog in the 
machinery? 
(South China Morning Post, February 22,1984) 
The failure to reach a decision was quite unexpected 
and it was reported that even the Board of Education had to 
cancel its meeting which had anticipated EXCO decisions. 
On March 7,1984, the Government announced that an 
Education Commission was to be established according to one 
of the major recommendations of the OECD Panel. The 
Education Commission was given six months to present its 
report. Q. W. Lee was appointd the Chairman, but the members 
were yet to be appointed (Government Press Release, March 7, 
1984). 
On the same day, March 7,1984, the Education and 
Manpower Branch issued "A Compendium of Public Comments on 
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The Report by a Visiting Panel: A Perspective on Education 
In Hong Kong". The Compendium was based on a total of 554 
comments made by 305 individuals and organisations, 
including the newly elected District Boards and education 
interest groups. The comments included 176 written 
submissions, 226 news reports and comments given in forums, 
seminars, speeches, etc., and 112 educational editorials or 
feature articles, totalling 2,280 pages (Hong Kong Hansard 
1983/84: 18). 
The compendium aroused another wave of concern, when 
the non-government groups felt that there was a bias when 
the compiler tried to present a balanced picture while there 
was in fact a majority inclination (South China Morning 
Post, March 8,1984). 
On March 29,1984, the Government announced the 
appointment of the other members of the Education 
Commission. It comprised seven educators together with 
other "community leaders". This included also the chairmen 
of the three high-level advisory bodies: BoE, UPGC and VTC 
(South China Morning Post, March 30,1984). 
This is the point of history beyond which this study 
will not go. 
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II. What the Research Finds 
II. 1. Background to the Overall Review 
As early as 1978, the BoE raised the necessity of an 
overall review of the education system. There are a number 
of versions of how the idea first started. One version says 
that it grew out of the private school issue which gave rise 
to a subcommittee of the BoE and this subcommittee suggested 
that there was a need for an overall review (CSBO2). A 
second version attributes the idea of an overall review to 
the deliberation of the Report on Sixth Form Education 
submitted to the Government in 1978 and released to the 
public in 1979 (ISPO2). A third version describes the idea 
of an overall review as a result of a debate between Y. T. Gi, 
the chief planner in the government Education Department, 
and Joyce Simons about the anomalies in the school system 
and the "art of control of the school system" (ISBOI; 
ISUI1). The different versions, all supported by 
considerable evidence, seem to suggest that there was a 
consensus within the BoE that there ought to be an overall 
review. This is further confirmed by the interesting fact 
that an overwhelming number of BoE members each claimed to 
be the initiator of the idea. 
The proposal did not seem to receive sympathy from the 
Governor. The proposal was put aside for some time. 
Our first proposal was actually thrown back. The 
Government seemed to oppose the idea very much. I 
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cannot remember, but at least two or three times, our 
proposal was rejected (ISBO1). 
There was apparently some tension between the BoE and 
the Government on the issue of an overall review. Then 
things came to a turn in June, 1978, as one of the BoE 
members recalls: 
Then in June, when I was waiting in the airport for the 
flight, MacLehose was seeing his wife off on the same 
plane. MacLehose told me: "I am going to see Q. W. Lee 
tomorrow. You are going to get what you want" (ISBO1). 
The Governor first announced the possiblity of an 
overall review when he made his annual speech to the LEGCO 
on October 11,1978. He said: 
On the advice of the Board of Education, I propose to 
initiate a wide-ranging review that would cover the 
whole of the educational system, its methods and its 
objectives. It is proposed this should be conducted 
primarily by persons from abroad with great expertise 
in education, though certainly with local participation 
(Hansard, 1978/79: 24). 
This was further recorded in the Annual Summary of the 
Education Department: 
the Board of Education recommended an overall review of 
the entire education system by a mixed group of 
overseas experts and local residents, with the aim of 
considering the coherence and effectiveness of the 
education service and advising on priorities of its 
long term development. This recommendation was 
accepted and the Government's decision to initiate the 
review was announced by the Governor in his speech to 
the Legislative Council in October, 1978 (Education 
Department, 1980: 4). 
Ever since, the Overall Review was regarded as an exercise 
mainly taken care by the BoE (BoE) (ISXOI). 
The membership of the review team was the next issue 
that took time to decide. 
At that time, Jack Cater came in and there were various 
permutations and combinations [about the membership]. I 
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can remember that for a long time, each BoE meeting 
actually ended up with the question: Any news about the 
overall review? (ISBO1). 
Different alternatives were thought of about the 
reviewer: a government committee, an internal independent 
body or an overseas team. It seemed that most of the BoE 
members agreed that it would not make much sense for 
insiders to look at the system. They therefore favoured 
overseas, impartial personnel (ISX07). 
As far as an overseas team was concerned, should that 
be from UK, as had usually been the case, or should that be 
sought somewhere else? Incidentally, Q. W. Lee, then the 
Chairman of the Board of Education, came across an old 
acquaintance, Arthur Maddocks, who had once been Political 
Adviser to the Hong Kong Governor and who was then UK 
representative to the OECD. Maddocks advised that Hong Kong 
might follow the OECD methodology of country reviews where 
the OECD carried out overall reviews of education as a 
service to its member countries. The BoE adopted this 
suggestion (ISX07). 
The British Delegate to the OECD put forward a request 
to the OECD to help the Government of Hong Kong to review 
its education (ISOR5). However, there was one technical 
problem: Hong Kong was not a member of the OECD. Lee went 
to Paris to discuss this issue personally with Ronald Gass, 
the Director of Education of OECD and George Papadopoulos, 
the Deputy Director. It took a while before they came to an 
agreement that the OECD would arrange something along the 
OECD review format, but Hong Kong would pay for the exercise 
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(ISX07). 
The OECD format for country review usually consisted of 
an international panel of visitors. The panel members were 
independent individuals approved by the government of the 
country under review. The views represented were their own 
and not views of the OECD. After an initial visit, the 
Panel would produce an interim report. This gave no 
definite results, but raised questions for discussion. 
Government reactions were then sought and there was usually 
a confrontation meeting. The usual format of the 
confrontation meeting was for the ministers, civil servants 
and advisers to sit on one side, the visiting panel on the 
opposite side, with representatives of some 20 countries 
sitting behind the panel. A report of the confrontation 
meeting would then be published and used by the government 
for internal policy formation (ISOR3; ISOR2; ISOR5). 
Although the review was eventually on its track, the 
Hong Kong Government's attitude toward the review was not 
entirely positive (ISX01; ISX07; ISX08). Anyway, it went 
ahead. 
11.2. Membership of the Visiting Panel 
The Hong Kong Government proposed to have as Panel 
members someone from U. K., someone from Australia, someone 
from North America and preferably someone from Europe 
(ISOR2). One interpretation of this choice is: 
The idea at that time was that there should be someone 
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from UK for some understandable reasons; someone from 
the Hong Kong Region which we could suppose they meant 
the Far East; and two else: two people who were more 
distant from the culture by which Hong Kong was being 
influenced (ISOR5). 
Papadopoulos, without consulting anyone else, appointed 
Greg Hancock to be the Rapporteur of the Panel (ISOR2; 
ISOR4; ISOR5). 
Greg Hancock was basically an administrator in 
Australia. He was Chief Education Officer of the Australian 
Capital Territory (i. e. Canberra) Schools Authority. He was 
once Commissioner of the Australian Commonwealth Schools 
Commission and a Senior Fellow of the CERI (Centre for 
Educational Research and Innovation) which is an OECD 
establishment (Perspective, 1982: 3). He was involved in the 
Australian review. He spent two years in Paris working with 
the OECD as the Rapporteur in its review of education in 
Denmark (ISOR2; ISOR4; ISOR5). 
Papadopoulos then contacted Sir John Llewellyn (ISOR2). 
John Llewellyn was a retired person when he was' appointed 
Chairman of the Panel. It was generally believed that his 
appointment was largely a political deliberation to include 
in the team a non-government, highly reputed, British 
element (ISOR4). He was formerly Director-General of the 
British Council, Vice-Chancellor of Exeter University and 
Chairman of the New Zealand University Grants Committee 
(Perspective, 1982: 3). Incidentally, he was a neighbour 
and a very good friend of Edward Youde who was later 
appointed new Governor of Hong Kong, just after the Overall 
Review report was completed (ISOR2). 
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Llewellyn recommended Karl Roeloffs (IS0R2). Karl 
Roeloffs was the Generalsekretar (Secretary General) of the 
Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD, German 
Academic Exchange Service). With its headquarters in Bonn, 
DAAD is the counterpart of the British Council in West 
Germany and was in charge of all overseas academic exchange 
programmes. He was once Director of Educational Planning in 
the German Federal Ministry for Education and Science and 
had started as a German Grammar School Headmaster. He was 
once member of the OECD Education Committee and had 
participated in a number of OECD country reviews including 
the well-known OECD-UK confrontation meeting, 1975. He 
particpated as an individual member in the OECD review of 
the Australian education system in 1975. He also once 
participated in a comparative review of science policies in 
UK and Federal Germany. He was obviously an old hand in the 
OECD reviews (Perspective, 1982: 3; ISOR3; ISOR2; ISOR4). 
Another reason for his appointment was that he spoke fluent 
English (ISOR2). 
Michael Kirst, " the fourth member of the Panel, was 
believed to be the last to be recruited (ISOR2). He came 
into the Panel when the format was set (ISOR4). He was 
introduced by Hancock who once cooperated with Kirst in a 
book on US-Australia comparison of education policy (ISOR4). 
Kirst was Professor of Education and of Business 
Administration at Stanford University. He published and 
edited a number of books on education policy in the 1970s 
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(ISOR4). He was once President of the California State 
Board of Education; Staff Director and Chief Counsel of the 
US Senate Select Committee on Employment, Manpower and 
Poverty (Perspective, 1982: 3). At Stanford, he was 
identified as basically a policy analyst and a politician in 
the education circle (CSHW; CSSY). Before coming into the 
Panel, he was not known to either Llewellyn or Roeloffs. 
The selection of members was made entirely by the OECD. 
The OECD did ask the Hong Kong Government for endorsement. 
The Hong Kong authority respected and accepted their choice 
and declined to interfere, so as to make the exercise more 
impartial (ISX07). Effectively, the Government had no 
influence in the selection of the members of the Panel. In 
fact, the Government, with hindsight, somehow regretted that 
it had not intervened. One retired official remarked, 
I thought [we] should not say too much about the 
membership of the panel, so that they would not feel 
that the Government was manipulating. Now I think [we] 
should have run the risk (ISX08). 
From the outset, Llewellyn decided not to be paid and 
the other members followed suit. The Hong Kong Government 
would pay all the expenses. It paid for the air fares and 
the accomodation and an amount of per diem, and that was all 
(ISOR2; ISOR5). 
There was, however, also the question of whether local 
members should be included in the Panel. The BoE decided 
that there should be no local members. The reason was that 
local members would tend to view things with the usual eyes 
and the BoE preferred to leave the review to "strange eyes" 
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(ISX07). Instead, it was arranged that two Special Advisers 
should assist the Panel. Q. W. Lee was appointed not only 
because he was Chairman of the BoE, but also as the 
architect of the entire review. James McHugh acted as 
someone from the UPGC. He was an ex-Principal of a U. K. 
Polytechnic (ISOR2). The two Special Advisers were supposed 
to acquaint the Panel with the local scene (ISOR2). 
McHugh came to Hong Kong at the same time the Panel 
arrived (South China Morning Post, October 21,1981), but he 
was not very much involved in the events that followed. Lee, 
on the other hand, proved extremely helpful to the Panel 
(ISX07; ISOR2; ISOR5). 
11.3. Before the Visits 
The appointment of 
in April, 1981. There 
period between this date 
it was rumoured that the 
once in trouble. Other 
the CRE report, but 
evidence. 
the review Panel was formally made 
were different stories about the 
and the Panel's visit. For example, 
Secretary of Education, Topley, was 
s relate this to the difficulties of 
none of these receives adequate 
Llewellyn at one point did not agree with Papadopoulos 
on the format of the review. Papadopoulos wanted the Panel 
to present a report "that nothing would be put forward in a 
very prescriptive way". Llewellyn did not agree and wanted 
to spell out whatever they might feel. In the end they 
agreed to stick to the OECD format as far as possible and 
261 
Chapter 5: OECD 
would retain the maximum degree of flexibility (ISOR2, 
ISOR4). 
The Government Secretariat immediately prepared a 
background report which was completed in June, 1981. The 
report, entitled The Hong Kong Education System, was 
prepared by the Education Department with Peter Lam (from 
the Education Branch) and John Winfield (from the Education 
Department) as the chief compilers. The thick volume was by 
far the most comprehensive account of the education system 
of Hong Kong. This comprised a main report of eight 
chapters and a large section of appendices (Government 
Secretariat, 1981). The background report was highly 
commended by both Q. W. Lee and the Panel, the latter remarked 
in its letter of transmittel to the Secretary of Education: 
Your background Report is valuable both for its 
substance and for the fact that it probably hastened 
the process of policy clarification: the very spelling 
out of policies can in itself be an exercise In 
formative evaluation (Perspective, 1982: 5-6). 
This background report, however, was not known to the 
public until the final report of the overall review was 
published In 1983. The Panel was also given the Topley 
Report and was aked to comment on It (DSXOI; DSX02). The 
Panel replied that since it was meant to be an overall 
review, it was not appropriate to comment on any particular 
sector before the completion of the entire review (DSX02). 
The Government announced the launching of the overall 
review on June 18,1981. 
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II. 4. The First Visit 
Upon the arrival of the Panel for its first visit in 
October, 1981, the Government hosted a cocktail welcome 
party in which all those who submitted representations, with 
few exceptions, were invited. In effect, most of the 
pressure groups were present. This was taken as an 
unprecedented recognition of the status of these pressure 
groups. In fact, some resentment occurred among the non- 
pressure groups who were not invited, such as the 
professional Association for Science and Mathematics 
Education (CST01) and the school sponsor Tung Wah Group of 
Hospitals (CSCO2). The Panel denied having anything to do 
with the invitation list (CSTO1). 
The first thing Llewellyn did when he arrived in Hong 
Kong was to put forward two questions to MacLehose (then the 
Governor) and Haddon-Cave (then the Financial Secretary) 
respectively (ISOR2). 
The question for MacLehose was: What assumptions 
should be made about 1997? (1997 was the shorthand for the 
resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong in the year 
1997. ) Llewellyn anticipated an assumption that no matter 
who would govern Hong Kong after 1997, Hong Kong would still 
be a free society. He took this as the only assumption that 
would make sense to the review. The advice given to the 
Panel was that "it would be unwise to contemplate what would 
be the implications of 1997". The Panel hence adopted the 
assumption as anticipated (ISOR2; ISOR5). Llwewllyn made 
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this point during the press conference on October 26,1981 
(see I. 2of this Chapter). 
The question for Haddon-Cave was: What kind of 
financial envelope was the Panel supposed to work within? 
The reply was: "We don't work things out like that! If a 
programme makes sense and is accepted with a good plan, we 
will find the money for you. " (ISOR2) Another version of 
the reply was made by Henry Ching, then the Deputy Financial 
Secretary: "We have lots of money and you can ask for 
anything you like" (ISOR4). The Panel members found this 
"both amazing and amusing" (ISOR2; ISOR5). 
Right on the first evening (October 25,1981), the 
first time the Panel members actually met, the Panel went 
ahead to figure out the chapter headings as tentative 
guidelines for the visit. They identified three major areas 
that would be given top priority. These were the three 
points that Llewellyn made on October 26,1981 to the press: 
technological manpower needs, language of instruction and 
future economic development needs (see 1.2 of this Chapter). 
This was followed by three days of intensive visitation 
of institutions. The institutions were chosen at the 
Panel's request. The Panel, for example, requested a visit 
to the best and the poorest private schools. They also 
requested visits to the universities and the polytechnic, 
and so on. Each evening, after the visits, the Panel worked 
for three or four hours (I30R2). The list of Institutions 
they visited is in the final report (Perspective, 1982: App 
IV). 
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On the fourth day, the report began to take shape. 
Some of the chapter headings had changed (ISOR2). 
During the visit, the Panel held extensive discussions 
with nearly all sectors of education. The Panel spent two 
full days (October 30 and November 3,1981) meeting people 
who asked for a meeting. In each of these meetings, 
Roeloffs and Llewellyn sat in one group and Hancock and 
Kirst sat in another. In each case, a secretary was 
provided by the Education Branch (CST01; CSHO1; CSCO1). 
During the first visit, the Panel did not perceive 
intended intervention from the Government, except on one or 
two episodes: 
[.. 1.. perhaps had hoped that we would give him 
additional support. ... But we have really disappointed him, at two points: 
One was the timing. .... hoped that we could present 
something to the Executive Council on one or two points 
[before we left] -a new university, expansion of the 
Polytechnic, Baptist College - and pressed us to give 
recommendations on these selected points, for quick 
legitimation of government policy. We refused. 
Two, .... wanted us to put emphasis on the expansion of higher education. We did not. Higher education was not 
even one of our priorities. We found the priorities we 
have chosen more pressing (ISOR3). 
Right from the beginning, MacLehose told me not to 
touch CUHK. I said that was what I could not promise. 
One episode was that one evening, rather late after our 
visits, ...., with three or four of his men, came to 
the sitting room next to my bedroom, which we used as 
our office. He said: "Before you leave, you have to 
leave something substantial on these three questions. " 
The first one was higher education expansion and I have 
forgotten the other two. I said: "..... I can't do that 
that. We are doing an overall review and results can 
only be found in the final report. " .... was apparently 
very angry. I said: ".... calm down. There is really 
nothing I can do now. " .... rushed out of the door 
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without a word. (ISOR2). 
After the first visit, each Panel member was given the 
task of writing a certain part of the report. They were 
given ten days, at the end of which each of them sent what 
he had written to the other three. A telephone conference 
was then conducted which lasted for two hours. This 
produced the Draft Report (ISOR2; ISOR5). 
11.5. The Draft Report and the Second Visit 
The Draft Report was submitted in March, 1982. This 
was never published. 
The title of the Draft Report was Chinese essence: 
Western science. A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong, 
1981 (Ibid. ). 
The Draft Report was in the form of 12 chapters plus 7 
appendices (Ibid. ). 
Chapter 1: "The Review in Context" started with a sub- 
section on "West meets East". Chapters 2 to 9 were on 
different aspects of Hong Kong education: language in the 
classroom, the teaching service, kindergartens, schools, 
beyond schools, continuing education, special groups, and 
sorting and sifting. Chapter 10 and 11 were devoted to 
broader issues: labour market implications and governance 
and management. The last chapter was a prospectus (Ibid. ). 
The whole idea of a Draft Report was to put forward 
something as an open draft, to provoke discussions and to 
base the final report on these discussions. At one stage 
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the Panel even suggested open discussion of the Draft Report 
but decided to put forward questions in the plenary sessions 
instead: 
The Panel did at some stage ask for public discussion 
of the open draft, but the officials felt that it might 
be risky and the Panel appreciated their point. The 
officials fear that public discussion might never get 
pass the draft and any change in the final report might 
not be recognised. Meanwhile, the Panel itself was not 
confident about the open draft. .. Therefore, instead, 
a number of questions were put forward to the plenary 
sessions and that became the agenda items. It is true 
that the initial impressions usually matter more. That 
contributes to the withholding of the open draft for 
open discussion (ISOR5b). 
The second visit took place in late March and early 
April of 1982. The activities during the second visit 
involved mainly discussions based on the Draft Report. 
A meeting was held with officials of the Education 
Department (ISOR2). The Chinese officials were mostly 
negative about the Draft Report, although Michael Leung, the 
Deputy Director of Education, did not speak a word (ISOR4). 
The general comment was that the Panel did not really 
understand what was happening in Hong Kong. Colvyn Haye, the 
Director of Education, played the role of a middleman and 
tried to moderate (ISOR4). 
A meeting was also held with the UPGC. This was 
described as "very civilized" (ISOR2). Nothing dramatic 
seemed to have happened (ISOR5b). 
A meeting was held with the BoE. There were heated 
debates. The debate was actually between the Panel and two 
or three Board members, particularly Alan Brimer, Professor 
of Education in HKU. Brimer accused the Panel of lack of 
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knowledge of Hong Kong and were just repeating what everyone 
had said (ISOR2; ISOR5b). 
The Panel also discussed the Draft Report with the 
representatives of the six countries (see 1.2 of this 
Chapter). 
Upon the second visit, the Panel asked Topley to 
arrange for further visits it desired. All the requests were 
met. They also asked for facilities of plenary sessions and 
these were arranged (ISOR2). 
The climax of the second visit was the Plenary Sessions 
held on March 29 and 31,1982. The Panel did not anticipate 
the enthusiastic participation from the floor. Papadoupolos, 
who was the Chairman of the Sessions, was unprepared during 
the first Session and had to handle the situation "impromtu" 
(ISORla). The second session turned out to be much more 
successful. 
Before the Panel left Hong Kong, its members sensed 
from a lunch meeting with MacLehose that his attitude was 
not too positive. He said in a typical British humourous 
way that the report might be dumped into the South China 
Sea" (ISOR4). 
11.6. Completion of the Final Report 
As decided by the Panel (ISOR2), the Draft Report was 
finally revised only after the Plenary Sessions. Here 
A. W. Lee gave his input, mainly on the wordings and the 
appropriateness of the report in the Hong Kong community 
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(ISOR2, ISOR4, ISOR5a, ISX07). Under Lee's advice, the Panel 
decided to give up the philosophical statement in the 
introductory chapter. One informant explains: 
The Panel was interested in the controversies, and 
tried to focus on the analyses of these controversies. 
In this case, the introductory chapter which carried 
more value problems might divert the attention of the 
public. We were not particularly unanimous (on this 
point), but on the whole, the Panel did not want the 
attention to the practical points be diverted by 
debates on things carrying value problems (ISOR5b). 
The Panel also decided to change the order of the 
chapters, because the Panel "came to understand that 
structure was the main problem and coordination should be 
given the first priority" (Ibid. ). The other chapters were 
also to be re-written to stress the practical aspects. 
We had the feeling that they [the Government) wanted 
the final report to be action-oriented, to be sort of 
practitioner's report and we felt there were points in 
their view (Ibid. ) 
The Panel members went away and each amended his own 
sections. This was done in the period from May to October, 
1982. The amended versions were sent to all the other 
members. A second telephone meeting was conducted where 
Hancock tape-recorded the entire meeting. Eventually, the 
members agreed to details on the final report. Hancock took 
up the task of piecing the sections together. In order to 
be exact in the nomeclature, facts and figures, John 
Winfield from the Education Department was sent by the 
Education Branch to Australia while the final report was 
being written up, to make sure that "it would not contain 
serious mistakes" (ISOR5a). Hancock did the final report on 
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floppy disks and this was sent to Llewellyn for editing, "to 
pick out some of the Australian and American colloquial 
expressions (ISOR2). The Englishmen in the Hong Kong 
Government were apparently quite cynical about the English 
in the draft: 
Some of the Panel members turned out to be unable to 
write English. .... asked if we could re-write the 
report because no one would pay attention to the report 
if people don't understand the English. In the end, 
Llewellyn had to re-write the whole report and his wife 
helped very much (ISX08). 
Llewellyn's wife, a professional editor, did the editing and 
proof reading. The edited Final Report was then sent to 
Hong Kong (ISOR2; ISOR5a; ISX08). 
The Final Report was completed in October, 1982. Apart 
from minor changes in the wording, there were several major 
changes when compared with Draft Report: 
(a) The original 12 chapters were divided into four 
sections with a change of order of the chapters, as 
shown in Table 5.1 on the next page. 
(b) The draft Chapter 1 was completely reformed. The first 
two sections, which had touched upon the historical and 
political development of Hong Kong, disappeared all 
together and was replaced by a five-paragraph 
description of the background. 
(c) The second last draft chapter on Governance and 
Management was to a large extent re-written to become 
Section II: Policy and Planning in the final report. 
(d) The chapter on Sorting and Sifting was almost totally 
re-written. 
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Table 5.1 Draft and Final Report: a comparison 
(Source: DSORI; Perspective, 1982) 
ra 
Chapter 1 
The Review in Context 
Chapter 2 
Language in the Classroom 
Chapter 3 
The Teaching Service 
Chapter 4 
The Kindergartens 
Chapter 5 
The Schools 
Final 
Section I 
The Review in Context 
Section II 
Policy and Planning 
Section III 
1. Language in the Classroom 
2. Sorting and Sifting 
3. The Kindergartens 
4. The Schools 
Chapter 6 
Beyond the Schools 
Chapter 7 
Continuing Education 
Chapter 8 
Special Groups 
Chapter 9 
Sorting and Sifting 
Chapter 10 
Labour Market Implications 
5. Beyond the Schools 
6. Continuing Education 
7. Special Groups 
8. The Teaching Service 
9. Labour Market Implications 
Chapter 11 
Governance and Management 
Chapter 12 
Prospectus 
Section IV 
Prospects and Priorities 
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(e) The last chapter of A Prospectus was very much reduced 
and re-written to emphasize the Priorities. 
(f) The original Appendix I (Questions Arising), which was 
meant to provoke discussion, was removed. Four 
appendices were added: the main stages of the overall 
review; government expenditure on education; school 
performance at public examinations and a chronological 
sketch of educational provisions in Hong Kong. 
The Panel members' view was that the changes did not 
seem to reflect any substantial difference and certainly was 
not made under Government pressure (ISOR2, ISOR3, ISOR4, 
ISOR5). 
11.7. Publication of the Final Report 
There was complete silence after the Panel submitted 
the Final Report in November, 1982. 
The Panel made clear from the very beginning that they 
would like the Report to be published and they were made to 
believe that the report would be a public report (ISOR2; 
ISOR4; ISOR1). In the very first announcement in June, 
1981, it was made claear that "the final report of the 
visitors is expected to be sent to the Government in mid- 
1982" (Government Press Release, June 18,1981). Yet, the 
Government did not actually promise that the report would be 
published (ISOR5b). Anyway, months passed and no one knew 
the whereabouts of the Report. 
At this point, Edward Youde replaced Murrey MacLehose 
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as Governor of Hong Kong. Youde happended to be a very good 
friend of Llewellyn as they lived in the same suburb of 
London, Wimbledon (ISOR2; ISOR4). Before Youde went to Hong 
Kong, Llewellyn showed him the Report. They spent three or 
four hours on that. Youde seemed to endorse the Report and 
said he could "see nothing to which the Government should 
say no". The Panel knew this and they pinned their hope on 
the new Governor. Llewellyn further recommended that he saw 
the setting up of the Education Commission as most important 
and if that were to come about, particular attention should 
be paid to Q. W. Lee (ISOR2: ISOR4). 
The new Governor made his first policy speech on 
October 6,1982, five months after he assumed office. The 
OECD review was mentioned briefly in only a few lines: 
The Panel conducted two very successful public plenary 
sessions in Hong Kong earlier this year in which they 
pointed to major areas of concern. These included the 
need to simplify our complex educational system and to 
improve our ability to formulate policy and plan new 
developments. The Panel's recommendations will be 
carefully considered by the Government (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 1982/83: 19). 
Still there was no sign that the Report would be 
published. The Panel had some discussion over the telephone 
about the delay. Llewellyn sent a letter to Topley to 
express their serious concern about the publication of the 
Report. The replies were: "We had to check with His 
Excellency! " "His Excellency is considering! " 
By the end of 1982, an academic in HKU who was also 
associated with Stanford University brought back the 
unpublished Report. The copy was soon photocopied and 
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circulated widely among the non-governmental groups. Some 
newspapers started disclosing and even commenting on some of 
the key issues in the Report which was still unpublished and 
unknown to even high-powered bodies such as BoE, UPGC or 
even LEGCO (Sing Tao Jih Pao, passim. ). 
On November 26,1982, in a general meeting of the 
Association of Heads of Secondary Schools, Topley, as the 
guest speaker, made unusual remarks about the Panel members. 
The school principals gathered that the Secretary for 
Education and Manpower was not happy with the OECD review. 
Colvyn Haye's remarks in January, 1983 was the first 
time the public ever learnt that there was a Report and that 
the Report was not even forwarded to the EXCO (South China 
Morning Post, January 27,1983). Haye disclosed that the 
Report would be forwarded to the EXCO in three weeks' time, 
i. e. in mid-February. 
On April 9,1983, the EXCO made a number of decisions: 
(a) that the Final Report should be published; 
(b) that the Government should seek and research the 
views of the public and 
(c) that the Government should produce"a compendium of 
the views and further recommend whether or not 
there should be an Education Commission (DSX05). 
There was a further question of whether the report 
should be referred in whole, or in part to the proposed 
Commission for consideration; if not, whether the report and 
the views of the public should be referred to another body 
or handed through established channels (DSX05). 
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The Report was eventually published on May 6,1983. 
The public was given until August 31,1983 to submit their 
views in writing (Government Press Release, May 6,1983). 
On that occasion, Llewellyn received a telex from 
Youde: 
"Report accepted! ... 
Congratulations! " 
II. 8. The LEGCO Debate and After 
Then came the dramatic confrontation between the 
Officials and the Unofficials in the LEGCO, on July 13, 
1983. Thereafter, Topley retired as Secretary for Education 
and Manpower (a new name for the post) and Neil Henderson, 
who used to be the Commissioner of Labour, took over. 
In the policy speech delivered on October 5,1983, the 
Governor hinted that 
The recommendations which have attracted most public 
comment and debate are those in respect of the 
language of instruction in schools; the abolition of 
the Junior Secondary Education Assessment; the incor- 
poration of kindergartens into the aided sector; better 
teacher training; and the expansion of opportunities 
for higher education (Hong Kong Hansard 1983/84: 24). 
Presumably, these were the priorities pre-selected by 
the Government. By pointing to the financial implications, 
he seemed to hint that the recommendations would be 
implemented. 
The report, together with public comments thereon, 
should be submitted to the Executive Council for 
decision before the end of this year. The financing of 
any improvement to our system of education will need to 
be carefuly considered, but I believe that the people 
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of Hong Kong attach great importance to education, and 
are prepared to pay for improvements (Hong Kong Hansard 
1983/84: 24). 
In the following debate on November 9,1983, Henderson 
disclosed details of the comments received: 
The position now is that these comments have been 
received though some of the more weighty responses were 
not received until September or early October. Not I 
think, Sir, that anyone has any doubts about the over- 
riding interest of our people in education, but if one 
did, the sheer volume of comments that this report has 
stimulated would soon convince. We have received a 
total of 544 comments from 305 organizations or 
individuals. These included 176 direct written 
submissions, 226 news reports of comments made in 
seminars, and public speeches and 112 editorials/ 
articles in all, totalling 2,280 pages. Probably more 
words than contained either in the Bible or the 
Complete Works of Shakespeare! ! laughter) (Hong Kong 
Hansard 1983/84: 191) 
Henderson more substantially elaborated on the point of 
finance made by the Governor: 
The timing, priority and budgetting of implementation 
plans are extremely vital. It is as well to bear in 
mind that the Overall Review contains not a single HK$ 
sign, nor does it relate its ideas to the human and 
material resources required to carry them out. 
(Hansard 1983/84: 191) 
It was in this same meeting Henderson made his remarks 
about the "goodies" in the OECD review and the counter- 
productiveness of interfacing an Education Commission with 
the existing consultative machinery (see 1.4 of this 
Chapter). 
Almost at the same time, Philip Haddon-Cave, the then 
Chief Secretary remarked when he met the Hong Kong Observers 
(a political commentary group) that it would be better if 
the Panel had not been invited (CSWO1). 
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11.9. The Establishment of the Education Commission 
On February 21,1984, the EXCO discussed the OECD 
report. This led to the headline report in the South China 
Morning Post the next morning. The discussion focussed on 
(a) the compendium of views responding to the OECD review 
Report and (b) the establishment of an "Education Policy 
Development Committee". 
Item (a) seemed to be non-controversial, but (b), 
according to the report, did not secure the necessary 
agreement. The advantages of establishing an Education 
Commission as proposed would have a number of advantages: 
"additional coordination and research"; to "help coordinate 
the work of BoE, UPGC and VTC"; to "improve community 
involvement in educational planning and decision making"; to 
achieve "awareness by the BoE, VTC and UPGC of each other's 
work" and this "would be of value to their own planning"; 
and would allow the Secretary for Education and Manpower to 
have "more outside advice in shaping educational policy". 
The disadvantages would be "including the potential for 
delay and adding to bureaucracy" (DSX05). However, the 
Government's disagreement. to the proposed model of a 
Commission was quite apparent: 
The administration considers that the theoretical model 
proposed is unlikely to function in practice as 
smoothly as envisaged (Ibid. ). 
A number of reasons were given which led to the summary: 
While initially having impressive status and public 
relations value, the Commission constituted as in the 
report would for the aforementioned reasons soon show 
its shortcomings and might well fail to live up to 
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public expectations (Ibid. ). 
Three options were therefore put forward to the EXCO: 
(1) an Education Commission as proposed, (2) a strengthened 
Education and Manpower Branch and (3) an advisory committee 
with the suggested title of Education Policy Development 
Committee (EPDC)(Ibid. ) 
The idea of a strengthened branch was not given much 
weight. One of the reasons was that "it would be difficult 
also to show the public the merit of this option". Much was 
said however, about the weaknesses of the first option (the 
proposed Education Commission) and the strengths of the 
third (EPDC). 
The major difference between the EPDC and the proposed 
Education Commission was that (a) the EPDC would "provide 
the Governor through the Secretary for Education and 
Manpower consolidated advice and would not, as proposed, 
report directly to the Governor; (b) the EPDC would co- 
ordinate but would not seek to subordinate or change the 
existing advisory machinery and therefore, unlike the 
proposed Commission model, the BoE, the VTC and the UPGC 
would remain directly answerable to the Governor and (c) the 
Branch would service the Commission but would not, as 
proposed, be incorporated in the Commission as its 
Secretariat (DSX05). 
The EPDC would be non-statutory, which was opposite to 
what the BoE and the Director of Education proposed (DSX05). 
The whole OECD review Report, excluding the establish- 
ment of the Education Commission, would be referred to the 
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EPDC and the EPDC would report to the EXCO. 
In the case of the EPDC, there was also the dilemma of 
whether the Chairman should be the Secretary for Education 
and Manpower, an Official, or an Unofficial, as proposed by 
the OECD review Report. (DSX05) 
It did not seem that the meeting came to a concensus. 
The South China Morning Post reported the next morning: 
The Executive Council yesterday failed to come to grips 
with the Llewellyn report on education and It took the 
unexpected step of deferring a decision until next week 
(South China Morning Post, February 22,1984). 
On March 7,1984, some two weeks after the dramatic 
EXCO meeting, the Government announced the establishment of 
an Education Commission (Government Press Release, March 7, 
1984). The Commission would report to the "Governor-in- 
Council"; it would be serviced by the Education and Manpower 
Branch and would have the Secretary as its Vice-Chairman; 
and the Commission would "coordinate but not direct the work 
of the three major advisory bodies on education" (Ibid. ). 
Neil Henderson, during the press conference, further 
clarified that the BoE, the VTC and the UPGC would "retain 
their rights of reporting directly to the Governor' (South 
China Morning Post, March 8,1984). One thing that the 
press release did not mention was that: the Commission was 
non-statutory. 
It is clear that this Education Commission was actually 
the EPDC as discussed in the February 21 EXCO meetingt 
Although the government anouncement did not made it clear, 
the South China Morning Post was sensitive enough to 
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identify that "this represents an important departure from 
the spirit of the Llewellyn formula" (South China Morning 
Post, March 8,1984). 
The dilemma on the Chairmanship was apparently solved 
by making Q. W. Lee, an Unofficial, the Chairman. Q. W. Lee had 
long been involved with educational policy-making and his 
reappointment to the EXCO in 1983 was believed to be closely 
related to the OECD Review. 
The announcement said that the members were yet to be 
appointed, but the membership was exactly in line with the 
Llewellyn proposals with the reinforcement of educators 
(Government Press Release, March 7,1985). A compendium was 
also compiled and published on March 7,1984, as was 
resolved by the EXCO in April, 1983. 
On March 29,1984, the Government announced the 
membership list. Five educators were carefully selected to 
achieve the maximum representation (South China Morning 
Post, March 30,1985). 
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III. Explaining the OECD Review 
In this section, the OECD Review will be analysed from 
two perspectives: the rational perspective and the 
legitimacy perspective. 
The analysis will first identify the critical junctures 
in the episode. These are the points that require 
explanation. The main body of the analysis will then try to 
provide explanations for the junctures, using two different 
frameworks of thinking as has been done for the CRE Review. 
In all these explanations, reference will be made largely to 
the same actors as are identified in Chapter 4. 
111.1. The Critical Junctures 
The first question was: Why was the OECD Review 
launched? Why was it advocated by the BoE rather than by 
others? What was the reason behind the Government's 
reluctance to accept the BoE proposal and why was it 
eventually accepted? The OECD review took place at the 
moment when the fate of the CRE review was still not clear. 
Was the overlap in timing a mere coincidence? Or was it part 
of a consistent process? 
The second question pertains to the methodology adopted 
by the OECD Panel. Why did the Panel adopt the so-called 
"political approach"? What were the assumptions behind this 
methodology? What was the implication of adopting this 
methodology in the Hong Kong review and what was its impact 
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on the policy arena? 
Thirdly came the Report. Why was the publication of 
the Report delayed? It was the Government which endorsed 
the OECD Review, but it was the same Government which 
delayed the publication of the Report. Was it a change of 
mind? Or was it a sign of Government's reluctance which had 
been hidden from the outset? 
The fourth juncture was the LEGCO debate. The LEGCO 
debate in July, 1983 did not seem to link itself directly 
with decision-making about the OECD Review. However, it 
demonstrated the role of the LEGCO and the relationship 
between the Officials and the Unofficials. What then caused 
the latter to 'revolt' and the former to surrender? 
The establishment of the Education Commission is the 
fifth point of concern. A dissection of the government 
hesitation at this point may lead to a better understanding 
of the inter-relationship between the different bodies 
within the government structure and on the rationale of 
government decisions. 
The analyses that follow will concentrate on the 
following questions: 
Why was the OECD review launched? 
Why did the OECD Panel adopt the 'political approach'? 
Why was the publication of the Report delayed? 
What was behind the LEGCO debate? 
What was the issue behind the establishment of the 
Education Cosaission ? 
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111.2. The Rational Explanation 
As was with the case in explaining the CRE review, the 
rational explanation assumes that the basic concern of all 
actors were the policies. They all try to strive for some 
goals in terms of policies in education. Conflicts arise 
because they have different goals, or means to arrive at the 
goals, or when there are basic interest conflicts that are 
not easily compromised. 
111.2.1. Launching of the Overall Review 
Education consumed the largest percentage of the 
government budget. Education had also grown into a huge 
enterprise. However, for historical reasons policies for 
different sectors of education had been deliberated by 
fragmented bodies. There was therefore a need for an 
Overall Review, to weave the fragmented policies into a co- 
ordinated framework (ISX07). 
The idea was initiated by the BoE (ISXO1, ISX07). The 
BoE was particularly sensitive about this fragmentation, 
because its members spanned the largest sector in education. 
One BoE member opines: 
The BoE was always conscious that our policy had been 
dealing with piece-meal and we need to see if the 
money was spent wisely. Frankly speaking, the 
Education Department was at that time in charge of 
everything from kindergarten to tertiary education. It 
had too big a territory. It was under these circum- 
stances that the BoE proposed an overall review of the 
system (ISX07). 
The BoE saw that such an overall review would better be 
done through 'strange eyes" (ISX07) because a local 
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committee would easily be preoccupied by the existing 
frameworksand might not have the international perspective 
necessary for the overall review. 
The idea did not receive sympathy from the Government. 
The argument for the government reluctance, in hindsight, 
was that 
Unlike the Topley review or the UPGC, the OECD review 
lacked continuity. It was advocated by a few people in 
the Board of Education - Q. W. Lee was particularly keen 
on this, but the Government was reluctant to let loose 
policy matters to a group like that. With only very 
short visits, things can only be reviewed in a very 
superficial way where a small but articulate group 
spoke on yet very sensitive issues (ISX01). 
The OECD Panel was appointed in April, 1981. This was 
the moment when the CRE review was still underway and it was 
optimistically envisaged that the CRE would be completed by 
mid-July as scheduled (DSCRE/51). The OECD review starting 
in October would then fit very well into the time schedule 
when policies at all levels of education would be available. 
111.2.2. The review methodology 
As typified by the CRE review and earlier policy-making 
processes, education policies had been formulated on 
carefully prepared "rational analysis" (e. g. the manpower 
model in the CRE review). Whether such analyses actually 
determine the policies or not, they provided some objective 
basis for educational policy-making. 
The methodology adoptd by the OECD Panel was 
distinctively different. From the outset, the OECD Panel 
did not start from any "rational analysis". It regarded 
"rational" exercises such as that carried out by the CRE as 
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a "juggling of figures" (ISOR3). As was summarised in the 
Report, the Panel classified this approch to educational 
planning and policy-making as "technical planning" which 
they identified as the "first generation" educational 
planning. This was distinctively different from the "third 
generation" which was "pluralistic and participatory" 
(DSOR1). Here it seems worthwhile to quote at length the 
following which expressed the basic disagreement of the 
Panel with the Hong Kong Government's approach to 
educational planning and policy-making: 
It is worthwhile to consider what is meant by the 
forward planning of educational development. While 
there is still a strong attachment in government 
circles to what might be called `technical' planning - 
for example, of trying to assess manpower requirements 
and making consequential adaptations to the system - 
there is a fortunate drift away from an allegedly 
value-free and mechanistic view of education-as- 
investment for both individual and society. Instead, 
we see a move towards the more 'political' approach of 
collating materials, testing options and implementing 
action in terms of increasingly explicit sets of 
values. 
The Government's Plans and Forecasts appear to be 
examples of this second generation approach which 
assumes that value statements about various positions 
can be expertly mapped and that stock can be taken of a 
range of feasible options. Overseas, as well as in some 
quarters in Hong Kong, the now serious doubts about the 
validity and utility of this concept of planning is 
giving rise to the formulation of a third generation 
approach - involving a move away from the stating of 
definite objectives in favour of pointing out broad 
directions.... 
We feel that strenuous efforts should be devoted to 
raising the level of parent and community involvement 
in policy-formation (especially at the school level) 
and to engage as much expertise as can be marshalled 
(not only from within the bureaucracy) In planning.... 
We had conversations with people who expressed to us 
the dilemma of educational policies directed towards 
285 
Chapter 5: OECD 
social cohesion and control being juxtaposed against 
those aiming at individual and minority-group freedom. 
The legitimacy of this tension seems to have been 
acknowledged in the virtual explosion of panels, 
committees and working parties, participatory devices 
that have been foreign to the local scene until 
recently. Despite the trend towards participatory 
governance, the technocratic planning techniques still 
being employed continue to cause problems (Perspective, 
1982: 16-17) 
Similar remarks are readily found in OECD documents, 
particularly in those related to the Re-appraisal of 
Educational Planning project (see, for example, Kogan, 
1980: 8). 
In the Panel's view, the Hong Kong Government's 
approach was technocratic and causing problems because it 
was not client-centred (Perspective, 1982: 17, para 11.8). 
Their faith in pluralistic and participatory approaches 
naturally led them to adopt a pluralistic and participatory 
approach in the Overall Review. Thus came the methodology 
described earlier. 
111.2.3. Delay of the Report 
As a consequence of the "political approach" the Report 
was a reflection, sometimes a pure reflection, of the 
opinions expressed by what the Panel identified as the 
"clients". Thus the most vocal groups such as the Education 
Action Group were given the most heed. 
In the Government's eyes, this was entirely 
inappropriate to policy-making in Hong Kong. Furthermore, 
the Government was totally unprepared for such an approach. 
One key informant from the Government remarked: 
I did not realize that the OECD had changed. I had read 
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many of the OECD reports, but not their recent ones. I 
read their Japanese report, Australian report which 
were tidy, rational. I did not read their reports on 
Greece, Norway which used a different approach. I was 
not updated of the OECD (ISX08). 
Thus Topley expressed his disappointment in the 
Association of Heads of Secondary Schools (see 11.7 of this 
Chapter) and Henderson cynically described the Report as "a 
sweet-shop full of `goodies' for all" (see 1.4 of this 
Chapter). 
On the other hand, the Panel regarded this as a 
success. They appreciated very much the method as well as 
the outcome of the Review: 
The intensity of public participation was outstanding. 
We had some 280 meetings with all the educational 
groups. Participation of public groups in the plenary 
sessions was again impressive. 
That was rather unusual, in almost all the other OECD 
reviews, review reports normally turned out to support 
government policies, e. g. Australia, Germany, and so 
the governments found them useful (ISOR3). 
The Panel even consciously went beyond education and 
envisaged: 
Any move towards greater participation in education 
decision making and policy formulation would add to 
existing pressures for the democratisation of the 
territory's government generally (Perspective, 1982: 
18,11.11). 
And it was convinced that 
Given what the education enterprise is about, its 
governance and management should be a model of public 
administrative theory and practice (Perspective, 1982: 
15,11.1). 
This presented a challenge to the existing administra- 
tion. It went beyond differences in methods and outcomes. 
It actually reflects a difference in the ideology of policy- 
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making. 
A senior member of the Government who was in charge of 
educational planning, was sharp in pointing out: "It is 
really a matter of choice. Had we invited UNESCO instead, 
the result could be completely different" (CSL03). 
It was not surprising that it was not only objected to 
by the Governor and Topley, but also objected to by Brimer, 
Professor of Education and member of the Board of Education, 
and even the UPGC where the majority was from overseas. 
They were familiar with the Hong Kong scene and believed 
that the mode of policy-making in Hong Kong should be very 
different from those in the West, let alone the "participa- 
tory" approach to which was often paid only lip service even 
in the West. 
If we take this view, it is not surprising that the 
Government was reluctant to publish the Report. Even when 
the Report was published under pressure, the Government 
found it difficult to fit its implementation into the 
existing political framework. 
III. 2.4. the GEGCO Debate 
If the above explanation is valid, then the Legco 
debate becomes a matter of course. 
In this issue, the Unofficials were largely led by Fr 
McGovern and Joyce Bennett. Fr McGovern was a senior member 
in the Catholic Diocese and was in the Catholic Board of 
Education. Bennett had long been well known for her liberal 
thoughts in education and her critical attitude towards the 
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government Education Department (CSWO1). She whole-heartedly 
supported the OECD review Report. In their viewpoints, It 
was the narrow-mindedness of the Government that went 
against the Report. 
The environment at that time was that the published 
Report was warmly received by the public. Reactions among 
non-government bodies were overwhelmingly positive. On the 
other hand, the Government made absolutely no comment about 
the Report. Most of the Unofficials would find no reason for 
not supporting the Report. 
The Officials, who were antagonized by the OECD Panel 
right from the beginning of the exercise, felt reluctant to 
show an endorsing attitude and commit the Government to 
fully implement the Report. They felt, very much the 
opposite of the Unofficials, that the report was merely a 
narrow-minded reflection of pressure group opinions and a 
broader basis should be sought for policy formulation. 
The whole thing therefore evolved into the dramatic= 
confrontation between the Officials and the Unofficials. 
The resolution of the confrontation was achieved by a 
concession of the Officials, as Topley made clear in his 
concluding speech, that 
It has now been made clear that the motion is not meant 
to exclude consideration of the public consultation 
which is continuing. It is not claimed that the Report 
is the only basis for the formulation of policy, nor is 
it suggested that the Government must proceed tomorrow 
to implement the recommendations of the report as a 
fixed blueprint (Hansard, 1983/84: 1126-27). 
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111.2.5. The Education Commission 
As is clear from the Report, the Panel saw the 
establishment of the Education Commission as of prime 
importance. The idea was a consequence of the finding that 
There is a pervasive feeling that the responsibility for and knowledge about what is happening lies 
elsewhere; but no-one is sure where this is, or who holds the master plan (Perspective, 1981: 16). 
The education system seems to be over-administered in 
terms of minute bureaucratic surveillance of regula- 
tions yet under-planned in terms of strategic goals and the know-how to attain them (Ibid). 
In concrete terms, there was the need to have a body to 
coordinate the three existing policy advisory bodies: BoE, 
VTC and UPGC. The proposal coincided with the Government's 
concern on fragmentation, which led subsequently to the 
creation of the new Secretary for Education and his Branch. 
However, the proposal was administratively undesirable. 
As was explained in the relevant document and vividly 
reported by the South China Morning Post (see also 1.5 of 
this Chapter) the establishsment of the proposed Education 
Commission would (a) add a "cog" to the existing policy- 
making machinery; (b) present a constitutional anomaly to 
the EXCO and (c) discourage the existing advisory bodies who 
then had to submit themselves to the new Commission. One 
unpublished document had the following criticisms about the 
proposed Education Commission: 
The Commission, or indeed any other body which is 
juxtaposed upon and seen to be superior to the three 
existng bodies, which incorporate the Education and 
Manpower Branch as its Secretariat and reports directly 
to the Governor would be cumbersome in operation by 
introducing another step in the consultative process 
(DSX05). 
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The Government's reluctance was further reinforced by 
the objection from the existing advisory bodies. The UPGC, 
in particular, emphasized that (a) coordination is the 
function of the Government and not of an advisory body and 
(b) coordination is an impossibility in modern education 
systems. It said in its recommendation: 
There is no quarrel with the need for coordination, but 
we have grave reservations about the degree of co- 
ordination that can be exercised or should be exercised 
by an advisory body. Coordination and assignment of 
priorities ultimately involve executive decisions and 
the taking of executive decisions is not properly the 
role of an advisory group. Furthermore in our view it 
is not appropriate for overall government priorities to 
be determined by anyone other than the Government, 
using the eatablished machinery. ... 
On a more philosophical note, we cannot commend the 
establishment of an Education Commission which derives 
conceptually from out-moded educational theories of the 
1960s when it was believed for a time by some exponents 
that a common philosophy could be applied to both 
kindergarten and post-doctorate research (DSU02). 
Under these circumstances, the difficulties in 
implementing the idea of the proposed Education Commission 
had put the Government away from the idea. The eventual 
establishment of the revised version of an Education 
Commission was a compromise between the proposal and the 
status quo. 
111.2.6. Summary of the rational explanation 
In short, the rational explanation sees the different 
actors in the episode as "goal conscious". Their primary 
concern was to arrive at some desired policy in education. 
The launching of the OECD review was based on the 
genuine need for overviewing the fragmented policies and 
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policy-advisory bodies, with the hope that a third-party 
with the expertise of the OECD would provide the most 
objective recommendations. The OECD Panel, however, adopted 
a pluralistic and participatory approach where public 
opinions were regarded as the norm for policy decisions. 
This deviated significantly from the existing policy 
mechanism of Hong Kong where technical deliberations formed 
the basis for decision-making. The Government therefore 
found it difficult to follow. The popular groups, on the 
other hand, naturally supported the Report which reflected 
their views. This conflict came to a head in the LEGCO 
debate between the Officials and the Unofficials. With 
reluctance, the Government accepted the Report and tried to 
resolve the basic conflict by setting up a Education 
Commission which is a compromise between the proposed 
Commmision and the existing policy-making machinery. 
111.3. The Legitimacy Explanation 
The legitimacy explanation assumes that the primary 
concern of the actors might not be the policies per se. The 
different advisory bodies might find themselves in the 
position of defending their own legitimacy which gave them 
the authority to contribute to educational policy-making. 
The OECD review, just like the CRE review, emerged as a 
foreign body in the arena of legitimacy and in effect 
disturbed the original order of legitimacy and hence aroused 
vigorous interactions. 
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Before we proceed to answer the five questions at hand, 
it might be useful to examine some of the characteristics of 
the OECD review. 
111.3.1. Characteristics of the OECD review 
The OECD Panel was basically an external consultant. 
This has to be studied with care. 
On the one hand, the nature of the OECD reviews 
determined that the Hong Kong review Panel was to be 
independent and impartial. 
Firstly, in the OECD convention, the country reviews 
are not used to endorse government policies. Rather it is 
designed to help the host government identify problems not 
easily seen by the government itself. The government may or 
may not agree with the results of the overall review. In 
fact, the UK confrontation meeting in 1975 was famous for 
the disagreement between the review Panel and the Department 
for Education and Science (OECD, 1975; Department of 
Education and Science, 1975). Anyway, from the outset, the 
review Panel was not obliged to follow government lines. 
That is, it was impartial. 
Secondly, as initiator of the Hong Kong review, the 
BoE's intention was to present the Hong Kong case to some 
'strange eyes' and it agreed that it would not make much 
sense for insiders to look at the system (see II. 1 of this 
Chapter). Therefore, the BoE started with no intention to 
use the overall review to endorse existing policies. 
Thirdly, the Panel from the outset took itself as a 
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free agent. They deliberately decided not to be paid and 
took this as a guard against government intervention (see 
11.2 of this Chapter). In the Panel members' own words, "We 
insisted in the integrity to act as free agents so that 
government manoeuvre would be practically zero" (ISOR4). 
Therefore, the OECD Panel viwed itself as a free agent, 
independent and impartial. 
On the other hand, right from the beginning, the 
Government made much effort to publicise the Overall 
Review. This gave the community a strong sense that the 
Review was going to be a public exercise. The public 
invitation for representations and meetings, the wide 
publicity of the Panel's extensive visits, and the plenary 
sessions, all confirmed this impression. 
Meanwhile, the Panel was committed from the very 
beginning to producing a public report. Although this was 
not known to the public, the Panel members all had in mind 
that they were doing something public. 
As a result of both the government publicity and the 
Panel's commitment, It was tacitly understood that the 
Overall Review was a public review. 
If we combine the two aspects, the OECD Panel was 
special in that It was not only answerable to the Governor 
or the Government, but also answerable to the public. It 
was therefore not supposed to be advising the Government 
alone, but Hong Kong as a whole. This is the basic 
difference between this Hong Kong review and other OECD 
294 
Chapter 5: OECD 
country reviews. Elsewhere, a panel was invited by the 
government which was supposed to be elected and representing 
the citizens. Although the Panel was invited by the 
Government, it was deliberately set up to be essentially not 
only a Government consultation; it was a third-party 
consultation. As an actor in this political episode, the 
OECD Panel was a third-party consultant. 
Viewed from this angle, the OECD Review was basically 
an episode of the triangular relationship among the 
Government, the public and the third-party consultant. 
We can now proceed to explain the five junctures. 
111.3.2. Launching of the Overall Review 
We can examine this from two angles: the insistence of 
the BoE and the acceptance by the Governor. 
The BoE Insistence That the BoE initiated the exercise 
was politically explainable. The BoE was a body of shrinking 
territory. Following the loss of the Technical College 
(which became the Polytechnic) to the UPGC, it is going to 
lose the Technical Institutes to the successor of Hong Kong 
Training Council. When the OECD Panel was being appointed, 
discussions were underway In the CRE Committee that Baptist 
College, Lingnan College and Shue Yan College which were 
registered with the Ordinance of Post-Secondary Colleges 
would be taken away from the Education Department. 
The declining image of the BoE was not only because of 
its decreasing sphere of influence, but also of its status 
in terms of policy-making. Although the BoE was established 
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by the Education Ordinance and was supposed to advise the 
Governor in all matters of educational policy, it had never 
been really influential in policy-making. The 1973 Green 
Paper was a BoE endeavour, but it was this very Green Paper 
which was almost completely revised by the Government 
Secretariat when it appeared subsequently as White Paper 
(see Chapter 1, I. 1.2). Thereafter, the BoE had virtually 
become an advisory body for the Director of Education rather 
than for the Governor, although nominally the Director of 
Education was only the Vice-Chairman. It discussed matters 
of administration rather than matters of policy. 
This was also an observation by the OECD Panel: 
Our understanding is that there is little capacity or 
corporate willingness [within the BoE] to address 
principles or long-term development planning (although 
it was put to us that in recent years references to the 
Board have been more to do with details of 
administration than with general policy) (Perspective, 
1982: 20). 
Meanwhile, the BoE was in charge of the largest sector 
of the education population. The school system was always 
the most crucial part of the entire education scene. It was 
highly sensitive to changes in the other sectors (viz. 
technical education and higher education). Under these 
circumstances, it was legitimate for the BoE to think of an 
overall review of the system, to look into the expanding 
territories of the other policy advisory bodies; so that 
before its role further declined, it could justify its own 
position in the policy-making arena. In other words, the 
BoE sought to strengthen its legitimacy as a genuine policy- 
making body, and this legitimacy could be provided by an 
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overall review. 
This Justification was not likely to be achieved by 
local members of the education community who, in one way or 
another, had their involvements in different established 
interests. The impartiality of a third-party consultant 
will best provide the legitimacy required by the BoE. The 
OECD, as an established international organization in the 
business, provided a useful means in this respect. 
The Governor's acceptance The Governor, MacLehose, was 
not happy at all with the idea of an overall review. He did 
not believe that anything useful could come out of such a 
short review. The following quotation is still true: 
Unlike the Topley review or the UPGC, the OECD review 
lacked continuity. It was advocated by a few people in 
the Board of Education - A. W. Lee was particularly keen 
on this - but the government was reluctant to let loose 
policy matters to a group like this [the OECD Panel]. 
With only very short visits, things can only be 
reviewed in a very superficial way where a small but 
articulate group spoke yet on very sensitive issues 
(ISXO1, also appears in 111.2.1. of this Chapter). 
Why then did MacLehose, to start with, approve the idea 
in 1978 and appointed the Panel in 1981? 
One immediate explanation is that the BoE's proposal 
was irresistible because it tested the Government's 
sincerity in improving education. One key informant sees 
the BoE as follows: 
It was not easy to resist the pressure brought about by 
the BoE. The BoE has been there for twenty or thirty 
years, but has done very little if not nothing (ISX08). 
Hence, although the BoE was not terribly influential, 
the Government had to pay respect. If the proposal were 
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rejected, the Government would not be able to hold its 
credibility among the BoE members who were representative of 
the major sponsors of the school system. In other words, 
refusal of the proposal might cost the Government a loss in 
legitimacy. The above statement of the senior official 
illustrates this point. 
However, it is not fair to assert that the Governor was 
totally passive and reluctant in launching the OECD review. 
If we look back into the years before the Overall Review, we 
should find that MacLehose was good at third-party 
consultations. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1,111.2), 
the T. K. Ann Commission and the Rayson Huang Committee are 
well-known examples of third-party consultation. There 
could be similar exercises in other sectors. As far as 
education is concerned, the Overall Review was the third 
major exercise as third-party consultation in the "MacLehose 
Years" . 
Third-party consultation was a device which placed the 
Governor in an impartial position over any dispute between 
the government bureaucracy and the public, thus winning 
credibility from all parties and providing the Governor with 
legitimacy for his authority. 
If legitimacy provides acceptable arguments, then it 
was the process rather than the output of the consultation 
which was more important. The concern, both on the parts of 
the BoE and the Governor, was more on the consultation per 
se than the results from the consultations. 
The negative interpretation is that carrying out such a 
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consultation is a purpose in itself. Whether the 
consultation actually contributes to policy-making is of 
secondary importance. As one veteran OECD member observed, 
that the government is willing to hear does not necessarily 
mean it is ready to listen" (ISOR1a). 
The argument may be extended to explain the timing of 
the OECD review. The OECD review was not meant to pre-empt 
CRE results. Rather it was the timing of the CRE that was 
political. There were at that time published policy 
statements on primary, junior secondary and senior secondary 
education. Technical and higher education was absent on the 
list. The Government found it necessary to put forward some 
policy statement in these areas before the OECD review 
actually started, hence the CRE. One of the informants 
opines: 
The BoE had succeeded in initiating the OECD review. 
The Government might feel uneasy that it had done very 
little in higher education and therefore would like to 
produce something. The substantive recommendations are 
less important than something to show "where we stand" 
in higher education. So, the Topley Committee could be 
regarded as a way with which the Government wished to 
restore its credibility and confidence when facing the 
OECD review (ISPO4). 
Although the OECD Panel was not expected to endorse 
government policies, a lack of policy statement would put 
the Government in a totally passive position. If that 
actually happened, it would undermine the Government's 
credibility among its citizens and damage its legitimacy in 
its future policy-making. 
In fact, one may notice the unusual case in the 
299 
Chapter 5: OECD 
background report (Hong Kong Education System, 1981) where 
specific government policies on higher education were 
missing. A substitute was the 1979 Working Group which was 
only a tentative set-up within the Government (Ibid.: 96- 
101). 
The same argument may explain the haste in producing 
the CRE report (ISPO2) and the eagerness of the Government 
to obtain some quick statements from the Panel about higher 
education (See 11.4 of this Chapter). 
111.3.3. The review methodology 
The adoption of a "political approach" is partly a 
change of trend in the OECD practice, but is not entirely an 
OECD convention. The Hong Kong review was in fact quite 
different from the other OECD reviews. As one of the old 
hands in OECD reviews pointed out, and was echoed by another 
member of the Panel: 
There are at least two points where the Hong Kong 
review is outstanding. Firstly, OECD reviews usually 
focus on some specific area of education. For example, 
transition from school to work was the theme of the 
Australian review; compensatory education was the theme 
of the US review. The Hong Kong review was an overall 
review. Secondly, the intensity of public participa- 
tion was outstanding. We had some 280 meetings with 
all the educational groups. Participation of public 
groups in the plenary sessions was again extremely 
impressive (ISOR3) 
As described in an earlier section (see II. 1 of this 
Chapter), the normal practice in OECD reviews was to hold 
confrontation meetings between the visiting panel and the 
hosting officials or policy-relevant personnel. On the 
whole, such reviews were governmental affairs, the objective 
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of the reviews was to help the governments in their policy 
deliberations. 
The special feature of the Hong Kong review could be 
explained in two dimensions. 
Firstly, faced with such a huge review but with only 
limited time and knowledge, the Panel was forced to adopt 
some quick method to establish its legitimacy. In a way, the 
suspicion of the Government about the validity of such a 
review was not without justifications (see II. 1 of this 
Chapter). It was quite impossible for the Panel to carry 
out a comprehensive rational analysis of the situation in 
the short period of time, even if they wished to. It remains 
to be explained, however, why the review exercise should be 
confined to such short visits. 
Meanwhile, the Panel discovered that the system had 
already tolerated a whole series of rational planning 
exercises: 
When we were given the documents, we found that there 
existed a series of standing reviews. The UPGC has been 
there for a long time. The Topley Committee had a 
comprehensive plan. We found that all these were quite 
instrumental in approach. So if you put all these 
pieces together, you have an enormous shopping list 
(ISOR4). 
It would be extremely difficult and totally unwise to 
compete with these rational deliberations. As a matter of 
fact, with the exception of Karl Roeloffs, the Panel 
members' experience in these technical analyses was limited. 
Under these circumstances, there was actually little choice 
left to the Panel to design the methodology. If this was the 
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case, then the following quotation could be read as a frank 
statement: 
We decided at the moment when we arrived that we had no 
other choices. There was no other frames of reference 
on which we can rely (ISOR4). 
At this point, the Panel adopted the "political" or 
"participatory" approach, which is quite popular at least in 
the literature of educational planning. The label serves to 
legitimate a convenient approach which would otherwise be 
identified as cheap. The 'political approach" provides a 
legitimate alternative and was quickly adopted when there 
was not much choice. 
The adoption of the "political" and "participatory" 
approach was also reinforced by a second reason. There was a 
tacit assumption among the OECD Panel members that Hong Kong 
was a colony where people's voice was 'suppressed". Seeing 
things in this light, the OECD Panel member felt that it was 
their responsibility to dig out what was suppressed and 
speak out for the "oppressed" majority. Subconsciously, the 
Panel believed that anti-establishment opinions should be 
given more attention. The following supports this view: 
The entire philosophy of the overall review, and of the 
Panel, was unanimously that the audience we were going 
to address should be parents and citizens and 97% of 
these were Chinese. Therefore we thought the public 
meetings were very important in framing our ideology. 
The EAG (Education Action Group), for example, might 
not have high influence on the Government, but had high 
influence on us, that they infringed the formal power. 
We listened very carefully to citizens in general, 
rather than the organized citizens. ... (ISOR4) 
In sum, the Panel adopted the "participatory" approach 
which gave them immediate multifold legitimacy: (a) It would 
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provide a decent alternative to tedious technical analyses. 
(b) It would fit very well into the prevalent notion of 
"third generation" educational planning. (c) It could 
maximize the collection and hence representation of the 
"s'uppressed" views. 
It is therefore not surprising if the Report turned out 
to be a collation of criticisms rather than a balanced view. 
The former was what the Government felt about the Report. 
However, the Panel was not worried at all by the 
Government's disappointment. In fact, the Panel to some 
extent regard Government's disappointment as a sign of their 
success. As Michael Kirst, a member of the OECD Panel, 
remarked in the CIES (Comparative and International 
Education Society) Conference at Stanford in 1985: 
The Hong Kong review had the special feature that the 
third-party provided legitimacy for the popular 
group, but not for the government. This was rather 
interesting. 
Some of the Panel members actually took this as an 
achievement, something that signified their "dignity" that 
they did not toe the Government line. In a sense, this was 
a matter of their prestige and they took this more seriously 
than what came out of the report. That is, it is again a 
matter of legitimacy. One member of the Panel remarked: 
We threw all our professional reputations behind the 
report. The Government could ask anything, but we 
could say not We insisted on the integrity to act as 
free agents so that government manoeuvre would be 
practically zero. It is hard to believe that a tenure 
professor at Stanford (referring to Michael Kirst) 
would try to appease the Hong Kong Government. We were 
not even constant OECD members (ISOR4). 
If we follow the above argument, the following quotations 
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Immediately become enlightening: 
Topley accused the Report for being unduly critical. I 
said there was no point that we should not be critical 
(ISOR2). 
I had thought that John Llewellyn was a British noble 
and he would follow the government line. Amazingly, he 
was a complete free agent. ... It was rather amusing to 
see how the Governor was confronted by John Llewellyn 
(ISOR4) 
Such remarks can easily be accused for being emotional, 
but might well explain the actual motives at the time. The 
emphasis of integrity and impartiality could have easily but 
subconsciously reinforced the anti-government and anti- 
establishment tendency in the approach. 
It was then not surprising that the Panel went as far 
as to include the following in the final Report: 
Any move towards greater participation in education 
decision making and policy formulation would add to 
existing pressure for the democratisation of the 
territory's government generally(Perspective, 1982: 18). 
Such an advocation from a foreigner was rather unusual in 
the international scene. In fact, a staff member of the 
UNESCO EPP (Education Policy and Planning) Division, on an 
informal occasion, criticised the above paragraph as an 
"interference of internal affairs" (CSRO1). 
In sum, the third-party position and the OECD label 
provided the Panel with adequate legitimacy to assume its 
status, but did not automatically serve to legitimate the 
approach it adopted. The "political" and "participatory" 
approach came to the rescue and gave the Panel the most 
convenient legitimacy to produce some weighty result given 
limited resources and time. 
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111.3.4. Delay of the Report 
The above analysis may also explain the delay in the 
publication of the report. In handling a report full of 
"undue criticisms" (ISOR2), the Government faced a dilemma. 
On the one hand, the Government saw the report as an 
unbalanced picture which denounced all that the Government 
had done in education. Publication of the report might 
disgrace the Government. On the other hand, the OECD Panel 
was quite popular and had given much credit to the 
Government's openness. If the Government rejected the 
report, it would undermine the legitimacy which had just 
been built up. 
In particular, one primary explanation for the delay of 
the publication of the report was that its proposal for of a 
coordinating Education Commission disturbed the legitimacy 
structure. It is not surprising that the major policy- 
advisory bodies expressed their reservations and even 
resentment towards the OECD review Report. 
BoE The BoE Initiated the overall review, and was glad 
to see some coordination so that the BoE would stand on 
equal footing with other policy advisory bodies. However, 
the BoE had not expected that the Panel would propose the 
Education Commission which in effect would subordinate the 
BoE and insert a new layer between the BoE and the Governor. 
The Education Commission, as proposed, would undermine the 
legitimacy granted to the BoE by Ordinance. Therefore in 
its comments of the OECD review Report, the BoE emphasized 
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that the BoE, the UPGC and the VTC should maintain direct 
access to the Governor' (DSX46). Similar views were put 
forward by the HKEA (Hong Kong Examinations Authority) and 
the UMELCO (Unofficial Members of the Executive and 
Legislative Councils). 
The BoE, the HKEA and the UMELCO Education and Manpower 
Panel support the establishment of the Education 
Commission. The BoE and UMELCO Panel further 
considered that it should be statutory. However, the 
point is made that the BoE, the UPGC and the VTC should 
remain autonomous and not subordinate to the Commission 
which should co-ordinate and serve as a forum for 
mutual consultation but not direct their work. The HKEA 
feels that the subordinate role will discourage the 
existing bodies and affect their performance (DSX05). 
The Director of Education supported the view of the BoE 
(Ibid). 
UPGC The most significant resistance perhaps came from 
the UPGC: 
The UPGC has grave reservations and is of the view that 
the establishment of the Commission should create 
difficulty in recruiting people of the right calibre to 
the UPGC and that assignment of priorities and decision 
should be the function of the Government, not of a 
commission (Ibid). 
The UPGC was virtually answerable only to the Governor. 
The Knights and Lords in the UPGC held direct dialogues with 
the Governor and this might serve as an incentive to their 
services which were otherwise unrewarded. The legitimacy of 
the UPGC lay in the personal trust from the Governor. The 
proposed Education Commission would break this "kinship" and 
would undermine the legitimacy upon which the UPGC members 
served. This point was overtly made in the UPGC's reaction 
to the OECD review report: 
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The UPGC is able to take this planning role upon itself 
because it has available to it through the overseas 
academics and their connections an extra-ordinary 
breadth of academic expertise which is given willingly 
and generously in the service of Hong Kong. Overseas 
members give this assistance willingly because they 
feel that the advice is directed to and appreciated 
by the Governor. There is little likelihood that the 
members of the newly proposed HEPGC would feel such a 
personal commitment in reporting to an Education 
Commission (DSX07). 
HEPGC, the Higher Education Planning and Grants Committee, 
was the name proposed by the OECD Report for a re-defined 
UPGC (Perspective, 1982: 22). 
Such comments presented a threat of quitting which was 
even more powerful than any direct attack. 
In fact, in its reaction to the OECD review report, the 
UPGC even challenged the legitimacy and competency of the 
proposed Education Commission: 
The UPGC disagrees with the fundamental premises upon 
which the Education Commission is to be based, and at a 
more practical level it doubts the capacity of a 
commission composed largely of part-time non-experts to 
act as a surrogate for the Government in this wide and 
costly area of public spending (DSX07). 
In this context, the UPGC's charge that coordination 
and priority setting should be the function of the 
Government and not of a Commission is more an argument on 
legitimacy than one on philosophy. What the UPGC actually 
said was that the legitimacy of coordinating and priority 
setting should lie with the Government, and not with any 
advisory body. 
The EXCO From the legitimacy point of view, the EXCO's 
rejection was natural. The proposed Education Commission 
would in fact be directly responsible to the Governor in all 
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matters of education policy. This would mean by-passing the 
EXCO and as a matter of course the EXCO would not allow this 
to happen. One Exco member made It clear: "If the 
Commission were to direct the three bodies, and were 
statutory, what would then be the place for the EXCOV 
(ISX04) 
Under these circumstances, despite the public support 
for the Report, the Government felt the pressure of 
opposition from the high-level advisory bodies against the 
Idea of an Education Commission. Unfortunately, the 
establishment of the Education Commission was the very first 
thing to which the Government had to respond before any of 
the other recommendations could be considered. If this key- 
issue presented unsurmountable difficulties, Implementation 
of the Report recommendations would become almost 
impossible. If only from this point of view, It was natural 
that the Government was reluctant to publish the Report. 
Should the Report be published, the Implementation would 
face foreseeable objections from within the policy-making 
machinery. 
The Government was therefore In another dilemma: It 
might choose to face the public objections once and for all 
by not publishing the Report; or It might choose to ease the 
tension first by publishing the Report, but had to face 
serious objections from the advisory bodies In the long run. 
With hindsight, this dilemma seemed to be Intrinsic and 
was Inevitable. As one OECD official remarked. - "Once the 
Government accepted the Overall Review, It accepted also the 
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risk of being criticised" (ISORlb). 
The Government gained overall legitimacy by Its 
openness to conduct a third-party consultation, but It faced 
heavy loss of legitimacy if the existing advisory system 
broke down. 
The dilemma was virtually an accounting of legitimacy. 
If the Report were rejected, then the whole exercise would 
be devalued and there would be a bankcruptcy of legitimacy. 
If the Report were accepted, the acceptance would mean an 
overhaul of the policy-making machinery that would undermine 
the normal Government policy-making mechanism. Both ways, 
the Government would lose legitimacy. 
If this explanation reflects the truth, then the 
eventual publication of the Report reflects the Government 
decision (largely the EXCO decision) to treasure the 
legitimacy created by the conduct of the OECD Review and to 
minimize the loss of legitimacy due to the proposed co- 
ordinating Education Commission. 
There could also be a secondary political factor for 
the delay In the publication of the Report. This happened at 
the point of history when there was a change of Governor. 
Edward Youde replaced Murray MacLehose. Discussion about 
the OECD report took place at a point of *double honeymoon" 
for the top administrators when firstly there was a change 
of "boss" and secondly the new "boss' was too occupied by 
Sino-British negotiations. The Chief Secretary Haddon-Cave 
was in actual power and It was believed there was a tendency 
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to overturn what MacLehose had advocated. Participation and 
consultation, which were highly rated by MacLehose, might 
not be favourable among other top officials and therefore 
might not be getting the same momentum it used to get. 
The LZGCO debate 
If the above argument holds, then the Legco debate was 
a natural consequence. 
The Government dilemma in the publication of the Report 
Involved not only a conflict between the third-party 
"experts" and the existing advisory bodies; but also a 
conflict between the "Insider* and the "outsider" of the 
policy-making machinery. 
Insiders here refer to those who were members of the 
top policy-advisory bodies. As is seen in the earlier 
discussion, most of the minsiders* saw the Report as a 
threat to their existing legitimacy, although they might not 
have objections to the particular recommendations. 
The outsiders Included the Unofficials who were not 
involved in educational policy-making. They were the most 
powerful outsiders. In the education arena, they had no 
political legitimacy to defend and hence their attention 
focussed on the particular recommendations which were quite 
appealing in their own right. 
The different foci led to opposite attitudes towards 
the Report. This eventually led to the unprecedented LEGCO 
debate. 
A careful study of the Hansard reveals that even among 
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the "united front" of the Unofficials, the insiders and the 
outsiders showed marked difference in their speeches. 
The outsiders enthusiastically pressed for Implementation of 
the report;, the insiders evaded direct comments on the 
report, but took the opportunity to show that they were not 
toeing the Government line. 
The unprecedented unity among the Unafficials was also 
facilitated by the imminent problem of the future of Hong 
Kong in 1997. While the appointed Unofficials used to feel 
satisfied with their loyalty to the Government, the 1997 
Issue urged them to present themselves as answerable also to 
the public. It was at the time when Sino-British negotia- 
tion was about to start. The Unofficials would be In a very 
awkward position. In any case they were not considered as 
part of the British Government, but that they were appointed 
and not elected made them Illegitimate even as representing 
Hong Kong. If they could not make themselves seen to be 
representing the Hong Kong people, they would Immediately be 
identified as mere puppets of the OBritish" Hong Kong 
Government. This would put them in an extremely difficult 
position when they were still supposed to be policy-makers 
of Hong Kong, at least in the years before 1997. 
In other words, the unofficial LEGCO members were in a 
legitimacy crisis. In addition to their legitimacy which 
came from Governor's appointment, they need now to acquire a 
new type of legitimacy which came from popular support. The 
Overall Review debate gave the UnoffIcIal3 a very good 
opportunity to Identify themselves as separate from the 
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Officials, without causing serious harm to the Administra- 
tion. 
In all these, Topley's role was interesting. The 
speeches seemed to hint that everyone in the LEGCO was glad 
to see Topley In difficulties. This personal element 
certainly added colour to the episode as apparent In the 
many jokes, stories and even fairy tales told during the 
debate (Hong Kong Hansard, 1983/84: 1081-1127). It seemed 
that the Unofficials had used the attacks on the "Toleysian 
stroke' (Ibid.: 1124) as an opportunity to gain their own 
legitimacy as Oresponsible" Councillors. Anyway, Topley was 
near retirement and could do no harm to anybody. The result 
of the debate apparently made the Unofficials gain enormous 
legitimacy for their future role In the LEGCO. 
This argument could be further carried forward to 
reveal the more complicated side of the story. 
In the short term# the LEGCO debate was a demerit for 
the Government. It was naturally interpreted that Officials 
In the supposedly highest policy-making body did not go 
along with the public opinion and even the Unofficials In 
the LEGCO had to revolt. The fact that the Unofficials did 
revolt, and that the revolt was reported as setting a 
precedent, created a sort of "legitimation crisis" for the 
Hong Kong Government. Along this line of argument, the 
victory of the Unofficials added to the "crisis". 
However# if we look Into the broader context, the 
debate occurred at the moment when the future of Hong Kong 
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was the focus of concern and the Hong Kong Government was 
eager to democratize the political structure. Although the 
split in the LEGCO challenged the existing system, the 
victory of the Unofficials de facto demonstrated that the 
Unofficials were able to "represent" public opinions and the 
Officials could submit themselves to the Unofficials. 
This in the end was a credit to the Government and 
legitimated the status of the Unofficials as spokesmen of 
the public, although they were not elected by the public. 
After all, the Government gained legitimacy in that the 
existing political setup was not an autocracy. Haddon- 
caveps (see II. S) decision by the end of the debate, in a 
hindsight, was a right move to gain legitimacy for the 
Government and Topley became the scapegoat. The absence of 
the Governor In person actually put the Government in a more 
advantageous position to gain In the legitimacy game. After 
all, the Governor did not submit himself to pressures In 
person. It was Topley, not even Haddon-Cave, who made the 
asurrender' conclusion. 
The Education Commission 
The publication and acceptance of the Report pressed 
the Government to act positively towards the Report. 
Failing to do that would lead to a new legitimation crisis. 
Thus the Government fell into what could be called a 
"legitimation trap" where the compensation of one 
legitimation crisis immediately leads to the rise of another 
legitimation crisis. 
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If anything were to be implemented according to the 
Report, the first Inevitable step would be the establishment 
of the Education Commission. However, as Is discussed at 
length In 11.9 of this Chapter, the proposed Education 
Commission was a challenge to the legitimacy of the existing 
policy-making setup. The OECD Panel proposal In fact 
suggested that the Education Commission could by-pass the 
EXCO and oversee the other advisory bodies. Both the EXCO 
and the exIstnq advisory bodies, UPGC in particular, felt 
this to be Intolerable (see 11.9 of this Chapter). 
The wisdom of the EXCO members then created the idea of 
setting up an Education Commission In name, but replacing 
the substance by what was originally proposed as the 
Educational Policy Development Committee (see 11.9 of this 
Chapter). On the one hand, the public would see this as the 
very crucial step that the Report was being implemented. On 
the other hand, It retained the legitimacy for the EXCO and 
other policy-advisory bodies to maintain their status In 
policy-making. The whole Idea was to satisfy public 
aspirations and to restore the existing legitimacy system. 
In the actual deliberation, a number of designs were 
significant. Firstly, the Education Commission was 
answerable to the Governor-in-Council which guaranteed that 
the Education Commission would not by-pass the EXCO. 
Secondly, the Education Commission was appointed with a 
very strong Chairman and comparatively weak members (ISU09), 
so that the Education Commission might be respected but 
would not be threatening. The appointment of Q. W. Lee as 
314 
Chapter 5: OECD 
Chairman gave every party confidence. His experience In 
education and his status In community would impress the 
public that this was a very high power commission. His 
Chairmanship made the Panel feel relieved that the Edutation 
Commission was In the hands of someone they trust. In fact, 
Llewellyn recommended Q. W. Lee to Youde as the right person 
(ISOR2; see 11.7 of this Chapter). 
If the Education Commission worked out well, It would 
then take up the responsibility of implementing the Report, 
or in fact decide on whether or not to Implement the 
recommendations. The Education Commission then faced the 
responsibility that would otherwise be faced by the 
Government. This thus saved the Government from the 
legitimation trap. The legitimation crisis, If there Is 
any, was then passed on to the Education Commission. This 
was a stroke of genius in the legitimacy game. One top 
official at the time had a very good summary: 
My contribution to the OECD review was to devise the 
Education Commission and to put It In the position to 
study the Report. This was at that time the only way to 
go round the difficulty (ISX08). 
The retention of the name "Education Commission", in 
this context, was a "disguise" device. Although Government 
people did not deny that the Education Commission as 
established was not the one as proposed by the OECD Panel 
(ISX09; ISX08), this was never made clear in the public. In 
the end the mEducation Commission* was the *Education Policy 
Develoment Committee" proposed In the EXCO as an alternative 
to the Education Commission proposed by the OECD Panel. it 
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wore the clothes of its opponent. The Government announced 
its establishment with the following sentence: 
Following careful consideration of the Llewellyn 
Report, an Education Commission is being set up to co- 
ordinate, consolidate and give advice on education 
policy in Hong Kong (Government Press Release, March 7, 
1984). 
On the whole, the public, including the most vocal 
groups, hailed the establishment of the Education 
Commission, without noticing that this was not the Education 
Commission proposed by the Panel. It was only In 1986 when 
the Education Commission was found lacking the power to co- 
ordinate that the public began to reallse the significance 
of the difference. 
It was rather amusing when it was revealed during the 
research that even the Panel members did not realize that 
the Education Commission was a disguised version and was 
substantially different from what they had proposed. 
Thus, the Government successfuly solved a legitimacy 
problem. 
Summary of the legitimacy explanation 
The legitimacy explanation sees the Overall Review 
episode as largely a battle In which the actors fought to 
increase or compensate for legitimacy for their authorities 
In policy-making. 
The OECD review was Initiated by the BoE which felt Its 
own position declining and would like some third-party to 
re-a3sure its legitimacy. The launching of the Overall 
Review by an OECD team was a credit to the Government In 
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terms of legitimacy. The review demonstrated the open- 
mindedness of the Government in inviting an established, 
impartial third-party to conduct a public review. This 
credit in legitimacy, however, was gained at the cost of a 
risk In legitimacy brought about by criticisms that might 
disturb the existing legitimacy system. Such a risk 
materialized as a crisis In legitimacy when the Panel 
established its legitimacy as the spokesman of the anti- 
establishment vocal groups. It produced a very critical 
Report, Implementation of which would mean a major overhaul 
of the existing legitimacy for educational policy-making. 
This immediately Invited strong objection from the existing 
legitimate policy-makers such as the EXCO and the UPGC, and 
was made severe by the LEGCO split where the Unofficials 
gained their legitimacy (as spokesman of the public) at the 
expense of the Government's legitimacy. 
The Government was forced to face a legitimacy dilemma. 
It might lose the legitimacy gained through the openness of 
the review (by refusing to publish the report), or It might 
undermine the existing legitimacy system (by publishing the 
report and accepting Its recommendations). Either ways 
might led to further crises of legitimacy ahead. There was 
obviously the beginning of a series of legitimacy traps. The 
dilemma caused the delay In the publication of the report 
and the controversy in the seting up of the Education 
Commission. The legitimacy dilemma was eventually resolved 
by setting up a disguised Education Commission which 
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preserved the existing legitimacy of the establishment, 
while serving as a surrogate for the Government to face the 
legitimacy problems ahead. 
Summary of the OECD Review 
The Chapter analyses the OECD review episode in three 
stages. The first stage collates all the facts readily 
perceived by the public. The second stage tries to weave 
complex research findings Into a consistent picture of what 
happened both on the front- and the back- stages. Analyses 
are then made from two perspectives: the episode as 
interactions between rational actors and as an account of 
legitimacy conflicts between the actors. 
In the rational explanation, the assumption is that the 
actors were primarily concerned with the production of 
policies. The conflicts that occurred during the OECD 
Episode were then due to different perceptions about policy 
and policy-making. 
In the legitimacy explanation, however, the assumption 
Is that the production of the policy was not so much the 
primary concern as the legitimacy of respective actors In 
maintaining their authority and Influence In policy-making. 
The conficts are ones of legitimacy which each actor was to 
acquire, or defend. 
Both perspectives lend themselves to consistent 
explanations. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND DI SCUS 3IONS 
0. Introduction 
As pointed out In Chapter Two, this study seeks to 
discover rather than confirm theory* to generate rather than 
to test hypotheses. This final chapter explores whether 
theories have been discovered or hypotheses generated. 
The preceding chapters have attempted to explain the 
two policy-making Episodes using the two different models. 
The first section of this chapter attempts to replicate 
briefly these two models to Interpret three more policy 
events. This attempt Is to ensure that the use of legitimacy 
model In parallel to the rational model is not unique to the 
two Episodes chosen for this study. The overall objective 13 
to hypothesise that the notion of legitimacy, as depicted in 
previous chapters, Is worth pursuing as an alternative to 
other conventional models. 
The rest of the chapter Is devoted to further 
developing the notion of legitimacy.. by comparing and 
contrasting It with other existing theories. This section 
concludes with a discussion of the specific Implications of 
the notion of legitimacy to Hong Kong. 
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I. The Explanations Generalized 
As explained In Chapter 2, theories "discovered" In 
ethnographic types of research are not to be generalized by 
statistical Inference. The success of ethnographic case 
studies does not lie in applying the theories generated to 
the "full population". Full population generalization is 
impossible and unjustified. However, the theories generated 
can be enriched by their applicability to other cases of 
similar nature. If one Is forced to use the language of the 
conventional "hypothesis-testing" paradigm, applying the 
discovered "hypothesis" to a larger number of cases will 
help to justify the claim that what is discovered Is a 
worth-while hypothesis. 
It Is therefore useful to see the extent to which the 
two explanatins used In this study can be applied to other 
policy events in Hong Kong education. The three cases chosen 
In the following sections are again policy events of 
territory-wide implications. They occurred at more or less 
the same time In history. They are: (a) the unexpected 
introduction of nine-years free compulsory education In 
1977, (b) the Issue of course duration at the CUHK and (c) 
the adoption of manpower surveys In the planning of 
vocational training In the years 1973 to 1984. 
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1.1 Introduction of 9-years Compulsory Education 
As Is mentioned In Chapter 1, the Hong Kong Government 
produced a Green Paper on senior secondary and tertiary 
education In November, 1977 (Senior Secondary, 1977). 
However, the publication of the Green Paper was pre-empted 
by an unexpected announcement by the Governor on October 5, 
1977 to phase in 9-years compulsory free education. There 
was apparent inconsistency in the policy-making process. 
The following is an attempt to explain this inconsistency by 
the two models used earlier. 
Z. 1.1. The rational explanation 
There had long been pressure to provide universal 
education beyond primary schooling. 
In 1972, when MacLehose made his first policy speech in 
the Legislative Council, "the provision of 3 years 
secondary education for all In the 12-14 year age group" was 
anticipated as one of the major goals of social policies 
(Hong Xong Hansard, 1972/73: 7). In 1973, the Board of 
Education, which was charged with the duty of producing a 
Green Paper, had included In Its terms of reference *the 
Government's objective of providing three years secondary 
education for all in the 12-14 year age group ...... 8 
(Report, 1973: ix). The subsequent White Paper specified the 
target date as 1979 (Secondary, 1974: 3). 
The 1977 Green Paper was based on the Report of a 
cross-departmental Working Party which made the assumption 
that universal education would eventually be provided to all 
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pupils of age 12-14 (DSX09). 
Taking all this into the framework of a continuous 
process of policy evolution, the announcement of compulsory 
and free education was just a matter of time. The following 
time-line may help to summarise the picture: 
1972 MacLehose Speech 
1973 Green Paper 
1974 White Paper 
1977 Working Party 
1977 Announcement 
9-years education for all 
9-years education for all 
9-years subsidized education for all 
9-years universal education 
9-years free-compulsory education 
Hence, the claim that there was an inconsistency in 
policy is unjustifed. 
Z. 1.2. The legitimacy explanation 
The Introduction of universal 9-years education was a 
stated policy and the final arrival of 9-years free and 
compulsory education was only a matter of time. However, a 
closer look at the policy-making process reveals that the 
announcement was made when all the policy advisory bodies 
were totally unprepared. And this was rather abnormal in 
Hong Kong. 
The Board of Education, during its deliberation of the 
1973 Green Paper, argued for 9-years universal education, 
but against 9-years compulsory education (CSB02). This led 
to the stated target In the 1974 White Paper that 
usubsidized"t but not 'compulsory* and certainly not ufree" 
education, be provided for every child for nine years. 
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The workilng party report prior to the 1977 Green Paper 
(DSX09) did not go further than that. In any case, there 
was no sign that this was to be Implemented in the near 
future. The Governor's announcement was therefore 
extraordinary. It was a move that was not scheduled. it 
was a surprise to almost everyone. Even members of the 
Board of Education learnt the news from the radio. It is 
confirmed In the research that MacLehose in fact consulted 
only two persons, Topley, the Director of Education and Q. W. 
Lee, Chairman of the Board of Education (ISXOI). The 
research also reveals that the decision was made under 
international pressure: 
There was always the policy of providing education for 
all. There was little problem of making this free. The 
question was whether we should make it compulsory. You 
know when education policy was being made, there were 
social as well as political considerations. By ILO 
standard, the lowest legal labour age was 15; by that 
time ours was 14. There was the possibility that we 
might be accused of exploiting child labour and this 
was dangerous to Hong Kong's reputation. It was for the 
sake of International rapprochement that the Governor 
felt some change had to be made. This was to (resist] 
the pressures at the time which were adverse to Hong 
Kong's International credibility (ISX01). 
The OECD panel made It specific In their unpublished "Open 
Draft" that It was the EEC that was exerting the pressure: 
It has been suggested to us that the rapid succession 
of policies to extend the limits of free and compulsory 
eduction was not unrelated to conditions attached to 
securing of trading rights with the European Economic 
Community (Chinese, 1982: para 1.24). 
All these suggest that the sudden announcement of 
compulsory education was prompted by reasons that were not 
generated from policy deliberations within Hong Kong. As 
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one key informant recalled: 
The Board of Education had long been arguing for 
universal education, but never thought compulsory 
education was desirable. It was MacLehose who made it 
compulsory, and he made it free in order that it might 
be compulsory.. He wanted to show the EEC that Hong 
Kong was no longer making use of child labour (CSB02). 
There was in fact a debate on whether it was necessary 
to make it free. One informant recalls: 
It was interesting that all the expatriates argued that 
if It was compulsory, It had to be free; while all the 
Chinese argued that even If it was compulsory, you 
could still make people pay (ISXID. 
This Is further confirmed by another key informant: 
When MacLehose launched 9-years compulsory education, 
Haddon-Cave said it could be compulsory, but not 
necessarily free. My Immediate reaction was that if It 
was compulsory, it had to be free. MacLehose did not 
utter a further word and made it free (ISX07). 
Hence, MacLehose's decision was made when Hong Kong, 
because of her minimum labour age set at 14, was losing Its 
legitimacy to compete with other countries on equal footing. 
While the reason for compulsory education Is yet to be 
justified (e. g. Tyack, 1976; Boll et al., 1985). there is a 
*culture" In the international community that year 15 should 
be the minimum labour age. Hong Kong's opponents' concern 
was not the well being of Hong Kong children, but to make 
use of Hong Kong's low labour age to legitimate putting Hong 
Kong In an unfavourable trading position. With the usual 
assumption that compulsory education cannot be made 
overnight, the opponents felt quite safe that Hong Kong 
would not be able to comply with this rule of game. Under 
these circumstances, MacLeh03eOs decision to launch 9-years 
compulsory education gave Hong Kong the Immediate legitimacy 
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to fight back and hence restored Hong Kong's position in 
international negotiations. 
I. 2. Course Duration of CUHK 
The two universities in Hong Kong followed very 
different curricula which differed in duration. The normal 
length of an undergraduate degree course In HKU was three 
years and that for CUHK was four. In addition, the 
matriculation requirement for HKU was geared to an Advanced 
Level Examination which took place two years after the 
students' completion of Form 5; while the CUHK matriculation 
was geared to a Higher Level Examination which took place 
one year after Form 5. What added to the difficulty was 
that In most subjects, the two examinations followed 
separate syllabuses whose overlap was minimal. Students 
therefore had to opt for either the A-Level or the H-Level 
courses. To play safe, most prospective students sat for 
both examinations (doing one course by self-study) and had 
to make the very difficult decision at the end of the fIrAt 
year when they were offered a place In the CUHK. There was 
therefore social pressure to stop this confusing situation. 
While the 1977 Green Paper was being deliberated, there 
was a suggestion for CUHK to change Its course duration from 
three to four years. This was recorded in the Working Party 
Report: 
The CUHK has a basic four-year course; and HKU a three- 
year course. This Is therefore important In financial 
terms, because a CUHK graduate automatically costs 
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about 30% more than a HKU one. ... It has recently been 
proposed that there should be common two year sixth 
form curriculum leading to a common university matricu- 
lation examination. It may be appropriate thereafter 
for the Chinese University to consider moving to a3 
year undergraduate programme, though any such develop- 
ment should come about as a voluntary response by the 
University to the changes In the sixth form curriculum, 
rather than be Imposed on the University for reasons of 
economy (DSX09: 98). 
This started the well-known "four-to-three" controversy. 
This point was put forward In a more subtle form in the 
published Green Paper when It referred to ways of expanding 
university student enrolment: 
It would be possible for a further increase to occur in 
the number of students provided with a university 
education, without causing these student population 
targets to be exceeded, If the Chinese University were 
to decide to reduce Its undergraduate course (except In 
the Medical Faculty) from four to three years, the same 
course length as obtains at the University of Hong 
Kong, following the proposed development of a common 
two-year sixth form course (Senior secondary, 1977: 39). 
This immediately aroused a storm of protest that the 
Government was forcing the CUHK to conform to a British 
system, that It was a reactionary move to substitute 
Ogeneral education* by "specialized education", that the 
Government was Interfering with the University's autonomy. 
There were protests In the press; there were campaigns In 
the campus which came to a climax when the students launched 
a sit-in demonstration. The anti-ofour-to-threeo campaign 
received much support from the educational pressure groups 
who identified CUHK with "Chinese education" (i. e. teaching 
using Chinese as the medium of Instruction) and linked the 
CUHK campaign with the au3e-of-Chinese" campaign. 
The Sixth Form Report produced by the BoE in 1979 again 
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attempted to solve this problem. It gave three alternatives 
to streamline the matriculation procedures. This was not 
popular because any move towards streamlining was taken as 
pressure upon the CUHK to change its course duration from 4 
to 3 years, because It would be unlikely that HKU was going 
to change its course length to 4 years. 
However, In 1980, the new Vice-Chancellor of CUHK, Ma 
Lin, announced that "the issue of 'four-to-threel is now 
over". 
The reason for Ma Lin's announcement Is not clear. A 
number of key informants said that Ma Lin In fact went to 
MacLehose who promised to drop the Idea of converting CUHK 
courses to three years (ECHOI, ECFO1). Some informants even 
said that the Governor specified that the "four-to-three" 
Issue would not be raised again In seven years, which 
happened to be the term of service for Ma Lin. 
That MacLehose did make the promise seemed to be 
supported by events that occurred thereafter. At the very 
early stage of the CRE, the Committee received a letter from 
the Governor* as one of the CRE members recalled: 
There was a student rally In the CUHK almost 
Immediately before the first meeting of the Topley 
Committee. I ... I Right after that, Topley read a letter from MacLehose telling us to assume the duration of 
courses (in the universities) to be unchanged (ISP04). 
In fact it was documented in CRE papers: 
After taking further advice from the Executive Council, 
the Governor wrote to the Chairman of the Committee on 
9 December, 1980 Instructing that for the purpose of 
the report and its recommendations the Committee should 
assume that the length of courses and arrangements for 
intake of undergraduates currently In force at the two 
universities will continue (DSCRE/0: 1). 
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The CUKK Issue was perhaps the only Hgovernment 
intervention" identifiable by the OECD review Panel. One 
member of the Panel made this remark: 
Right from the beginning, MacLehose told us not to 
touch CUHK. I said that was what I could not promise 
(ISOR2). 
This was felt by all the other Panel members. (In fact the 
OECD Panel did argue against the 4-year programme in the 
CUHK, see Perspective, 1982: 69). 
Moreover, most of the UPGC members interviewed 
expressed the feeling that there was an understanding within 
the UPGC that any move to change the course duration of CUHK 
would not be endorsed by the Government. 
However, even after 1980, the anti-"four-to-three" 
campaign was sustained. The public was still under the 
impression that the CUHK was under pressure to cut Its 
length of courses. There were also strong gestures from 
members of the CUHK that they were fighting a battle against 
*four-to-three". This in fact led to the *provisional 
acceptance schemeo by which the CUHK would admit students 
provisionally after they have completed their fifth form. 
The whole issue lasted until November, 1986 when HKU 
announced Its Intention to change its basic courses Into 
four year duration. 
Was there such a pressure and such a battle? If there 
was* where did it come from? There can be no doubt that it 
was politics that was underlying the 13suep but what exactly 
was the politics? 
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There could again be two possible explanations. 
1.2.1. The rational explanation 
The Green Paper proposal would considerably change the 
nature of CUHK's courses which was embodied in a model of 
four years with a foundation year. This was proposed by the 
"First Fulton Report* which led to the foundation of the 
University. The change of course duration would disrupt the 
traditions of the University and would cause unnecessary 
detriment to the development of the University. Reduction 
of course duration would also Inevitably lead to 
unfavourable re-structuring of the staff. The University 
therefore fought to resist the proposed change. This was 
well expressed In Ma Lin's speech In a Congregation in 1980: 
From the very beginning, the Report by the Fulton 
Commission had embodied a historic conviction and 
expectation of Its time: the Commisison not only 
proposed a university of international standard, but 
also that It should be a four-year Institution using 
Chinese as the principal medium of Instruction (Chinese 
University, 1980: 6). 
MacLehose appreciated the difficuftles and accepted 
that it was after all the Government which had founded the 
four-year course structure. Hence, MacLehose felt morally 
obliged to guard the CUHK against Intervention and therefore 
on several occasions (the CRE, the OECD review, the UPGC) 
adopted very exceptional measures to "decreeo that the 
various policy bodies should avoid proposing a reduction of 
course length In CUHK- 
MacLehoset however* did not manage to stop the OECD 
Panel who, just like the 1977 Working Party, felt a 
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reduction of course length In CUHK would improve the 
efficiency and consistency of the education system. 
Because of the adoption of the OECD report after the 
LEGCO debate, the CUHK again faced the "four-to-threem 
pressure and hence had to revive the battle. 
1.2-2. The legitimacy explanation 
The CUHK found it difficult to accept the Green Paper 
proposal of reduction of course length, not only because of 
administrative and staffing difficulties, but more 
importantly because It would become a sign that Its autonomy 
was being undermined. This was particularly unacceptable 
because CUHK had since its establishment Identified Itself 
as a Chinese institution. Conforming to a three year degree 
course, which was practised In HKU and was taken as British, 
would undermine Its legitimacy as a "banner" for Chinese 
education. 
This stand of the CUHK posed considerable pressure on 
MacLehose, for If he continued to endorse the Green Paper 
proposal, he would easily be identified as an Imperialist 
who was moving to "oppress" Chinese education. For two 
reasons, this had become particularly sensitive. First.. 
there was at that time the Chinese education movement which 
merged with a "use of Chinese" movement, both had grown Into 
an anti-government movement. Second, the "19970 Issue (the 
return of the sovereignty over Hong Kong to China) was 
moving ahead and the outcome was unclear. The CUHK Issue* 
originally economic In nature* might cause adverse political 
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effects to the Government's Image. In other words, the CUHK 
Issue was putting the Government"s legitimacy at risk. As 
one informant remarked: 
My impression was that in the 1970s MacLehose was keen 
on "getting it done". The coming of the 1997 issue of 
course changed the situation and we can feel the top 
officials distancing themselves from the Issue of 
(CUHK'sl course duration (ISP04). 
In these circumstances, MacLehose had to submit to the 
requests from Ma Lin, as a way of restoring the "legitimacy" 
by showing that the Government was not dominated by colonial 
attitudes. 
However# MacLehosels decrees were not made public. 
This Is understandable, because otherwise he would be 
admitting that Government had Indeed had the Idea of forcing 
the CUHK to change Its duration. Opponents of "four-to- 
three" made use of this secrecy and kept on campaigning as 
if there were still the pressure for "four-to-three*. 
Pressure group leaders and leaders in the CUHK would welcome 
the maintainence of this "phonyo pressure. The pressure 
helped to keep up an anti-colonial spirit and to legitimate 
the CUHK's leadership Image In Chinese education by adding 
to it a vague colour of anti-colonialism. 
The OECD's revitalizing the *four-to-three" issue gave 
the public the false Image that it was expressing what the 
Government would wish. This gave the CUHK a further 
opportunity to confirm its legitimacy In resisting 
government woppression*. It also gave the CUHK the 
opportunity to launch the "provisional acceptance scheme" 
which attracted students of better quality and put the CUHK 
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in a privileged position. 
If the legitimacy arguments stand, then the concern of 
all relevant parties is not only the course duration per se. 
It was the anti-colonialism movement that was built up which 
was behind the real pressure. 
1.3. Manpower Survey for Vocational Training 
Hong Kong has a long history of manpower surveys to 
assess the needs of vocational training. Meanwhile, Hong 
Kong has long been well-known for Its free-market economy. 
The most enthusiastic advocate of free-markets, Friedman, 
uses Hong Kong as the model of a free market economy 
(Friedman and Friedman, 1980). Hong Kong's labour market Is 
characterised by Its adaptability, flexibility and 
substitutability (Report, 1979). All these present the worst 
environments for successful manpower forecasting. 
This poses an interesting question: Why Is It that 
manpower forecasting, which is most unfavourable in a free 
market, Is practised in the free market of Hong Kong. 
A small scale research was carried out in 1985 to trace 
the entire process of planning in one Industry, viz. the 
Building and Construction Industry (Most industries carry 
out bi-annual surveys), to understand the actual process of 
forecasting and the use of manpower forecasting in actual 
course planning. Two Interesting points were discovered. The 
first pertains to the forecasting process and the second to 
the planning process (for details, see Cheng, 1985b). 
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The forecasting method adopted, as Is the case In other 
industries, was the "employers' opinion survey". In this 
case, a full population survey was carried out. The data 
were used together with the stock of data In previous years. 
A family of curves were arrived at using an "adaptive 
filtering method" (Building, 1984) which gave heavier 
weights to more recent data. It was then up to the Training 
Board, which comprises the major employers In the industry, 
to select the most appropriate curve for projection. This 
was done on the basis of experience and expert judgement of 
the Board members. During the 1983 exercise, the Industry 
was still In Its most severe recession due to the 
uncertainty of Hong Kong's future. The mathematical model 
produced a family of pessimistic curves. The Board was much 
more optimistic and eventually arrived at a projection which 
did not lie In the mathematically produced family. 
The question is, if the curves were not regarded as 
reliable (and they were not), why should the mathematical 
model be used In the first place? 
The small scale research also examined closely the 
planning of intake in 1984 and found the following for the 
craft courses in Building and Construction: 
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planned number of graduates for 1987 1,800-2,100 
original planned intake for 1984 
(allowing for 50% dropout) 3,600-4,200 
planned intake for 1984 
(as readjusted In 1983) 2,000 
actual Intake in 1984 1,000 
That is, the courses are only able to recruit one quarter of 
the required manpower. The original planned Intake for 1984 
was based on the 1983 forecast. It took Into consideration a 
normal drop-out rate of 50%. The adjustment made In 1983 was 
based on the low Intake In that year, Indicating that the 
original plan was unrealistic. According to the normal 
drop-out rate, the actual turn out In 1987 would only be 
5001 
The second question Is, therefore, if the intake Is 
anyway led by the demand of the applicants rather than the 
demand of manpower, what was the use of manpower planning. 
There could be two sets of answers to the two 
questions. 
Z. 3.1. rho rational explanation 
it is true that manpower forecasting is most 
unfavourable In a free market economy, but It Is also true 
that no country can entirely avoid manpower forecasting. 
Although It cannot produce accurate projections, It does 
take stock of the existing situation so that there is a 
baseline for future policy formulation. 
In concrete terms# the Hong Kong forecast In 1983 for 
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Building and Construction gives a very typical case where 
mathematical forecasting has to be complemented by 
judgemental projections. There is in fact no clearcut 
distinction between "objective" and "Judgemental" forecasts. 
If more could be understood about the Board members' 
"experience", it would be more likely to operationalise and 
quantify this Nexperience" and Incorporate It Into 
mathematical manipulations. In other word, It Is not that 
rational forecasting was unreliable, but that the 
mathematical model was not rational enough. 
In connection with the planning of Intakes# the 
discrepancy exhibited In the 1984 Intake pointed to (a) the 
danger of craftsmen shortage In 1987 and (b) the inadequacy 
of measures to attract young people to the Industry. These 
are very useful Information for the industry. Such 
information would not have come forth If there was nc 
manpower planning. 
Z. 3.2. The legitimacy explanation 
The provision of training facilities needs some 
apparently rational base to rely on. The mathematical model 
provided the VTC the legitimacy to plan Its training 
courses. Whether the mathematical model Is accurate or 
reliable Is a secondary matter. It has the prime Importance 
of giving people the confidence that planning of vocational 
training Is based on objective needs; It Is Impartial and Is 
not arbitrary. 
Although the 1983 forecast In Building and Construction 
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assumes that it was personal experience that provides more 
effective forecastingp it does not automatically lead to the 
conclusion that forecasting can be done purely by personal 
experience. It is not that the persons cannot yield 
acccurate projections, but that forecasting would then 
become a purely personal and hence political game. 
Therefore the "adaptive filtering technique" survived. 
The method may require improvement, but the adoption of the 
method does not depend on the accuracy of the method. It is 
the process and not the product that matters. 
Similar arguments apply to the case of Intake planning. 
The forecast figures provide the legitimacy to plan courses 
in an "objective* way. Or else, course planning, which has 
serious implications in staffing and resource allocation, 
will soon become highly political. Whether the plan can be 
fulfilled or not Is of secondary Importance. Although the 
discrepancy between the planned and the reality In fact 
caused troubles of staff reshuffle and resource re-alloca- 
tion every year, the planning methodology Involved the least 
personal elements and all parties felt comfortable. 
1.4. Other Possible Explanations 
Rationality and legitimacy do not exhaust the possible 
explanations of policy-making processes. 
One of the alternatives Is a p*rsonality model where 
many of the decisions during policy-making are attributable 
to interpersonal relationships and In particular the parti- 
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cipants' feelings towards some particular person or persons. 
This model came up strongly during the researchp but 
did not receive adequate evidence to apply it to all 
junctures of the two Episodes. In particular, the fate of 
the CRE was seen by many informants as a result of the 
personal dislikes of some particular key figure. One 
Informant remarked: 
Don't you see that It is obvious that the failure of 
the Topley report was due to people's dislikes of ..... You do not know how he was disliked by people. Although 
it would not be spelt out in public, such factors play 
very important roles in the political arena (CSPOI). 
A number of informants did present this bad feeling. Much of 
of this was either Implicit or explicit In the records in 
Chapter 4 and will not be repeated. One retired EXCO member 
confirmed: 
When you come to Topley's report, you have to bear in 
mind that the UPGC members didn't like .... During the CRE, ... held a meeting with the UPGC. He tried to be funnyp but that really annoyed the UPGC members. They 
found him rude, impolite, knowing nothing about higher 
education, and so forth. In fact they wrote to the 
Governor to complain (ISX10). 
In fact, the UPGC members' disfavour prevailed In all 
the interviews and can easily be sensed from the report in 
Chapter Four. 
A second alternative is the rather popular political 
aodol which tries to explain policy-making as a process 
where the actors compete for policy outcomes favourable to 
their respective interests. This did not come out very 
strongly during the research# perhaps because in the early 
1980s, the policy advisory bodies In Hong Kong were still 
seen as answerable to the Governor, or the aGovernment", and 
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not to parent interest groups. Members of such advisory 
bodies treasure their status as government appointees more 
than as representatives of group interests. 
However, In a number of places, the political model 
does lend Itself to sensible explanations. As an example, 
the HKTC could be seen as representing industrialists. They 
were keen to defend their own Interests of remedying 
manpower shortages. As another example, some Informants 
expressed the view that many of the overseas UPGC members 
*have their own axe to grinda (ISU01; ISU05), that their 
enthusiasm might be prompted by personal Interests: Chinese 
studies, Hong Kong connections and, after all, 'most of them 
get Into a more senior position back home after being a 
member of the Hong Kong UPGC" (ISU01). 
Nevertheless, these are mere fragmented *opinions' and 
did not motivate a serious pursuit of the model. 
Still another alternative is the organizational model. 
in educational policy-making, the organizational model tends 
to look into bureaucratic causes that lead to policy 
outcomes. Again some evidence emerged during the research 
that can explain one or two Incidents. 
The Education Commission proposed by the OECD panel, 
for example, was seen by the EXCO as an odd "cog in the 
existing policy-making machinery", as "cumbersome In 
operation" (see Chapter 5# 11.9). This can be explained as 
a matter of bureaucracy. The EXCO admits that *there Is no 
quarrel about the need for co-ordination" (Ibid. ), but this 
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goal is not supposed to be achieved in an overhaul of the 
existing machinery. It is the structure and not the function 
that is under consideration. 
At some point, even the UPGC was viewed as a 
bureaucracy. The OECD panel viewed the UPGC as "not a very 
imaginative lot*, a satisfied with the 3% growth rate" 
(se Chapter 4, IV-1.1). There were views that although the 
UPGC was not a bureaucracy, the UPGC Secretariat, and the 
Secretary In particular, held all the information and played 
the role of a key bureaucrat (ISU01b; ISU02; ISU05). 
The above discussion is to Illustrate that analyses of 
the Episodes using the two models do not deny other 
alternative explanations. However, the notion of legitimacy 
does seem to be a strong alternative to all conventional 
models. This is further elaborated In the next section. 
I. S. An Interim Summary 
Policy-making processes can be explained using multiple 
perspectives and among this a legitimacy notion emerge as an 
alternative to other conventional models. This legitimacy 
explanation 13 viable not only In the specific Episodes 
selected for this research. The discussions In this thesis 
have at least provided grounds to say that the notion of 
legitimacy as adopted In this study is worth pursuing. The 
rest of the chapter will therefore be devoted to further 
discussion of this notion of legitimacy. 
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II. Legitimacy as an Explanation 
Much is said about legitimacy In Chapter 3 and It Is 
not the intention here to repeat it. What follows are 
attempts to further elaborate the notion of legitimacy 
adopted in this study by comparing it with other relevant 
theories. Four-aspects will be discussed: (a) the notion of 
legitimacy adopted In this study as compared with other 
senses of legitimacy In the literature; (b) legitimacy as a 
kind of conflict; (c) the notion of legitimacy as placed in 
a framework of rationality and (d) legitimacy In educational 
policy-making in Hong Kong. 
II. I. fte Fifth Son&* of Legitimacy 
. 
To recall Is said In Chapter Three, there could be four 
senses of legitimacy as applied to education policy: the 
curriculum to legitimate the State (e. g. political 
education); the education system as an Instrument to 
legitimate the State (e. g. credentialism); a njustifted" 
process to legitimate the State; and a *Justified" process 
to legitimate education policies. 
The results of this study seem to add to the list a 
fifth sense of legitimacy: that Is, a ujustifiedo process 
for political actor to legitimate his own position as a 
policy-maker. This could be regarded as an extension of 
the third sense above. The political actor can be the State 
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or the government bureaucracy, but can also be any person or 
organization In the policy-making arena. 
When we apply the legitimacy model to the CRE episode, 
the tremendous effort spent to build the manpower model was 
not only meant to tackle manpower problems. Rather, It also 
provided the Government with the legitimacy to co-ordinate 
the fragmented policy-making machinery. Similarly, during 
the OECD episode, the invitation of overseas consultants, 
the subsequent 'political approach" (popular consultations)* 
the plenary sessions where all pressure groups attended, and 
so on were not necessarily meant to yield "good" or desired 
education policies, but to justify the Government as a 
legitimate open-minded policy-maker. 
It could be loosely argued that these exercises served 
to legitimate the State of which the government bureaucracy 
was a proxy. But this Is nothing new. 
What research results of this study strongly suggest Is 
that leq11JZggZ ll 021 gall 1bg 2202t1: a 21 IbI §Igll 2r6 Ift 
921MMIDIA kill 12 A StOlUl Millit 2f 22P12101 21 §11 221M. 
i1a 1121! 2M lb! Adiligrl k2dit! 2 1U 221121=MMIRSt. The 
following examples are retold to highlight this point. 
There Is little evidence that the UPGC refuted the 
Topley report on the grounds that they strongly disagreed 
with the recommendations. In fact* they endorse many of the 
recommendations afterwards. There are strong signs, however, 
that the UPGC did not think they could function In the way 
they worked (i. e. by the legitimacy of "judgement by 
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expertise" and by direct dialogues with the Governor) If 
they accepted manpower modelling as a basis for policy 
deliberations and submitted Itself to some government 
machinery). 
The OECD panel found difficulties in legitimating their 
mission as one of expertise, because most of the jobs that 
could possibly be carried out by a traditional expert (e. g. 
manpower calculations, students demands) were readily there; 
and more sophisticated deliberations would be prohibited 
either by the short time available or by the limitations In 
their competency. The only alternative left was then to 
carry out an "opinion survey" with the conceptual support of 
a "second" or "third generation" planning approach. 
In both cases, the legitimacy established by and for a 
new actor (the CRE; the OECD Panel) seriously affects the 
existing legitimate functioning of other actors (the UPGC; 
the "Government'). Conversely, the refusal to accept this 
legitimacy (the UPGC: rejection of the Topley Report; the 
Government reluctance to publich the OECD report) led to 
dramatic outcomes (the non-publication of the Topley Report; 
the delay of publishing the OECD Report and the LEGCO 
debate). 
11.2. Legitimacy Conflicts 
The conventional theories of a conflict often base 
their arguments on either value differences# Competing 
economic interests or contrasting political ideologies. All 
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these conflicts are visualised In conflicting policy 
alternativest or policy outputs. The results of tbil 112§1 
Itad 12 1299111 Mlbtl: Me of conflict: conJ1121 2f 
jj9jjImacX_ 3at actorts legitimacl 22219 gaftrmiu L -- -- ------ 
:! Q2jhtr'1. Jht 11gitima2Z ! 2gnf1j! 2t §jtftrj ftgM 1bg g1her 
M111211 in that the 22UL112t lies In the Lorocess and agj 
iht LoroLuel 21 22112Y. =&Aý1a9z 
The underlying explanations are: 
(a) Different actors in policy-making operate upon 
different kinds of legitimacy visualized in different forms. 
For example, other things being more or less equal, the CRE 
worked upon the legitimacy provided by manpower modelling; 
the UPGC on *Judgement by expertise*; HKTC on memployersP 
opinion survey* for assessing manpower needs; and the OECD 
panel on *participatory planning". 
(b) They are different because legitimacy is a matter 
of credibility, belief or culture. It has to do with the 
client of the policy-making. Different clients grant 
different kinds of legitimacy. The CRE was supposed to face 
the public; the UPGC was answerable only to the Governor; 
the HKTC was answerable to the Industralists in the training 
boards; and the OECD panel was to face peers in the 
international community of educational planning. 
(c) Hence* as a consequence of (b), the different kinds 
of legitimacy normally may not exist in the same arena. The 
UPGC, for example, might feel very comfortable with the 
legitimacy of "expert judgement* If they were only 
answerable to the Governor and were looking after a few 
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Institutions, but felt very uneasy when they were to face an 
open comprehensive planning to be scrutinized by the public. 
As one UPGC member expressed: 
Topley likes to be involved in public debates. When I 
was in Hong Kong or back In UK I never talked about the 
UPGC,... UPGC has always been working under a different 
kind of communication. We work behind the scene in 
strict confidentiality. I doubt if UPGC can go on with 
this kind of communication, under the same rules of 
confidentiality (ISU05). 
The HKTC, as another example, was quite happy with 
their "employers' opinions survey" to estimate manpower 
shortage, but were unprepared to participate in a game of 
comprehensive educational planning. One informant who was 
with the HKTC started his Interview by this remark: 
I have to make it clear from the very beginning that we 
never claim we are doing educational planning. The 
entire purpose of our manpower survey Is to forecast 
manpower shortage to serve the Industries. I repeatedly 
argued for this point during the Topley Committee, but 
no one seemed to understand. Therefore, our manpower 
survey was unfairly criticised QSVOI). 
The OECD reviews did not encounter similar difficulties 
elsewhere, because normally they dealt with only one 
specific area and did not normally interfere with the 
overall legitimacy in that country (the 1975 review of 
England and Wales could be a marginal exception, see OECD, 
1975 and Tenth Report, 1976). One informant remarked: 
OECD reviews were usually focussed on some specific 
area in education. For example, transition from 
education to work was the theme for the Australian 
review; compensatory education was the theme In the US 
review. The Hong Kong review was an overall one 
QSOR3). 
The legitimacy difficulty had in fact reinforced the 
participatory flavour of the OECD visit: 
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We tried to make the legitimacy as great as possible# 
and sometimes we even changed our original design. The 
plenary sessions, for example, were not in our original 
plan (ISOR4). 
Hence, the degree to which the OECD review undermined the 
existing government legitimacy was rather abnormal, as one 
of the Panel members admitted: 
The Hong Kong review has the special feature that the 
third party provided legitimacy for the popular group, 
but not for the government. This Is rather interest- 
ing (see Chapter 5,111.3.3). 
It could be said that legitimacy exists In each of the 
policy-advisory bodies as part of Its sub-culture. It Is an 
order of life that Its members feel comfortable with, a set 
of rules of the game that is recognised as "rational", and a 
matter of Integrity that makes its members feel offended 
when it is trespassed against. 
(d) Conflicts of legitimacy are more apparent when the 
different sub-cultures are to be co-ordinated or are 
required to co-operate, I. e. when the different actors have 
to face the same client, or work under the same rules of 
gable. 
The UPGC refused to follow the CRE formula or else they 
would have undermined their own legitimacy. The OECD panel 
did not commit themselves to the risky game of 'figure 
juggling" QSOR3) because after all they might find 
themselves less knowledgeable than the local experts. The 
OECD panel put the Government in trouble because they had 
established a new type of legitimacy through their 
Nparticipatory approache which was nonetheless popular. The 
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EXCO found the idea of an Education Commission unacceptable, 
because 
If the Commission were to direct the three bodies [i. e. 
UPGC, VTC and BoEl and were statutory, what would then 
be the position for EXCO (ISX04). 
(e) There is little evidence from the study that 
legitimacy in this sense is a matter of intention, let alone 
of conspiracy. The legitimacy for policy-making evolves over 
time as a sort of "sub-cultureo without being noticed. The 
policy actors did not start with the aim to gaining or 
defending legitimacy. They feel the need for legitimation 
only when there Is a crisis, that they cannot possibly 
assume their authority of policy-making unless their 
*formula" for making policies Is re-assured. This Is a kind 
of *second level' or whiddeno objective which does not 
exist naturally In the means-end paradigm. This Invites re- 
examination of the notion of rationality. 
11.3. Legitimacy as Rationality 
If the actors are after all *rational* In acquiring or 
defending their legitimacy, 13 the legitimacy model not just 
another version of the rational models? 
Let us briefly recall examples in the study for 
illustration. 
Suppose the legitimacy explanation stands. When 
manpower modelling and forecasting were employed In the CRE, 
the primary concern was not manpower supply and demand which 
was supposed to be the primary function of the process. The 
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concern was the legitimacy of co-ordination that Is provided 
by the impartiality, objectivity, science and so on of the 
process. Once the process is smoothly carried out, the 
actor feels satisfied because legitimacy Is achieved. There 
is a "second-level objective" which Is not visible in the 
primary function of the process. 
Again, suppose the legitimacy explanation stands. When 
extensive public consultation was conducted by the OECD 
panel In Its "participatory approach", the primary concern 
was not citizen participation which was supposed to be the 
primary function of consultation. The concern was in the 
legitimacy that the panel was Independent of the Government. 
Such a legitimacy was provided by the democratic flavour and 
participatory procedures in the process. What such a process 
would produce was not given much attention. There was again 
a osecond-level objective" that was not apparent In the 
primary function of the consultation processes. 
There are two Issues that merit attention. First, the 
notion of a "second-level objective* and second, the 
oprocess consciousness'. 
IZ. 3.1. "Socond-level objectives* 
The above examples suggests that the objective of the 
actors In a legitimacy model Is not the production of any 
preferred policy as Is In the case of substantive 
rationality or political rationality. They are not even 
aiming at second-best "satisfactory" policy solutions as Is 
the case in procedural rationality. They aim at the 
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acquisition or maintainence of legitimacy which is not 
visualized In the stated policy goals (e. g. manpower needs, 
social demand) nor In the primary function of the procedures 
(e. g. manpower modelling, citizen participation). 
Legitimacy per se is an objective. This objective of 
course serves higher level aims such as authority of a 
government or the status or Influence of an actor, but the 
primary objective during the policy-making process Is 
legitimacy. Whether the CRE wanted to co-ordinate the 
fragmented policy-making machinery, or to expand higher 
education, the concern during the policy-making process was 
to establish Its legitimacy of having a say in overall 
policies. The OECD panel In fact paid little attention to 
what was proposed In their report as a matter of education, 
nor was that the primary concern of the Government. 
We may re-define rationality to Include this 'second- 
level objective". Then, the legitimacy model can be re- 
named as "legitimacy rationality" and can be compared with 
the other three models defined In Chapter Three (See 1.7). 
Table 6.1 Obj*ctIves In the Models 
Substantive Rationality 
Procedural Rationality 
Partisan Rationality 
Legitimacy Rationality 
Concern 
during policy- 
making 
Policy output 
Policy prOCe33 
Policy output 
Policy proce3i 
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ZZ. 3.2. "Process consciousness* 
The above table also re-Iterates the point In Chapter 3 
that the three earlier rationality categories are all 
concerned with the policy output - to get an optimal 
solution or a satisfactory solution. They are all "output- 
conscious" or "goal-consciousm. 
In "legitimacy rationality", the actors are primarily 
oprocess-consciouso or "procedure-conscious*. 
If actors In the legitimacy model are "procedure- 
conscious", Is that not just another version of Simon's 
procedural rationality? The answer is no. The argument here 
is that although actors In procedural rationality attend to 
the process, their objective is to arrive at consensus in 
the process so as to produce some "satisfactory* policy 
output. In the legitimacy model, (a) the actors do not aim 
at consensus In the process and (b) In fact their primary 
aim is to acquire or maintain their preferred policy 
process. 
There are two dimensions: the concern of process and 
the consensus In process. 
In legitimacy rationality, the actors aim at acquiring 
and maintaining their respective forms of legitimacy, but do 
not aim at consensus among different actors. 
This brings us back to Table 3.1 In 1.7 of Chapter 
Three. In this model of legitimacy rationality, there 13 an 
opportunity that the actors may In fact agree in their final 
goals (e. g. both the UPGC and the CRE might like to expand 
349 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
higher education), but they cannot come to terms because of 
the conflict In legitimacy. This Is then a case of *goal 
consensus, process conflict". However, It has to be 
qualified Immediately that this is not always the case. 
Legitimacy conflicts do not automatically Imply goal 
consensus. 
The figure on the next page is an attempt to Include 
this legFitimacy rationality In a framework which also 
contains the three rationality models defined In Chapter 
Three. 
ZZ. 3.3. An interim summary 
The above discussions are an attempt to systematize the 
various models encountered during this study and to Identify 
the position of the legitimacy model. There are two 
significant points In the framework discussed. 
First, i. t reminds people of the process dimension of 
policy-making. The process Itself may independently 
influence the policy-making process. This can be regarded 
as an extension of Simon's procedural rationality to cases 
where there is no consensus in the process. 
Second, It reminds people that the substance of the 
policy produced may not always be the primary objective of 
the policy-maker. Legitimacy could well be the primary 
concern and this may again have prime Influence on the 
process as well as the result of policy-making. This can be 
regarded as an extension of Habermas* notion of legitimation 
to cases where the object of legitimation Is not only the 
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State . 
Figure 6.1 Models of Extended Rationality 
PROCESS 
CONSENSUS 
Procedural Substantive 
Rationality Rationality 
PROCESS ........................................ OUTPUT 
CONSCIOUS CONSCIOUS 
Legitimacy Partisan 
Rationality Rationality 
PROCESS 
CONFLICT 
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11.4. Legitimacy and the Government of Hong Kong 
It sounds appropriate to end this thesis with some 
remarks on the significance of the legitimacy concept In 
Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong is a British colony and 
(the] Governor Is the symbolic representative of the 
Queen's sovereignty over Hong Kong and exercises by 
delegation the powers of the royal prerogative (Miners, 
1986: 73) 
ZZ. 4.1. Legitimacy crisis 
That Hong Kong Is a colony and that the Governor is 
appointed by the Queen of Britain mean that there Is an In- 
built legitimacy crisis in the Hong Kong polity. 
As a rather developed capitalist society, there should 
be no doubt that Offe's contradiction of accumulation and 
distribution exists. However, if legitimacy Is regarded as 
a kind of belief, climate of opinion or culture, Offe*s 
contradiction Is not the main contributor to legitimation 
crisis In Hong Kong. Hong Kong has achieved in the past 
decades a very rapid economic growth. Distribution Is not so 
much a concern partly because of the corresponding expansion 
of social welfare, partly because of the cult for efficiency 
at the expense of equity, but more Importantly because of 
the contrasting economic and social failures exhibited by 
Mainland China next door during the Cultural Revolution. 
Hong Kong Is thus said to enjoy "prosperity and stability" 
and the citizens seem to accept the status quo. There 13 
little visible legitimacy problem In this respect. In fact 
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It could be argued that the Hong Kong Government has gained 
some "legitimacy surplus", because it Is seen as 'efficient" 
in Offe's terms (see Chapter 3,11.1.4. ). 
However, a legitimacy problem does arise because of 
the non-democratic polity. It was only In 1982 that elected 
District Boards were established and 1985 saw the first 
elected members in the LEGCO. Even then, decision-making In 
major policies were made only In the EXCO whose members were 
entirely appointed by the Governor and whose meetings were 
confidential. This non-democracy has been identified, 
particularly by the Intellectuals who are increasingly 
Influenced by Western Ideas, as a symbol of colonialism. 
Citizens In general still regard the situation as a case of 
"Chinese ruled by the British". 
Therefore, the Government Is always In a legitimacy 
deficit because It does not possess the necessary legitimacy 
which would otherwise be coming forth through election. In 
these circumstances, the Government has always been 
extremely careful to secure popular support in each and 
every step of policy-making. The situation Is very 
different from the case in a Western democracy where the 
administration is extremely keen at soliciting support 
before elections but can afford to neglect citizen support 
between elections. 
ZZ. 4.2. Expertise and consultation 
In general# expertise and consultation are the two 
major political means which the Government employ to secure 
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popular support or, in Habermas' notions, to compensate for 
the legitimacy deficit. This is not surprising, as the 
legitimating functions of expertise and consultation are 
well established (see Chapter Three), but these have 
particular significance In Hong Kong because they provide 
almost the only political means of acquiring legitimacy. 
In the Hong Kong context, expertise is provided by a 
sophisticated Information base and a team of competent 
experts. In education, such an information base and expert 
team contributed to the manpower deliberations during the 
CRE exercise and to the earlier exercises In 1977 and 1979 
(see Chapter One, 111.3.3. ). One may even date the use of 
such tactics back to 1964 when the Hong Kong Government was 
quick to. take up the Harbison and Myers model (1964)(see 
Chapter One, 111-3-1. ). The strong basis of Expertise has 
provided the Government with the impartiality which helps 
the Government to shake itself off any accusation of 
colonial bias, and Is particularly effective in a Chinese 
community which traditionally respects rationality more than 
democracy. Expertise Is more respectable In Hong Kong than 
it is elsewhere In a modern Western state. This may explain 
why Hong Kong has become ma planners' paradisem (see- 
Introductionp 2). 
Consultation plays an equally Important role. In the 
colonial context# the general mentality Is still Intrinsic- 
ally anti-government. Consultation Improves communication 
between the Government and the citizens and very often the 
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latter feel satisfied at being heard. Consultation also 
provides the Government with a kind of "feedforward" which 
makes the Government feel more confident in promulgating or 
implementing policies. As is mentioned In Chapter One, 
consultation In education is extensive. This Is a general 
policy across all sectors of public administration. Without 
such consultations the Government lack the means to 
demonstrate that it Is representing and not oppressing the 
people. This explains the over 360 official advisory bodies 
established by the Hong Kong Government. 
Third-party consultation, which Is a mix of expertise 
and consultation (see Chapter Three, 11.4.4. ), is used quite 
often by the Hong Kong Government, particularly in the area 
of education. As mentioned earlier in Chapter One (111.2), 
the T. K. Ann Commission and the Rayson Huang Committee proved 
effective in placing the Governor In an Impartial position 
and placing the government bureaucracy and citizens on an 
equal footing. The large proportion of overseas membership 
in the UPGC Is a type of standing thIrd-party consultation. 
Without such membership, the Government would always be In 
embarassmnent when It faces competing demand from the 
different institutions. Given all these, the invitation of 
Peter Williams to the CRE and the conduct of the OECD review 
were part of this tradition. The participation of overseas 
consultants In policy deliberation can easily be regarded 
elsewhere as an Infringement of sovereignty, but has become 
a credit to the legitimacy of the Hong Kong Government. 
Expertise and consultation hence have their special 
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functions In Hong Kong. They serve to legitimate a 
Government which is not created by election. 
What the research findings strongly hint at Is that the 
acquisition of legitimacy through expertise and consultation 
has developed Into a culture which concerns not only the 
Government. In this case, expertise and public opinion 
serve as the major means by which political actors in Hong 
Kong seek to legitimate themselves. When policy actors are 
not representatives elected by their constituencies, when 
they are appointed by a government which lacks legal means 
to legitimate Itself, what can serve better than expertise 
and public opinion as admission tickets to the club of 
policy-making. This underlies the legitimacy lessons told 
by the two Episodes in this study. 
rr. 4.3. Looking ahead 
Howeverp the polity in Hong Kong Is changing. 1985 saw 
the first elected members In the LEGCO. When votes at an 
election have become essential means of legitimacy 
acquisition, the role of expertise and consultation becomes 
subtle. 
The future of expertise and consultation may not be 
optimistic. The respect for expertise and consultation has 
been possible only because "Hong Kong is a virtual 
autocracy' (Griffiths, 1984: 547). The Government was obliged 
to rely on these for legitimacy. "The result Is a wholly 
undemocratic but exceptionally receptive management systemo 
(Ibid. ). The change of legitimacy may Increase the emphasis 
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on political powers and reduce the reliance on *rational" 
and impartial expertise or day-to-day consultation. The 
change in legitimacy is prompted by a process of 
democratization,. but may reduce the receptiveness of the 
Government to its client citizens. Just at the moment when 
this thesis is being finished, one elected LEGCO member 
(incidentally an educator) has proposed a reduction of the 
number of consultative committees. This Is by no means 
surprising. For an elected member, his legitimacy does not 
come from consultative committees which to him are 
ustructurally clumsy" (Ming Po Daily, December 29,1986). 
These are mere speculations, but are nevertheless not 
totally unrealistic In the light of the findings of this 
study. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
As is mentioned at the beginning, the study does not 
seek to solve policy problems and is unlikely to be ever on 
the policy agenda. The concept of legitimacy In explaining 
policy-making processes proves to be a worthwhile hypothesis 
and lends itself to further research and theory building. To 
the writer, the concept of legitimacy was "felt" rather than 
Othought outo during the ethnographic research. Those who 
are not In the same position may not share the same feeling. 
However, legitimacy as an alternative explanation will 
certainly help to achieve a better understanding of the 
policy-making process. 
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When I started the Ph. D. programme In October, 1983, my 
desire was to understand the role of technical planning in 
policy-making. However, the study has enabled me to tour a 
number of unexpected territories: policy studies, state 
theory and research methodology. Of these, some areas have 
particularly Impressed me: Claus Offe's discussion of 
legitimacy, Herbert Simon's cla331fIcat1n of rationality, 
Graham Allison's multiple perspective approach, Carol 
Weiss's notion of enlightenment, and various writers on 
ethnographic research. 
It is a real learning process. The end product of this 
process is not so much a claim of mastery of any particular 
discipline, but rather, an opening of my mind to the 
splendid spectrum of perspectives and a deviation from 
monolithic interpretation of the social world. Such an 
opening and a deviation, I am convinced, are essential to 
both Hong Kong and China. 
At this moment when this thesis is being finished, what 
comes to my mind is what I wrote at the back of my M. Ed. 
dissertation. It Is the Chinese saying, now with a 
different# perhaps better, translation: 
OLearn and you'll discover your poverty In knowledge". 
Much is yet to be learnt. Let this Thesis mark another 
starting point. 
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